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Abstract 
Four alternative macroeconomic scenarios for southern Mediterranean countries are quantified in this study 
with the use of GEM-E3, a general equilibrium model. These are i) the continuation of current policies 
(business-as-usual scenario), ii) southern Mediterranean–EU cooperation (Euro-Mediterranean Union 
scenario), iii) a global opening of the southern Mediterranean countries and cooperation with the rest of the 
Middle East and other developing countries like China (Euro-Mediterranean alliance scenario), and iv) a 
deterioration in the regional political climate and a failure of cooperation (Euro-Mediterranean under threat 
scenario). Explicit assumptions on trade integration, infrastructure upgrade, population and governance 
developments are adopted in each scenario. The simulation results indicate that an infrastructure upgrade and 
governance improvements in the context of southern Mediterranean–EU cooperation could benefit most of the 
countries under consideration. The analysis remains important in light of ongoing regional developments and 
the need to design the best policies to pursue in the aftermath of the Arab spring. 
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1. Introduction 
This report documents the work completed for Work Package 8 on “Scenario building and impact 
assessment” of the MEDPRO project. The goal of Work Package 8 is to simulate alternative 
scenarios of economic development for the Euro-Mediterranean region based on varying 
approaches to cooperation policy. The research work for this purpose has included extensive data 
collection, model calibration and scenario construction using the GEM-E3-MEDPRO model, a 
computable general equilibrium model derived from the standard GEM-E3 model and extended for 
the MEDPRO project. The scenarios simulate the implementation of policies associated with i) 
Euro-Mediterranean cooperation (referred to as QII); ii) the development of a global policy by the 
southern and eastern Mediterranean countries (SEMCs), i.e. opening up and cooperating with the 
rest of the Middle East and other developing countries like China (QIII); and iii) a deterioration of 
the political climate in the region (QIV). The scenarios are compared with the reference scenario 
(QI), which assumes a continuation of current policies in the Euro-Mediterranean area. 
The definition of the scenarios follows the general framework developed by Ayadi and Sessa (2011) 
concerning alternative future scenarios for the Euro-Mediterranean region. The quantified 
projections focus on ten countries: Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, the 
Palestinian Autonomy, Syria and Tunisia, often referred to as ‘southern Mediterranean’ neighbours, 
plus Turkey. With the exception of Turkey, the rest of the SEMCs participate in the Barcelona 
Process and the European Neighbourhood Policy. Turkey, while not included in the Barcelona 
Process or the European Neighbourhood Policy, attracts special attention because of its negotiations 
for EU membership.  
The remainder of the report develops as follows: section 2 discusses the main features of the GEM-
E3-MEDPRO model. Section 3 discusses the theoretical underpinning of the alternative scenarios of 
Euro-Mediterranean policies. Section 4 summarises the simulation results for the QI–QIV scenarios. 
Section 5 summarises the results of the sensitivity analysis performed. The last section attempts to 
draw conclusions and useful policy implications. 
2. Main features of the GEM-E3-MEDPRO model 
The alternative scenarios are quantified with the use of the GEM-E3-MEDPRO model.1 The GEM-
E3-MEDPRO is an applied general equilibrium model that provides details on the macroeconomy 
                                                   
1 The GEM-E3-MEDPRO model is a version of the GEM-E3 model. GEM-E3 is the result of a collaborative 
effort in the 1990s by a consortium involving the National Technical University of Athens, the Catholic 
University of Leuven (Centre for Economic Studies), the University of Mannheim and the Centre for 
European Economic Research (ZEW) as the core modelling team. Since the initial model version, E3MLab 
and other contributors have extended the model in various directions, including the development of model 
versions suitable for analysing growth, market reforms (e.g. the EU internal market) and structural policies. 
The model has been extensively used in a series of studies completed for the European Commission and in 
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and its key sectors for each individual country. It is an applied, large-scale model, formulated 
entirely in structural form. The model computes the equilibrium prices of goods, services, labour 
and capital that simultaneously clear all markets under the Walras law.2 GEM-E3-MEDPRO is 
dynamic, recursive over time, and involves the dynamics of capital accumulation and technology 
progress, stock and flow relationships and backward-looking expectations. 
The GEM-E3-MEDPRO model has a worldwide coverage. It is a multi-country model that treats 
each country separately and links countries through the endogenous trade of goods and services. 
The model includes multiple industrial sectors and economic agents, allowing the consistent 
evaluation of the distributional effects of policies. The version employed for the MEDPRO project 
considers 19 countries/regions and 23 economic activities. The sector-specific and regional 
disaggregation of the model is presented in Table 1 and Table 2 respectively. The model is 
specifically designed to simulate economic development by sector, as influenced by investment in 
infrastructure and human capital, risk perception, population developments and trade liberalisation. 
The model covers the major aspects of public finance, including all substantial taxes, social policy 
subsidies, public expenditures and deficit financing. The GEM-E3-MEDPRO model is solved for 
the period 2010 to 2030 following five-year time steps. The model is calibrated on the GTAP v.8 
database3 (with 2007 as the base year) and extended to separately represent all the SEMCs. In the 
GTAP database, most of the SEMCs are grouped into regions. Additional data from various 
statistical sources were collected to complement the GTAP database and build detailed social 
accounting, bilateral trade, consumption and investment matrices for each of the SEMCs.4 The 
statistical sources used to construct the database include the scholarly literature, international 
financial institutions, national statistical offices, etc. The data collection revealed significant data 
scarcity and lack of consistency in terms of the data matrices on social accounts. This problem was 
encountered for most of the SEMCs.  
Table 1. GEM-E3-MEDPRO sectoral coverage 
No. Sector No. Sector 
1 Agriculture 13 Transport equipment 
2 Animal products 14 Consumer goods industries – Food 
3 Coal 15 Consumer goods industries – Rest 
4 Crude oil 16 Textiles and clothing 
5 Oil refining 17 Construction 
6 Natural gas extraction 18 Transport 
7 Gas distribution 19 Communication 
8 Transmission and distribution of electricity 20 Business – Financial services 
9 Water 21 Public services 
10 Chemical products 22 Recreational and other services 
11 Other energy-intensive 23 Dwellings 
12 Electric goods – Other equipment goods     
                                                                                                                                                           
several research projects (http://www.e3mlab.ntua.gr/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&id 
=36%3Agem-e3&Itemid=71&layout=default&lang=en and http://ipts.jrc.ec.europa.eu/activities/energy-and-
transport/gem-e3/). 
2 The model follows a general equilibrium approach. 
3 See the Global Trade Analysis Project (https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/). The selection of the base year 
is based on the latest year for which a fully complete detailed database is available for each of the 
countries/regions included in the model. 
4 For a detailed analysis on the construction of the model database and on the development of the reference 
scenario, see Paroussos et al. (2013a) and Paroussos et al. (2013b) respectively.  
MACROECONOMIC SCENARIOS FOR THE EURO-MED AREA QUANTIFIED USING THE GEM-E3 MODEL | 3 
 
Table 2. GEM-E3-MEDPRO regional aggregation 
Country/Region  Code Country/Region  Code 
Algeria DZA Turkey TUR 
Egypt EGY EU-10 countries a) R15 
Israel ISR New EU member states b) NEU 
Jordan JOR Southern EU member states c) EUS 
Lebanon LBN Emerging Asian economies d) EAE 
Libya LBY Rest of the OECD countries e) ROECD 
Morocco MAR Rest of the emerging economies f) REE 
Palestine PAL Rest of the Middle East g) (the Gulf region) ME 
Syria SYR Rest of the world  ROW 
Tunisia TUN   
a) Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Sweden and the UK 
b) Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Romania 
c) Cyprus, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Portugal and Spain 
d) China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam and India 
e) Australia, New Zealand, the Rest of Oceania, Japan, Korea Republic, Canada, the US, the Rest of North 
America, Switzerland, Norway and the Rest of EFTA 
f) Mexico, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Venezuela, Albania, Belarus, Croatia, Russian Federation, Ukraine, the 
Rest of Eastern Europe, the Rest of Europe, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Rest of the Former Soviet Union, 
Azerbaijan and Georgia 
g) Armenia, Bahrain, Iran Islamic Republic, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, 
Yemen and Iraq 
Extensive work has been carried out to estimate the missing data and to render the data matrices 
consistent. Different balancing methods (including RAS and cross-entropy methods) have been 
used in this process. For estimating the missing data, a variety of alternative information sources 
have been employed and analogies derived based on countries for which data existed. Once the 
consistent data matrices covering the entire requirements of the model were constructed, the model 
was calibrated and used for the simulation of the reference and the alternative scenarios.  
3. The alternative scenarios of Euro-Mediterranean policies 
3.1 Overview 
The countries in the southern Mediterranean area will have to cope with significant challenges over 
the coming decades. These involve economic reforms, trade liberalisation, infrastructure, 
enhancements of human capital and improved governance. The southern Mediterranean region is of 
strategic importance to the EU in both economic and political terms. In the 1995 meeting in 
Barcelona, the EU explicitly committed itself to promoting Euro-Mediterranean political and 
economic cooperation. At the summit in Paris on 13 July 2008, the EU member states, candidate 
countries and partner countries in the Mediterranean area decided to upgrade the Barcelona Process 
and to create the Union for the Mediterranean.5  
 
                                                   
5See “Paris Summit for the Mediterranean”, July 2008 (http://www.eu2008.fr/PFUE/lang/en/accueil/PFUE-
07_2008/PFUE-13.07.2008/sommet_de_paris_pour_la_mediterranee_4758.html). 
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The qualitative scenarios for the Euro-Mediterranean region developed by Ayadi and Sessa (2011) 
have formulated the theoretical underpinning for the quantitative scenarios simulated with the 
GEM-E3-MEDPRO model. Ayadi and Sessa (2011) defined a set of qualitative scenarios of Euro-
Mediterranean policies by looking at several core determinants of Euro-Mediterranean growth and 
cooperation and by taking into consideration the recent turmoil in the Arab countries. The scenarios 
develop along two core dimensions: EU–MED cooperation and sustainable development (Figure 1).  
Figure 1. Alternative scenarios quantified for the MEDPRO project 
 
Source: Ayadi and Sessa (2011). 
Four different scenarios of the Euro-Mediterranean policies have been defined:  
1) The reference scenario (quadrant I, Figure 1) assumes that the Euro-Mediterranean policies in 
place and the present state of affairs continue without any substantial change up to 2030.  
2) In the scenario of “sustainable development of an enlarged ‘EU–MED’ union” (see quadrant 
II, Figure 1), the Euro-Mediterranean countries join an integrated economic area, with a 
common market and institutions in place that advance cooperation, including migration, 
trade, investment and governance. Governance improvements are assumed to reduce the risks 
associated with the SEMCs. The scheme follows the common trade model of the European 
Community. Enlargement to include the SEMCs is a scenario in which the countries in the 
region exploit their complementarities and achieve a stable economic environment, attractive 
for investment. EU–SEMC cooperation is assumed to lead to an upgrade in the infrastructure 
and an enhancement of human capital in the SEMC region. The main bulk of infrastructure 
and human capital investment is assumed to be undertaken by the SEMCs. The EU is 
assumed to contribute to infrastructure investment but to a lesser extent. Investment is 
assumed to influence productivity and facilitate the trade integration of the SEMCs. In 
addition, EU–SEMC cooperation is assumed to influence social norms and health standards 
affecting the demographic developments in the region. 
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3) The scenario of “sustainable co-development of the EU and Mediterranean sub-regions” (see 
quadrant III, Figure 1) does not include integration of the SEMCs 6  into the European 
Economic Area. In this scenario, the SEMCs are assumed to form a common market, to 
develop global policies and to proceed with trade integration with other regions in the world, 
notably the Middle East and certain Asian countries, such as China and India. Cooperation 
with the Middle Eastern and Asian countries will also lead to infrastructure upgrading and 
human capital investment in the SEMCs. The expenditures will be mainly undertaken by the 
SEMCs, but additional funding will flow from other Middle Eastern and Asian countries.  
4) The pessimistic outlook for development, described by the scenario of the “Euro-
Mediterranean area under threats” (see quadrant IV, Figure 1), envisages the possibility of an 
escalation in regional conflicts. Sporadic conflicts in the region are assumed to persist and 
spread from one country to another, leading to increased political uncertainties, economic 
strains and social difficulties. In this scenario, the absence of cooperating authorities is 
expected to undermine the capacity of the EU and other major geopolitical actors to achieve 
the necessary cooperation in key economic sectors. In this scenario, conflicts are assumed to 
affect demographic developments, to halt the trade integration of the SEMCs with the EU and 
other countries/regions in the world, to lead to the dilapidation of infrastructure and of capital 
stock in the region, to a deterioration of governance and an increase of the investment risks 
associated with the latter. 
The E3MLab team has simulated several versions of the quantitative scenarios that have been 
defined based on the work of Ayadi and Sessa (2011). For the purposes of sensitivity analysis, an 
additional scenario simulates a more sustainable growth path for the SEMCs, in which structural 
changes are financed without increases in the countries’ current account deficits. Another 
alternative scenario simulates the “optimal” pathway regarding GDP growth and employment for 
the SEMCs, beyond the scenarios proposed by Ayadi and Sessa (2011). This latter scenario 
(henceforth Q*) is designed and simulated after the quantification of the QII and QIII scenarios. Its 
design is based on a combination of the best policies already included in the QII and QIII scenarios.  
3.2 Main assumptions 
As noted above, the scenario of sustainable development of an enlarged EU–MED union depicted in 
quadrant II, Figure 1 (henceforth scenario QII) assumes that EU–SEMC cooperation will improve 
significantly compared with the reference scenario. In the scenario of sustainable co-development of 
the EU and Mediterranean sub-regions depicted in quadrant QIII, Figure 1 (henceforth, scenario 
QIII) the SEMCs are assumed to increase the cooperation among themselves as well as with other 
countries in the Middle East and the rest of the world (mainly Asian economies, including China) 
compared with the reference scenario. In the scenario of the Euro-Mediterranean area under threat 
depicted in quadrant IV, Figure 1 (henceforth, scenario QIV) a future with persisting tensions in the 
Mediterranean and failure of the EU–SEMC area and the SEMCs to integrate and cooperate is 
assumed.  
The quantification of the above alternative scenarios has incorporated explicit assumptions about 
the following aspects:  
i) population and labour force, 
ii) investment in infrastructure and human capital, 
iii) governance and risk, and  
iv) trade liberalisation in the SEMC region. 
                                                   
6 Turkey is not assumed to be part of the EU in 2030. 
6 | PAROUSSOS, FRAGKIADAKIS, CHARALAMPIDIS, TSANI & CAPROS 
 
The assumptions and their quantification in each of the alternative scenarios are based on the work 
and the inputs provided by the rest of the MEDPRO project partners (discussed in detail below). 
The following subsections summarise the assumptions employed for the quantification of the 
alternative scenarios. 
3.2.1 Population and labour force 
Population data have been extracted from the International Labour Statistics database of the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) and the World Bank database.7 Projections regarding the 
EU countries have been extracted from the 2012 Ageing Report prepared by the European 
Commission (2011). For the rest of the model countries (excluding the SEMCs), the projections 
provided by the ILO up to 2020 have been employed. For the period 2020–30, the trends of the 
2015–20 projection period are assumed to continue. For the SEMCs, the estimations of population 
growth for the period 2015–30 have been based on the population projections provided by 
Groenewold et al. (2011). These were built on the qualitative analysis of Ayadi and Sessa (2011) 
and were developed under four alternative demographic scenarios (S1–S4) up to the year 2050 for 
each of the SEMCs.  
For the QI scenario, the population projections of scenario S1 have been used. This scenario 
describes a demographic future in which past trends are extrapolated. The assumptions underlying 
the S1 demographic projections state that the EU and the SEMCs fail to upgrade their partial and ad 
hoc style of cooperation to a coherent framework of action and collaboration on key political, 
security, economic, socio-cultural and environmental issues. In this scenario, the net migration rates 
observed over the period 2005–10 for individual countries are assumed to remain constant for the 
whole projection period. An exception are the rates for the period 2010–15, for which it is assumed 
that for some countries emigration numbers will be higher as a result of the political turmoil and 
insecurity in a number of countries in 2011.  
The S1 scenario assumes that the EU continues imposing severe restrictions to legal immigration. It 
is assumed that refugee stocks will not alter significantly. The presence of refugees (e.g. Iraqi 
refugees in Jordan) is assumed to put pressure on available national (health, housing) resources and 
the ecosystem, and this may, directly or indirectly, impinge on the health conditions of nationals. 
The presence of large refugee stocks may affect labour (im)migration flows, as refugees, for their 
survival, will try to compete in the local labour market, with or without work permits.  
The observed decline of fertility rates in most countries is assumed to continue and eventually 
remain at constant levels, i.e. at replacement level. This means that women, on average, give birth 
to 2.1 children during their reproductive life. Improvements and a levelling-off of changes in life 
expectancies are expected to continue in the SEMCs. The recorded differentials among countries 
regarding life expectancies are also assumed to continue in the future.  
Data and projections on the active population and participation rates have been extracted from the 
ILO database. For the SEMCs, it is assumed that the growth of the active population follows the 
growth rates of the population group aged 15-64 over the period 2010–30 as documented in the 
work of Groenewold et al. (2011). The QI scenario assumptions on population and active 
population are presented in Table 3. 
 
 
 
                                                   
7 See the websites of the ILO (http://laborsta.ilo.org/default.html) and World Bank (http://DataBank.World 
Bank.org/ddp/home.do). 
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Table 3. Population and active population in the QI scenario 
Country Population Active population (15-64) 
  Million 
persons 
(2010) 
Million 
persons 
(2030) 
Annual 
% growth 
rate 
(2010–30) 
Million 
persons 
(2010) 
Million 
persons 
(2030) 
Annual % 
growth 
rate  
(2010–30) 
Algeria 35.5 45.3 1.23 24.2 31.0 1.24 
Egypt 81.1 109.3 1.50 51.5 70.8 1.61 
Israel 7.6 9.9 1.30 4.8 6.1 1.29 
Jordan 6.0 9.0 1.98 3.5 5.8 2.46 
Lebanon 4.2 4.9 0.69 2.9 3.3 0.77 
Libya 6.4 8.0 1.19 4.1 5.5 1.41 
Morocco 32.0 38.7 0.97 21.2 25.9 0.99 
Palestine 4.2 7.4 2.91 2.3 4.3 3.19 
Syria 20.4 29.7 1.89 12.1 18.9 2.25 
Tunisia 10.5 12.4 0.81 7.3 8.4 0.70 
Turkey 72.8 87.7 0.94 49.2 59.6 0.96 
SEMCs 280.7 362.3 1.28 183.2 239.6 1.35 
Rest of the Arab world 176.6 225.9 1.24 116.1 149.7 1.28 
EU-27 502.1 522.2 0.19 336.6 319.4 -0.27 
Emerging Asian economies 3,092.6 3,619.1 0.79 2114.1 2,471.2 0.78 
Rest of the world 3,232.5 4,184.1 1.25 2,031.0 2,620.3 1.97 
World 7,284.6 8,913.7 1.03 4,781.0 5,800.2 1.30 
Sources: Authors’ estimations based on ILO, European Commission (2011) and Groenewold et al. (2011) data 
and projections. 
Following Groenewold et al. (2011), in the QII scenario it is assumed that the net migration 
volumes of the SEMCs will increase, while in the QIII scenario migration levels will be the same as 
those in QI. Fertility is assumed to decline but at higher rates in the QII scenario than in the QIII 
scenario. Family norms and values are assumed to remain intact in the QIII scenario, leading to 
fertility rates that are higher than in the QII scenario. Life expectancy in QIII is assumed to be 
higher than in QII (Table 4). Annual increases in life expectancies in the SEMCs are assumed to be 
somewhat higher in the QIII scenario than in the QII scenario. In the QIII scenario, it is assumed 
that a Pan-Arab identity is cultivated with a common set of norms, values and legal rights that are 
somewhat distinct from those maintained in the EU.  
In scenario QIV, it is assumed that high emigration from and low immigration to the SEMCs is 
recorded. Net migration numbers are assumed to hover at very high and negative numbers, as 
emigrants are assumed to outnumber immigrants. The decline in fertility is assumed to be slow. A 
similar trend is assumed for mortality levels, as improvements in life expectancies are the lowest of 
all four alternative scenarios.  
The deteriorating economies are assumed to result in poorer health services, including availability 
and access to family planning services. The net effect of macro-level economic and political 
developments is assumed to lead fertility levels to increase in most countries to levels observed in 
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the 1990s. Macroeconomic hardships are assumed to lead to higher maternal mortality rates and 
higher infant mortality rates, leading to life expectancies that hardly increase.8 
Table 4. Assumptions used for demographic projections in the alternative scenarios 
  QI QII QIII QIV 
Total fertility rate(*) 2.1 1.5 1.8 2.4 
Mortality(**) 0.12 0.18 0.25 0.06 
Migration  
2010–15 UN projections(***) Same as QI Same as QI Same as QI 
2015–20 UN projections Twice the QI QI High migration 
2020–30 UN projections As 2010–15 Zero balance High migration 
* Total fertility rates assumed to be reached by 2050  
** Life expectancy increase (in years) per calendar year  
*** Official UN projections were increased because of recent political changes  
Source: Authors’ notes based on Groenewold et al. (2011). 
Table 5 presents the active population estimated for each scenario. In the QII scenario, the 
combined effect of lower fertility rates and increased migration results in the active population in 
the SEMC region being smaller compared with QI by 930,000 persons in 2030. In the QIII scenario, 
the SEMC active population is estimated to stand higher by 1,500,000 persons in 2030 compared 
with the QI scenario. In the QIV scenario, the total active population of the SEMCs in 2030 is 
estimated to be smaller in comparison with QI by 10,400,000 in 2030.9  
Table 5. Active population projections in scenarios QII–QIV 
 Active population (15-64) 
 QII QIII QIV 
 Annual % 
growth rate 
(2010–30) 
Difference 
from QI 
Annual % 
growth rate 
(2010–30) 
Difference 
from QI 
Annual % 
growth rate 
(2010–30) 
Difference 
from QI 
Algeria 1.20 -0.04 1.26 0.02 1.03 -0.21 
Egypt 1.59 -0.02 1.64 0.03 1.47 -0.15 
Israel 1.78 0.50 1.51 0.22 0.22 -1.06 
Jordan 2.42 -0.04 2.51 0.05 1.71 -0.75 
Lebanon 1.56 0.79 1.25 0.47 -0.24 -1.02 
Libya 1.06 -0.35 1.27 -0.14 0.70 -0.71 
Morocco 0.85 -0.15 1.03 0.03 0.84 -0.15 
Palestine 3.15 -0.04 3.21 0.02 2.37 -0.82 
Syria 2.16 -0.09 2.24 -0.01 1.93 -0.32 
Tunisia 0.64 -0.06 0.71 0.01 0.40 -0.30 
Turkey 0.96 0.00 0.98 0.02 0.88 -0.08 
SEMCs 1.33 -0.02 1.38 0.03 1.13 -0.22 
Source: Authors’ estimations based on Groenewold et al. (2011). 
                                                   
8 In summary, in QI the population changes are assumed to follow current trends, in QII the population is 
assumed to marginally fall in the SEMCs, in QIII the population marginally increases while in QIV the 
population is assumed to fall in the SEMCs. 
9  These figures are the authors’ estimations based on based on ILO, European Commission (2011) and 
Groenewold et al. (2011) data and projections. 
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The GEM-E3-MEDPRO model uses as an input the projection of the total labour force by country. 
The ILO (2010) participation rates were used to estimate the labour force for the QI scenario. For 
the QII–QIV scenarios, the assumptions on participation rates were based on Blanc (2012)10 and 
Tsani et al. (2012). According to Blanc (2012), the cooperation of the SEMCs with the EU in the 
QII scenario is expected to increase labour participation rates in the SEMCs due to increased rates 
of female participation in the labour force.  
Tsani et al. (2012) have estimated that removing the region-specific barriers to female participation 
in the labour force in the SEMCs would increase female labour participation rates by 5%. In the QII 
scenario, it is assumed that region-specific barriers are removed as a result of partnership between 
the EU and SEMCs, and hence the female participation rates in the labour force in each of the 
SEMCs increase as suggested by Tsani et al. (2012). In the QIII scenario, these rates are assumed to 
increase in the SEMCs, but at lower rates than in QII. In the QIII scenario, region-specific barriers 
to female participation in the labour force are assumed to be partially lowered. Thus in the QIII 
scenario, the rate of increase in female labour force participation in the SEMCs is moderated to 1% 
above the QI scenario. The projections of the labour force used in each scenario are represented in 
Table 6. 
Table 6. Projections of the labour force and labour force growth rate in scenarios QI–QIV 
 2010 % Annual growth rate (2010–30) 
  (m. persons) QI QII QIII QIV 
Algeria 11.20 1.46 1.64 1.50 1.43 
Egypt 27.10 2.07 2.09 2.08 2.04 
Israel 3.18 1.83 1.87 1.95 1.36 
Jordan 1.55 2.74 2.86 2.77 2.61 
Lebanon 1.45 1.29 1.32 1.42 1.05 
Libya 2.38 1.54 1.56 1.51 1.36 
Morocco 11.39 1.39 1.43 1.41 1.35 
Palestine 0.97 3.49 3.53 3.50 3.35 
Syria 5.46 2.80 2.89 2.81 2.75 
Tunisia 3.83 1.29 1.34 1.30 1.21 
Turkey 26.52 1.38 1.40 1.39 1.36 
SEMCs 95.03 1.75 1.80 1.77 1.69 
Rest of the Middle East 59.78 2.49 2.49 2.55 2.49 
EU-27 243.66 -0.10 -0.07 -0.10 -0.10 
Emerging Asian economies 1,538.11 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 
Rest of the World 1,495.77 1.36 1.36 1.36 1.36 
World 3,432.35 1.049 1.051 1.050 1.047 
Source: Authors’ estimations based on Groenewold et al. (2011). 
3.2.2 Investment in infrastructure and human capital 
The SEMCs score relatively low in terms of infrastructure. According to the World Economic 
Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 2011-2012 (Schwab, 2011), with the exception of Israel 
(which ranks 33rd), no SEMC is ranked in the top 40 countries based on the available stock and 
quality of infrastructure (Figure 2). A growing amount of empirical literature debates the 
                                                   
10 Derived from an unpublished MEDPRO mimeo, which the authors can make available upon request. 
10 | PAROUSSOS, FRAGKIADAKIS, CHARALAMPIDIS, TSANI & CAPROS 
 
importance of infrastructure to economic growth (Box 1). Investment in infrastructure in the SEMC 
region is expected to have a triple effect: i) the first is associated with the financing of infrastructure 
projects, ii) the second is associated with the changes in the productivity of the country undertaking 
the investment in infrastructure and iii) the third is associated with the direct economic multiplier 
effect from producing the equipment and services required to build the infrastructure.11 
Figure 2. Global infrastructure rankings 
 
Source: GeoCurrents (http://geocurrents.info/economic-geography/problems-with-global-infrastructure-
rankings). 
For the quantification of the assumptions on infrastructure, five alternative aspects of infrastructure 
are considered: i) transport, ii) water and sanitation, iii) telecommunications, iv) electricity and v) 
human capital. The existing infrastructure assets of the SEMCs are measured using the indicators 
presented in Table 7. For each scenario, different assumptions are made about the development of 
each index for each SEMC. These assumptions are based on detailed studies performed under each 
MEDPRO Work Package (see below) and completed with an additional survey of the literature. In 
each scenario simulated, it is assumed that the financing of infrastructure projects is partly sourced 
from national funds and partly from foreign aid. SEMCs would raise a VAT-type tax to collect the 
necessary funds to finance the investment in infrastructure. 
 
 
                                                   
11 The multiplier effect refers to the increase in final income arising from any new injection of spending. 
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Box 1. Infrastructure and economic growth 
The relationship between infrastructure and economic growth has been studied extensively in the 
literature. Indicative is the work of Hirschman (1958), Arrow and Kurz (1970), Judd (1987), Aschauer 
(1989), Barro (1990), King and Rebelo (1990), Baxter and King (1993), Canning and Fay (1993), 
Glomm and Ravikumar (1994), Gramlich (1994), Hulten (1996), Kessides (1996), Cohen and Paul 
(2004), Teruel and Kuroda (2005), Romp and de Haan (2005) and Cadot et al. (2006). The World Bank's 
World Development Report (1994) and Jimenez (1995) provide surveys of why infrastructure is 
important to economic development and evaluate empirical results estimating the contribution of public 
capital and infrastructure to growth. All of the later works explore and identify a positive relationship 
between investment in infrastructure and factor productivity. This positive association varies in 
magnitude depending on the stock of infrastructure available in each country, on the utilisation to which 
infrastructure is subject as well as on the type of infrastructure under consideration (roads, 
telecommunications, water and sanitation, etc.). Aschauer (1989; 2000) identifies the presence of large 
returns to public capital using US data, while Canning et al. (1992) and Canning and Perotti (1994) 
estimate large growth effects of physical infrastructure. Easterly and Rebelo (1993) find that public 
investment in transport and communication is consistently correlated with economic growth. 
Demetriades and Mamuneas (2000) analyse 12 OECD countries and find that public infrastructure 
capital has positive long-run effects on activity. Calderon and Serven (2008) and Calderon (2009) 
analyse the impact of infrastructure on economic performance of African countries. They find that 
infrastructure is positively and significantly related to real GDP per capita growth. Loayza and Odawara 
(2010) analyses the effects of infrastructure in Egypt by examining the major sectors of infrastructure, 
including electricity generation, transportation, telecommunication, and water and sanitation. They find 
that “an increase in infrastructure expenditure of 1 percentage point of GDP would lead to a net present 
value gain of 6 percentage points of per capita GDP for the first 25 years of implementation and 10.5 
percentage points of per capita GDP for the first 50 years”.  
Alternative explanations of the relationship between infrastructure provision and economic growth have 
been developed in the literature to date. Macroeconomists suggest that infrastructure may impact on 
economic growth directly through a direct productivity effect on production inputs, by complementing 
private investment and by crowding-out private spending through the financial system. Public 
infrastructure may increase the marginal productivity of production inputs. In doing so, it raises the 
perceived rate of return on and may increase the demand for, physical capital by the private sector. In the 
short run, infrastructure may also affect private capital formation indirectly, through changes in output 
and relative prices. Public capital in infrastructure may raise the marginal productivity of the factor 
inputs (capital and labour), thereby lowering marginal production costs and increasing the level of 
private production. In turn, this scale effect on output may lead, through the standard accelerator effect, 
to higher private investment (thereby raising production capacity over time and making the growth effect 
more persistent). In the short term, an increase in the stock of public capital in infrastructure may have 
an adverse effect on activity, to the extent that it displaces (crowds out) private investment. This short-
run effect may translate into an adverse growth effect if the drop in private capital formation persists 
over time. However in the longer term, the increase of public spending and the upgrade of infrastructure 
improve the state of the economy (e.g. increases productivity, procedures to host FDI are improved) 
hence leading to more investment (crowding in effect). The productivity effect of infrastructure is the 
argument that is most commonly proposed to account for the growth effect of infrastructure investment. 
A higher stock of public capital in infrastructure would tend to raise the productivity of other inputs, 
such as labour and the stock of private capital, thereby reducing unit production costs. Given decreasing 
returns, the magnitude of this effect would depend on the initial stock of public capital. In mature 
economies, productivity effects are likely to be limited; but in low-income countries, they could be 
substantial. 
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Table 7. Indices considered for development of the assumptions on infrastructure investment in the 
SEMCs 
Sector/aspect Indicator 
Transport Road density (km/100 km2 of land area) 
Roads per unit of population (km/population) 
Roads per unit of GDP (km/GDP) 
Water and sanitation Improved water source (% of population with access) 
Improved sanitation facilities (% of population with access) 
Telecommunications PCs/1,000 persons 
Internet accounts/1,000 persons 
Fixed telephone lines/1000 persons 
Online population/1,000 persons 
Mobile cellular subscriptions/1,000 persons  
TVs/1,000 persons 
Energy Delay in obtaining an electrical connection (days) 
Access to electricity/100 persons  
Human capital School enrolment (primary, secondary, tertiary), % of gross education of the labour force 
Source: Authors’ notes based on the World Bank’s DataBank definitions. 
Evidence from the EU along with developed and developing countries suggests that transport takes 
the largest share of investment in infrastructure.12 Based on this evidence, in scenarios QII and QIII 
it is assumed that the largest share of infrastructure investment in the SEMCs pertains to that in 
transport infrastructure. In the QII scenario, it is assumed that transport accounts for 40.18% of the 
total infrastructure investment in the SEMCs. In the QIII scenario, investment in transport accounts 
for 32.78% of the total investment. Investment in all the other aspects of infrastructure 
(telecommunications, human capital, etc.) is based on evidence from new member states of the EU 
as well as developed countries, such as the UK and Germany.13  
Table 8 summarises the allocation of the total budget directed at infrastructure investment for the 
different kinds of infrastructure for all four scenarios.14 
Table 8. Assumptions on infrastructure investment in the SEMC region in scenarios QI–QIV  
    Transport Human capital 
Water & 
Sanitation Telecommunication Electricity Total 
QI in % 33.79 13.33 20.64 1.39 30.85 100 
  in bn US $ 467.58 184.51 285.59 19.22 427.06 1383.97 
QII in % 40.18 17.21 14.82 1.21 26.58 100 
  in bn US $ 986.03 422.45 363.62 29.68 652.41 2454.18 
QIII in % 32.78 14.89 17.41 1.27 33.65 100. 
  in bn US $ 683.40 310.37 363.05 26.51 701.47 2084.81 
QIV in % 27.19 5.73 27.96 0.80 38.32 100. 
  in bn US $ 350.49 73.83 360.34 10.37 493.86 1288.88 
Source: Authors’ estimations.  
                                                   
12 See for instance Uppenberg et al. (2011) and Clark et al. (2001), in which data on several developed and 
developing countries suggest that investment in transport infrastructure has accounted for the largest part of 
public investment. Over the period 2006–09, EU investment in transport infrastructure alone has accounted 
for the largest share of public investment, equal to 0.7% of GDP. 
13 Data on new EU member states show that public investment in human capital ranges from 0.2% (Latvia) to 
1.2% of GDP. For developed countries like the UK, Germany, Italy, Spain and France, investment in water 
supply, transport and communication ranged from around 3.2% of GDP in 1995 to 4% of GDP in 2008. 
14 For detailed figures on investment in infrastructure by type in scenarios QI–QIV, see the appendix, Table 
67 to Table 70. 
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The alternative scenarios assume different financing partners for investment in infrastructure 
projects. According to the Infrastructure Consortium for Africa (ICA, 2011), China has emerged as 
one of the major investors in African infrastructure, with a market share of more than 20% in 
contracting infrastructure projects (among the foreign investors). The ICA estimated that the total 
Chinese commitments to Africa’s infrastructure in 2010 was $9 billion, while India’s commitments 
to infrastructure projects in the region were averaging $500 million from 2003 to 2007; for the Arab 
countries, the financing of infrastructure projects was $3.2 billion in 2010. Of this budget, 64% was 
allocated to North African countries. The funds of the European Commission used for infrastructure 
investment in Africa in 2010 amounted to $1.8 billion.15 
A. Transport 
Table 9 presents the current status of transport infrastructure for each of the SEMCs. Carruthers 
(2013) provides estimates of the needed additions to the transport infrastructure in each scenario. 
The additions needed to expand/upgrade the transport infrastructure in each scenario are presented 
in Table 10. These additions are calculated on the basis of the following assumptions:  
 QI assumes that the network density of the SEMCs in 2030 will reach the global average 
network density of 2010. 
 QII assumes that in 2050 the transport infrastructure of the SEMCs will be the same as the 
average of the EU-27 in 2008. This means that by 2030, the difference between the current 
infrastructure standards and the EU benchmark values will be reduced by a third. 
 QIII groups the SEMCs according to GDP per capita. Countries with high GDP per capita are 
assumed to set higher standards to achieve in transport infrastructure than those with lower 
per-capita incomes. 
 QIV forecasts that in 2030 the SEMCs will keep the national average infrastructure 
investment of the last decade.  
Table 9. Transport infrastructure indices in the SEMCs, 2007 
  Surface 
area 
(sq. km) 
Roads, 
total 
network 
(km) 
Road 
density 
(km of 
road per 
100 sq. km 
of land 
area) 
Roads, 
paved 
(% of 
total 
roads) 
Rail 
lines 
(total 
route 
km) 
Airports 
(incl. 
airfields) 
Airports 
with 
unpaved 
runways 
Main ports 
(according 
to tonnage 
and 
number of 
ships 
serviced) 
Algeria 2,381,740 112,039 5 74 4723 142 82 9 
Egypt 1,001,450 100,472 10 89 5,195 84 12 7 
Israel 22,070 18,318 83 100 1,005 47 18 4 
Jordan 89,320 7,878 9 100 294 18 2 1 
Lebanon 10,450 6,970 67 85 0 7 2 2 
Libya 1,759,540 83,200 5 57 0 144 80 4 
Morocco 446,550 58,216 13 70 2,110 56 25 5 
Syria 185,180 68,157 37 90 1,801 99 70 3 
Tunisia 163,610 19,371 12 75 1,991 29 14 5 
Turkey 783,560 362,660 46 89 8,686 98 9 8 
Palestine 6,020 5,588 93 92 0 0 0 0 
SEMCs 6,849,490 842,869 12 83 25,805 724 314 48 
Sources: World Bank and CIA World Factbook. 
                                                   
15 For a review of the policy and financing frameworks governing Euro-Mediterranean relations and on the 
determinants of Official Development Assistance (ODA), see Ayadi and Gadi (2013). 
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Table 10. Transport infrastructure additions 2015–30 assumed in scenarios QI–QIV 
Type of infrastructure Units QI QII QIII QIV 
Paved roads km 174,436 307,145 301,234 118,918 
Unpaved roads km 32,296 58,995 88,313 30,152 
Railways km 4,274 16,452 4,709 2,246 
Runways km 11 92 17 7 
Passenger terminals m2 888,062 976,869 888,062 732,652 
Container berths number 45 42 64 38 
Source: Carruthers (2013). 
Unit investment costs for each type of transport infrastructure are provided by Carruthers (2013). 
The expenditure for expanding/upgrading the transport infrastructure in each scenario is presented 
in Table 11. 
Table 11. Total investment in transport infrastructure, cumulatively over 2015–30 
  QI QII QIII QIV 
  (% of 
GDP) 
(bn 
US$) 
(% of 
GDP) 
(bn 
US$) 
(% of 
GDP) 
(bn 
US$) 
(% of 
GDP) 
(bn 
US$) 
Algeria 2.10 75.01 4.50 160.73 2.79 99.76 1.40 50.01 
Egypt 1.60 69.12 2.30 99.35 2.10 90.71 1.00 43.20 
Israel 0.20 9.20 0.60 27.60 0.20 9.20 0.20 9.20 
Jordan 1.50 8.30 2.60 14.39 2.00 11.07 1.00 5.54 
Lebanon 0.40 2.57 1.20 7.70 0.40 2.57 0.40 2.57 
Libya 1.30 25.73 4.30 85.10 4.00 79.16 1.70 33.64 
Morocco 2.00 43.46 3.80 82.56 2.60 56.49 1.30 28.25 
Syria 1.90 24.28 2.50 31.95 2.70 34.50 1.40 17.89 
Tunisia 1.80 20.41 3.10 35.14 2.39 27.14 1.10 12.47 
Turkey 0.90 187.37 2.10 437.20 1.30 270.65 0.70 145.73 
Palestine 1.50 2.14 3.00 4.29 1.50 2.14 1.40 2.00 
SEMCs 1.13 467.58 2.39 986.03 1.66 683.40 0.85 350.49 
Source: Authors’ estimations based on Carruthers (2013). 
B. Water supply, health, environment and sanitary services 
Investment in water infrastructure relates to projects that improve water management, increase 
access to water and improve/extend irrigation facilities. The investment cost to upgrade water 
infrastructure varies depending on the share of the population that is located in rural areas and the 
geographical dispersal of houses. Table 12 summarises the percentage of the population with access 
to improved water and sanitation facilities. Data on the population with access to water and 
sanitation facilities have been extracted from the “Economic and Structural Database” (World Bank 
DataBank, 2011).  
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Table 12. Water, health and sanitation infrastructure indices in the SEMCs* 
  Health expenditure, 
total (% of GDP) 
Hospital beds (per 
1,000 people) 
Improved sanitation 
facilities (% of 
population with 
access) 
Improved water 
source (% of 
population with 
access) 
Algeria 4.36 2.00(2004) 94 84 
Egypt 4.93 2.08 95 98 
Israel 7.57 5.83 100 100 
Jordan 8.64 1.80 98 97 
Lebanon 8.43 3.43 98 (2005) 100 
Libya 2.79 4.00 (2006) 97 54 (2001) 
Morocco 5.18 1.10 69 81 
Palestine n.a. 1.00 (1996) 91 86 
Syria 3.21 1.47 93 89 
Tunisia 6.16 1.76 85 94 
Turkey 6.04 2.80 90 98 
* Data are for 2007 unless the latest year for which data are available is given in parentheses. 
Source: World Bank. 
Varela-Ortega et al. (2012) have estimated the expenditures to be made on water infrastructure for 
each scenario. These expenditures depend on the water usage assessed for each scenario. The main 
drivers of water usage are i) socio-economic (e.g. GDP and population) and ii) physical and natural 
characteristics (e.g. country area and precipitation). As described in Varela-Ortega et al. (2012), 
lower expenditure on water infrastructure assets in QII and QIII (compared with QI) actually 
represent lower prices. It is assumed that the services provided by the QII and QIII investments in 
terms of water access and irrigation are the same as in QI but at lower costs; hence, in QII and QIII, 
water productivity increases. The opposite is assumed to hold for QIV. Table 13 summarises the 
investment in water and sanitation infrastructure in the alternative scenarios. 
Table 13. Total investment in water and sanitation infrastructure assumed in scenarios QI–QIV, 
cumulatively over 2015–30 
  QI QII QIII QIV 
  (% of 
 GDP) 
(bn 
US$)  
(% of  
GDP) 
(bn 
US$)  
(% of  
GDP) 
(bn 
US$)  
(% of  
GDP) 
(bn  
US$)  
Algeria 0.00 0.00 0.05 1.93 0.05 1.93 0.59 21.07 
Egypt 2.92 126.14 4.03 174.17 3.96 171.06 3.91 168.90 
Israel 0.60 27.60 0.61 27.87 0.61 27.87 0.76 34.96 
Jordan 4.02 22.25 4.86 26.90 4.82 26.70 7.40 40.96 
Lebanon 1.34 8.60 1.58 10.17 1.76 11.30 2.05 13.16 
Libya 2.97 58.78 3.29 65.19 3.17 62.70 1.01 19.99 
Morocco 1.30 28.25 1.40 30.42 1.40 30.42 1.58 34.33 
Syria 0.15 1.92 0.25 3.22 0.29 3.68 1.76 22.49 
Tunisia 0.12 1.36 0.14 1.59 0.14 1.59 0.24 2.72 
Turkey 0.00 0.00 0.05 11.24 0.07 14.99 0.00 0.00 
Palestine 7.49 10.71 7.64 10.92 7.56 10.82 1.23 1.76 
SEMCs 0.69 285.59 0.88 363.62 1.12 363.05 0.87 360.34 
Source: Authors’ estimations based on Valera-Ortega et al. (2012). 
16 | PAROUSSOS, FRAGKIADAKIS, CHARALAMPIDIS, TSANI & CAPROS 
 
C. Telecommunications 
Table 14 presents the current status of telecommunications infrastructure for each SEMC. The data 
to calculate the telecommunication infrastructure assets have been extracted from the World Bank’s 
database.  
Investment in telecommunications infrastructure is mainly made through private firms. Public 
contributions to this kind of infrastructure are low. Using the Abbassi (2011) study on ICT it was 
possible to quantify the four alternative scenarios by making the following assumptions: 
 In QI, Jordan, Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon and Tunisia follow Israel and Turkey in terms of 
telecommunications infrastructure. It is assumed that these countries will reach Israel’s 
current infrastructure status in 2060. Algeria and Palestine are assumed to follow Jordan, 
Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia with a five-year lag. Syria is the last to follow, with a ten-year 
lag. 
 QII assumes the same pattern as QI. Jordan, Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia will reach the 
current infrastructure status of Israel in 2040. 
 QIII also assumes the same pattern as QI. Jordan, Morocco, Egypt and Tunisia will reach the 
current infrastructure status of Israel in 2045. 
 In QIV, there is no upgrade of the telecommunications infrastructure. The current 
infrastructure is assumed to dilapidate at 2% p.a. 
Table 15 presents the public expenditure on infrastructure for each scenario. 
Table 14. Telecommunication infrastructure indices in the SEMCs, 2000 and 2009 
  Telephone lines  
(per 100 people) 
Internet users  
(per 100 people) 
Total investment 
(bn US$) 2000 
  2000 2009 2000 2009 2000–09 
Algeria 5.77 8.91 0.49 11.23 5.35 
Egypt 8.11 12.94 0.64 24.28 12.34 
Israel 49.44 44.76 19.96 61.23 10.92 
Jordan 12.84 8.32 2.64 26.49 2.24 
Lebanon 15.39 19.15 7.95 23.68 0.40 
Libya 11.57 16.98 0.19 10.80 1.35 
Morocco 4.95 11.12 0.69 41.30 8.69 
Syria 10.48 19.30 0.18 17.31 0.89 
Tunisia 10.10 12.34 2.72 33.83 3.56 
Turkey 28.91 23.01 3.76 36.40 24.86 
Palestine 8.51 9.37 1.18 32.32 0.88 
Source: World Bank (2011). 
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Table 15. Total investment in telecommunications infrastructure assumed in scenarios QI–QIV, 
cumulatively over 2015–30 
  QI QII QIII QIV 
  (% of GDP) (bn 
US$)  
(% of GDP) (bn 
US$)  
(% of GDP) (bn 
US$)  
(% of GDP) (bn 
US$)  
Algeria 0.12 4.39 0.16 5.77 0.15 5.34 0.09 3.19 
Egypt 0.11 4.76 0.19 8.04 0.16 7.01 0.04 1.89 
Israel 0.00 0.14 0.01 0.48 0.01 0.48 0.00 0.14 
Jordan 0.19 1.06 0.26 1.42 0.24 1.31 0.13 0.75 
Lebanon 0.16 1.03 0.24 1.54 0.21 1.38 0.09 0.58 
Libya 0.02 0.41 0.03 0.65 0.03 0.58 0.01 0.19 
Morocco 0.04 0.82 0.06 1.36 0.05 1.19 0.02 0.34 
Syria 0.21 2.69 0.28 3.61 0.26 3.32 0.15 1.89 
Tunisia 0.05 0.54 0.07 0.84 0.07 0.74 0.02 0.28 
Turkey 0.01 2.84 0.03 5.23 0.02 4.48 0.00 0.75 
Palestine 0.36 0.54 0.49 0.74 0.45 0.68 0.24 0.37 
SEMCs 0.05 19.22 0.07 29.68 0.06 26.51 0.03 10.37 
Source: Authors’ estimations based on Abbassi (2011). 
 
D. Electricity sector 
Fragkos et al. (2012) have developed alternative scenarios of energy supply and demand for the 
SEMC countries in accordance with the Ayadi and Sessa (2011) theoretical framework.16 Following 
the scenario definitions of “Euro-Mediterranean policy to 2030” as presented in Ayadi and Sessa 
(2011), a scenario of electricity supply and climate change mitigation has been specified, namely 
the “MED–EU-27 Energy Cooperation” scenario, in addition to the reference (business-as-usual) 
scenario. The aim of the MED–EU energy cooperation scenario is to project a power supply mix in 
the SEMCs in the context of Mediterranean integration and GHG emission-reduction policies. 
This scenario is in line with the “Green Transition” scenario of the Ayadi and Sessa (2011) 
framework. To quantify a scenario involving successful MED–EU integration, a cooperative MED–
EU frame of action towards climate change mitigation and the establishment of a well-
interconnected Mediterranean electricity grid are assumed. In this context, the MED–EU energy 
cooperation assumes that such projects as the Mediterranean Solar Plan, Desertec and MEDRING 
will partly materialise and that the EU Emissions Trading Scheme will expand to the SEMCs with 
special provisions for these countries. 
In the QIII scenario, it is assumed that no collaboration occurs among countries towards climate 
change mitigation. This scenario is based on the assumption that the MED–EU area moves towards 
decentralised production in the energy sector rather than an integrated approach (as assumed in 
QII). Instead, each SEMC individually commits its efforts to developing renewable energy sources, 
promoting energy efficiency, reducing import dependence (for net importers) and/or increasing its 
export capability (for net exporters). The promotion of renewable electricity exports to the EU is 
                                                   
16 The authors note that the economies of the SEMCs, with the exception of Israel, are far from having 
saturated energy needs in relation to potential growth and improving living conditions. So they present 
energy–GDP elasticity close to or higher than one, in contrast to developed economies, for which the 
elasticity is well below one. Electrification is a dominant trend and the GDP elasticity of electricity demand 
has been higher than that for total energy.  
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much more limited compared with scenario QII. Finally, flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) to 
the renewable resource sectors extend beyond facilities for concentrated solar power production to 
other forms of renewable energy sources, such as wind, rain and geothermal heat.  
Table 16. Total investment in the electricity sector assumed in scenarios QI–QIV, cumulatively for 
2015–30 
  QI QII QIII QIV 
  (% of 
GDP) 
(bn 
US$)  
(% of 
GDP) 
(bn 
US$)  
(% of 
GDP) 
(bn 
US$)  
(% of 
GDP) 
(bn 
US$)  
Algeria 1.16 41.53 2.13 76.11 1.66 59.37 1.26 44.91 
Egypt 1.42 61.51 3.38 146.1
5 
4.07 175.7
8 
2.68 115.6
8 
Israel 0.68 31.07 0.85 38.98 1.02 46.82 0.66 30.15 
Jordan 2.22 12.31 2.91 16.11 3.21 17.77 2.36 13.05 
Lebano
n 
1.66 10.67 2.11 13.52 2.42 15.50 1.64 10.55 
Libya 1.09 21.56 1.88 37.15 1.50 29.76 1.07 21.22 
Morocc
o 
1.13 24.54 1.74 37.82 1.79 38.81 1.11 24.01 
Syria 2.98 38.14 3.55 45.32 3.73 47.64 3.37 43.11 
Tunisia 1.31 14.84 2.16 24.53 1.91 21.69 1.23 13.91 
Turkey 0.81 168.7
6 
1.03 213.4
6 
1.18 244.8
3 
0.84 174.7
9 
Palestin
e 
1.40 2.13 2.14 3.26 2.30 3.51 1.62 2.47 
SEMCs 1.04 427.0
6 
1.58 652.4
1 
1.70 701.4
7 
1.20 493.8
6 
Source: Authors’ estimations based on Fragkos et al. (2012). 
E. Human capital 
Table 17 presents the current status of human capital assets in each SEMC in terms of the education 
level of labour and expenditure per student. Arbak (2012) measures human capital as equivalent to 
the aggregate stock of productivity, averaged over various education and experience levels. 
Productivities are estimated through the use of returns to education and experience in the 
Mediterranean. The four alternative scenarios were quantified based on the work of Arbak (2012) 
by employing the following assumptions: 
 QI assumes a continuation of past trends. Spending on education is such that the share of the 
labour force with tertiary education is projected to linearly follow past trends. 
 In QII, the enrolment rates in tertiary education increase. In 2030, the share of the labour 
force with tertiary education increases to reach 40% of the total on average.  
 In QIII, the enrolment rates in tertiary education also increase. In 2030, the share of the 
labour force with tertiary education increases to reach 36% of the total on average. 
 QIV assumes that enrolment rates decrease. No additional spending on education is 
forecasted. The share of skilled labour in the labour force remains at base year levels 
throughout the simulation period. 
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Table 17. Human capital indices in the SEMCs, 2010 
 Education of labour force 
(% of total) 
Public expenditure per student 
(% of GDP per capita)(*) 
 Primary Secondary Tertiary Primary Secondary Tertiary 
Algeria 72.15 19.65 8.20 11.32 17.16 24.42 
Egypt 63.20 21.40 15.40 16.09 15.69 33.12 
Israel 16.52 39.48 43.99 21.15 21.74 30.93 
Jordan 75.20 17.85 6.95 15.77 18.75 26.68 
Lebanon 57.70 18.20 24.10 8.14 9.68 13.77 
Libya 79.53 11.83 8.63 13.86 16.48 23.45 
Morocco 79.53 11.83 8.63 16.59 42.52 97.12 
Syria 75.20 17.85 6.95 6.09 15.60 35.64 
Tunisia 64.55 28.90 6.55 18.37 23.71 81.08 
Turkey 63.20 21.40 15.40 11.03 9.65 35.31 
Palestine 61.28 15.65 23.07 22.27 19.47 71.28 
* Public expenditure (current and capital) includes government spending on educational institutions (both public and 
private) and education administration as well as subsidies for private entities (students/households and other 
privates entities). See the World Bank’s DataBank definitions. 
Source: Authors’ estimations based on World Bank data. 
In the QIV scenario, there is no additional infrastructure (to the QI scenario) for investing in human 
capital in the SEMCs. No capital transfers from the EU, the Middle East region or the rest of the 
world targeting human capital in the SEMCs are expected to take place. Assuming the presence of 
conflicts, government investment in human capital in the SEMCs is restricted to 50% (70% for 
Israel) for the year 2015. Investment in the SEMC region is assumed to recover after 2020.  
Table 18. Total investment in infrastructure for enhancing human capital assumed in scenarios QI–
QIV, cumulatively for 2015–30 
  QI QII QIII QIV 
  (% of GDP) (bn 
US$)  
(% of GDP) (bn 
US$)  
(% of GDP) (bn 
US$)  
(% of GDP) (bn 
US$)  
Algeria 0.30 10.85 0.80 28.40 0.57 20.42 0.12 4.26 
Egypt 0.64 27.77 1.69 73.07 1.21 52.38 0.24 10.55 
Israel 0.92 42.53 1.06 48.72 0.92 42.53 0.44 20.10 
Jordan 0.27 1.49 0.70 3.87 0.50 2.79 0.11 0.61 
Lebanon 0.62 3.95 1.62 10.38 1.16 7.44 0.23 1.50 
Libya 0.52 10.37 1.38 27.39 0.99 19.58 0.19 3.83 
Morocco 0.45 9.67 1.18 25.63 0.84 18.29 0.16 3.48 
Syria 0.34 4.33 0.88 11.29 0.64 8.13 0.14 1.73 
Tunisia 0.57 6.44 1.49 16.87 1.07 12.13 0.22 2.52 
Turkey 0.32 66.70 0.84 175.72 0.60 125.88 0.12 25.11 
Palestine 0.29 0.41 0.78 1.12 0.55 0.79 0.09 0.12 
SEMCs 0.45 184.51 1.03 422.45 0.75 310.37 0.18 73.83 
Source: Authors’ estimations based on Arbak (2012). 
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F. Assumptions for capital stock in the QIV scenario 
Scenario QIV assumes that the SEMCs are involved in conflict. Thus government spending is 
modified accordingly, directing more at the sectors related to defence (ammunition, military 
equipment, etc.) and less at the sectors that furnish government demand in times of peace. The 
consumption patterns in the SEMCs are assumed to change under conflict, requiring more from 
consumption categories (such as food and medical care), and less from recreational services and 
miscellaneous goods and services categories.  
The presence of conflicts is associated with the destruction of the existing stock of capital in the 
SEMCs (Table 19). The quantification of the QIV scenario employs explicit assumptions on the 
stock of capital destroyed. Capital destruction is assumed to take place in 2015. The conflict 
between Israel and Palestine is assumed to worsen. This assumption leads to the relatively higher 
capital destruction rate in the latter countries compared with the rest of the SEMCs. The remaining 
countries are associated with lower rates of capital destruction stemming from the effects of 
regional tensions and conflicts. 
Table 19. Capital stock losses assumed in scenario QIV* 
 % of capital stock lost 
during 2015–30 period 
Algeria 10 
Egypt 12 
Israel 14 
Jordan 11 
Lebanon 14 
Libya 11 
Morocco 11 
Syria 11 
Tunisia 9 
Turkey 12 
Palestine 35 
* Losses pertain to the total capital stock in the economy. The magnitude of the losses assumed is associated 
with the probability of conflict in each country and proximity to the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. 
Source: Authors’ estimations. 
3.2.3 Risk and governance 
In the quantification of the alternative scenarios, appropriate assumptions have been employed 
regarding governance and institutional quality in the SEMCs and the effects of the latter on the 
SEMCs’ perceived risk.17 In the GEM-E3-MEDPRO model, the risk directly affects the cost of 
investment through the interest rate and thus the user cost of capital. In the QI scenario, the interest 
rate has been adjusted according to the sovereign risk of each country so as to incorporate the 
extra/lower return required by the investing agents. The reference long-term interest rate of each 
                                                   
17 A wide range of literature relates the quality of governance to FDI flows and investment returns, to the ease 
of access to credit, to the perceived financial risk of a country and to the cost of investment. Indicative is the 
work of Globerman and Shapiro (2002) and Benassy-Quere et al. (2007). The ability to manage debt, current 
account and deficit imbalances may affect investors’ choices of capital allocation and the ease of access to 
credit of the respective countries. Governance and political risk determines the country-risk rating or 
sovereign ratings, both closely related to investment decisions and FDI (Cosset and Roy, 1991). 
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country has been based on the ranking that the country has in Euromoney18 and the interest rate of 
the worst performing country.  
In the absence of structural changes and/or changes in the existing patterns of governance and 
institutions, the relative risk of the SEMCs and the ease of access to credit for each of the SEMCs 
recorded in the base year are assumed to prevail throughout the period up to 2030. In the alternative 
scenarios, the adjustment of the interest rates has been based on the adoption of appropriate 
assumptions regarding governance, government deficits and trade balances of the respective 
countries. This methodology has followed the approaches employed by rating agencies (Fitch 
Ratings, Standard and Poor’s), so as to model the sovereign risk of each country.  
To simulate the governance-related risk premium, the projections provided by Colombo (2011) 
have been adopted. 19  The author provides projections of the values of a composite index 
representative of governance and institutional quality developed in each of the SEMCs under the 
assumptions of each scenario (Table 20). The composite index ranges in value between -2.5 to +2.5, 
with higher values associated with better governance and institutions. 
Table 20. Values of the composite governance indicator assumed in scenarios QI–QIV* 
  QI QII QIII QIV 
Algeria -0.8 0.3 0.1 -1 
Egypt -0.4 0.3 0.1 -0.7 
Israel 0.5 0.7 -0.2 -0.5 
Lebanon -0.6 0.4 0.3 -0.7 
Libya -1.1 -0.2 -0.2 -1.5 
Morocco -0.3 0.5 0.2 -0.5 
Palestine -0.4 0.4 -0.5 -1 
Syria -0.9 -0.5 -0.5 -1.8 
Tunisia -0.2 0.8 0.3 -0.1 
* The index ranges in value between -2.5 to +2.5. The methodology follows the World Bank Governance 
Indicators. 
Source: Colombo (2011). 
Based on the values of the composite index provided by Colombo (2011), a risk parameter for each 
of the SEMCs is adjusted accordingly for governance developments in each of the alternative 
scenarios (Table 21). Higher values of the composite governance indicator are associated with 
relatively lower values of the risk parameter, while relatively lower values of the composite 
governance indicator are associated with relatively higher values of the risk parameter. 
Cooperation of the SEMCs with the EU countries in scenario QII is assumed to lead to improved 
governance and institutional quality in the SEMC region. Governance improvements are expected 
to lead to increased confidence in the governance and institutional patterns in the SEMCs and to a 
reduction in the perceived risk. The cooperation between the SEMCs and the rest of the Middle East 
and Asian countries in scenario QIII affects governance and institutional quality developments in 
the SEMC region. Stability in the regional relationships is assumed to reduce the risks of the SEMC 
region. Accountability and the rule of law are expected to change, resembling more closely the 
situations observed in the rest of the Middle Eastern countries. In this scenario, the perceived risk of 
the SEMCs is assumed to improve compared with the reference scenario, although to a level that is 
lower than the QII scenario. In the QIV scenario, a worsening of the regional conflicts is assumed to 
                                                   
18 See the Euromoney website (http://www.euromoney.com/poll/10683/PollsAndAwards/Country-Risk.html). 
19 Derived from an unpublished MEDPRO mimeo, which the authors can make available upon request. 
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increase the perceived risks of the SEMCs. Deteriorating governance and a decoupling of 
institutional aspects associated with regulatory quality, the rule of law and political stability are 
expected to worsen the risks associated with the SEMCs. 
Table 21. Risk parameters assumed in scenarios QII–QIV 
  QII QIII QIV 
Algeria 0.70 0.82 1.07 
Egypt 0.81 0.89 1.10 
Israel 0.95 0.97 1.37 
Jordan 0.89 0.93 1.18 
Lebanon 0.73 0.84 1.07 
Libya 0.75 0.85 1.08 
Morocco 0.78 0.87 1.09 
Palestine 0.56 0.66 0.85 
Syria 0.89 0.93 1.18 
Tunisia 0.73 0.84 1.07 
Turkey 0.85 0.87 1.23 
EU-27 0.99 1.00 1.04 
Emerging Asian economies 1.00 0.98 1.05 
Rest of the Middle Eastern countries 1.00 0.98 1.10 
Source: Authors’ estimations based on governance indicators provided by Colombo (2011). 
3.2.4 Trade liberalisation 
With the exception of energy exports, the SEMC region continues to be among the least integrated 
in the world in terms of trade (Iqbal and Nabli, 2004). One of the main impediments to trade 
integration is the high level of protection, measured by tariff rates and the tariff equivalents of non-
tariff barriers (NTBs).20 Andriamananjara et al. (2003) and Andriamananjara et al. (2004) suggest 
modelling NTBs as tariff equivalents, since NTBs create a price wedge as export taxes, or as 
institutional frictions causing efficiency losses depending on the type of NTB. NTBs do not create 
an increase in government revenues (Ferrantino, 2006). NTBs have a cost-raising and trade-
restrictive effect at the border (“protection effect” according to Fugazza and Maur, 2008) without 
creating direct tax revenues. 
The modelling of NTBs in the present work adopts the efficiency approach described in Fugazza 
and Maur (2008) and in Andriamananjara et al. (2003). This approach implies that the price 
differential calculated by the ad valorem equivalents (AVEs) is entirely explained by the efficiency 
losses due to the presence of NTBs. The assumption adopted considers that AVEs and NTBs are 
unobserved costs in the GTAP database that can be removed in a scenario simulation, thus 
eliminating the pre-existing price wedge between observed domestic and world prices. As a result, 
                                                   
20 Iqbal and Nabli (2004) find that average NTB protection is higher in the SEMCs than in other lower 
middle-income countries. According to the World Bank report by Arvis et al. (2011), NTBs are assumed to be 
higher in agricultural and manufactured products than in the services sectors. A shallow trade integration 
policy has been in force through the Barcelona process in relation to Euro-Mediterranean cooperation, and 
through the GAFTA, in relation to South–South trade cooperation. However, as Ghoneim et al. (2012) 
indicate, the shallow integration process is not yet fully completed, with the exception of Turkey and Israel, 
thus leaving scope for further trade liberalisation. The World Bank report by Arvis et al. (2011) indicates that 
the removal of NTBs and the steps to further trade liberalisation will enable an opening of the southern 
Mediterranean economies to global trade and would potentially improve welfare.  
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import prices are reduced as if there is an increase in productivity, without directly altering the 
revenues of the government.  
In the alternative scenarios, the assumptions employed take into account NTBs,21 transport costs 
and bilateral import-duty rates. In the QII scenario, NTBs are removed between the SEMCs and 
between the SEMCs and EU countries from 2015 onwards, assuming deeper trade integration.22 In 
QIII, NTBs are removed between the SEMCs and between the SEMCs and the rest of the Middle 
East and certain Asian economies. Moreover, NTBs between the SEMCs and Brazil and the 
Russian Federation reduce, to a lesser extent, as improvements in the trade relationships are 
assumed to expand in this scenario. In QIV, NTBs are assumed to increase in the presence of 
regional tensions (particularly in the services sector) and are maintained up to 2030. 
In addition to NTBs, trade integration has been modelled with the employment of the appropriate 
assumptions on the development of the transport costs in each of the SEMCs in the alternative 
scenarios. For the latter quantification, the Logistics Performance Index (LPI) has been used (Table 
22). The base year values were extracted from the World Bank report by Arvis et al. (2011), 
whereas the quantification of the index for the alternative scenarios is based on Ghoneim et al. 
(2012). Countries with lower LPI values, like Libya, have been assumed to have a larger scope for 
improvements in their logistics. Hence, relative transport costs can be expected to decrease more in 
the alternative scenarios (as a percentage of reference costs) for these countries.  
Table 22. LPI ranking for the SEMCs and other selected countries 
  LPI LPI 
Rank 
Customs Infra-
structure 
International 
shipments 
Logistics 
competence 
Tracking 
tracing 
Timeliness 
Algeria  2.36 130 1.97 2.06 2.7 2.24 2.26 2.81 
China  3.49 27 3.16 3.54 3.31 3.49 3.55 3.91 
Egypt  2.61 92 2.11 2.22 2.56 2.87 2.56 3.31 
Germany  4.11 1 4 4.34 3.66 4.14 4.18 4.48 
India  3.12 47 2.7 2.91 3.13 3.16 3.14 3.61 
Israel  3.41 31 3.12 3.6 3.17 3.5 3.39 3.77 
Jordan  2.74 81 2.31 2.69 3.11 2.49 2.33 3.39 
Lebanon  3.34 33 3.27 3.05 2.87 3.73 3.16 3.97 
Libya  2.33 132 2.15 2.18 2.28 2.28 2.08 2.98 
Syria 2.74 80 2.37 2.45 2.87 2.59 2.63 3.45 
Tunisia  2.84 61 2.43 2.56 3.36 2.36 2.56 3.57 
Turkey  3.22 39 2.82 3.08 3.15 3.23 3.09 3.94 
UAE  3.63 24 3.49 3.81 3.48 3.53 3.58 3.94 
US  3.86 15 3.68 4.15 3.21 3.92 4.17 4.19 
Source: World Bank (2011). 
Additional assumptions have been employed with regard to import duties. In scenario QII, it is 
assumed that import duties are gradually eliminated by 2015 on products traded between the 
SEMCs and between the EU and SEMCs. In scenario QIII, import duties are assumed to be 
gradually eliminated by 2015 between the SEMCs as well as between the SEMCs and the rest of the 
Middle East and certain Asian economies. In the QIV scenario, a continuation of past trends in 
import duties is assumed to prevail among the SEMCs, the EU and the rest of the model regions. 
 
                                                   
21 The quantification of NTBs and historical trends were derived from Ghoneim et al. (2012). 
22 In scenario QII, electricity exports from the SEMCs to the EU are also assumed to take place. 
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3.3 Summary of assumptions 
The drivers of economic development above the reference scenario levels in the QII and QIII 
scenarios can be summarised as follows: 
 an increase in labour mobility and changes in the active population; 
 an upgrade and expansion of infrastructure, inducing productivity gains in many sectors; 
 investment in human capital, which also allows for productivity gains and improvements in 
governance; 
 geopolitical stability, better governance and structural reforms, which enable i) greater 
confidence and a reduction of risk premiums, ii) foreign direct investment and iii) trade 
integration; and 
 trade liberalisation (abolition of tariff and non-tariff barriers, the creation of a single market), 
which induces lower trade costs. 
Conversely, in the QIV scenario, a lack of stability and the exacerbation of tensions induce the 
opposite effects (Table 23). 
Table 23. Total budget allocated to infrastructures investment in scenarios QI–QIV, cumulatively 
over 2015–30  
  QI QII QIII QIV 
  in % in bn US $ in % in bn US $ in % in bn US $ in % in bn US $ 
Algeria 3.69 131.79 7.64 272.94 5.23 186.83 3.46 123.44 
Egypt 6.70 289.30 11.59 500.78 11.50 496.95 7.88 340.22 
Israel 2.40 110.54 3.12 143.65 2.76 126.90 2.06 94.55 
Jordan 8.20 45.41 11.33 62.69 10.77 59.64 11.00 60.90 
Lebanon 4.18 26.81 6.75 43.30 5.95 38.18 4.42 28.36 
Libya 5.90 116.84 10.89 215.48 9.69 191.78 3.99 78.87 
Morocco 4.91 106.73 8.18 177.79 6.68 145.20 4.16 90.41 
Syria 5.58 71.35 7.46 95.39 7.61 97.28 6.82 87.12 
Tunisia 3.84 43.59 6.97 78.96 5.58 63.29 2.81 31.90 
Turkey 2.04 425.68 4.05 842.86 3.17 660.82 1.66 346.39 
Palestine 11.15 15.94 14.22 20.33 12.54 17.93 4.70 6.72 
SEMCs 3.36 1383.97 5.96 2454.18 5.06 2084.81 3.13 1288.88 
Source: Authors’ estimations. 
Investment in infrastructure is financed partly from abroad, in the form of FDI, and from additional 
public investment by the SEMCs, with costs recovered through additional indirect taxation. 
Infrastructure generates positive external effects on domestic production by increasing total factor 
productivity, according to a relationship with decreasing returns to scale; hence, output tends to 
increase. Infrastructure building also creates multiplier effects for the economy, although it 
increases imports.  
In QII, it is assumed that the cooperation between the SEMCs and the EU increases. The main 
assumptions of this scenario can be summarised as follows: 
i) The active population decreases in the SEMCs but the labour force increases due to the 
higher participation rate of females. 
ii) The EU finances 34.2% ($361 bn) of the additional to QI investments ($1,065 bn). Total 
cumulative investments in the SEMCs amount to $2,454 bn (authors’ calculations based on 
detailed investments by type of infrastructure presented in the previous section).  
iii) Investment risk and hence interest rates decrease in the SEMCs. 
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iv) Tariff and non-tariff barriers between the SEMCs and the EU are abolished and the Logistics 
Performance Index for the SEMCs improves compared with QI. 
In the QIII scenario, the assumptions can be summarised as follows: 
i) Investment in SEMC infrastructure over the period 2015–30 is $2,084 bn, of which 36.5% is 
financed by Middle Eastern countries and emerging Asian economies (authors’ estimations). 
ii) Investment risk decreases. 
iii) The SEMCs are assumed to cooperate with the rest of the Middle East, emerging Asian 
economies, Brazil and the Russian Federation. This leads to a removal of tariff and non-tariff 
barriers between the SEMCs, and between the SEMCs and the rest of the Middle 
East/emerging Asian economies. It also leads to the lowering of tariff and non-tariff barriers 
between the SEMCs and Brazil and the Russian Federation. 
In the QIV scenario, regional conflicts are assumed to occur and intensify until 2030. This has 
direct negative implications for the population, risks and infrastructure. Table 24 summarises the 
main assumptions of the alternative scenarios. 
Table 24. Overview of main scenario assumptions  
 Population Infrastructure Risk Trade 
QI Continuation of past trends 
QII - Population 
marginally falls 
in the SEMCs  
- Labour force 
marginally 
increases in the 
SEMCs due to 
increased 
female 
participation 
- Labour force 
marginally 
increases in the 
EU due to 
migration from 
the SEMCs 
- SEMCs invest in infrastructure 
and human capital (5.96% of 
GDP) 
- EU funds are directed at 
infrastructure and human 
capital investment in the 
SEMCs 
- Infrastructure investment 
affects total factor productivity, 
with an increase in demand for 
investment goods and an 
increase in the capital stock of 
specific sectors 
- Investment in human capital 
increases labour productivity 
- Sovereign risks 
of the SEMCs 
decrease as 
governance is 
assumed to 
improve 
- Governance 
improvements 
lead to a lower 
risk parameter 
in the SEMCs 
than in QI 
 
- Import duties and 
NTBs are removed 
between the SEMCs 
and the between 
SEMCs and the EU 
- Logistic performance 
is improved in the 
SEMCs, reducing 
transport costs 
between the SEMCs 
and the EU 
- Electricity exports 
from the SEMCs to 
the EU 
QIII - Population 
marginally 
increases in the 
SEMCs  
- Labour force 
marginally 
increases in the 
SEMCs due to 
increased 
female 
participation 
- Female labour 
participation 
rates are higher 
than in QI but 
lower than in 
QII 
 
- SEMCs invest in infrastructure 
and human capital (5.06% of 
reference GDP) 
- Funds from the rest of the 
Middle East & emerging Asian 
economies directed at 
infrastructure and human 
capital investment in the 
SEMCs 
- Infrastructure investment 
affects total factor productivity, 
with an increase in demand for 
investment goods and an 
increase in the capital stock of 
specific sectors 
- Investment in human capital 
affects labour productivity 
- Governance 
improvements 
lead to a lower 
risk parameter 
in the SEMCs  
- Risk parameters 
for the SEMCs 
are higher than 
in QII 
- Import duties and 
NTBs are removed 
between the SEMCs 
and between the 
SEMCs and the rest 
of the Middle East & 
emerging Asian 
economies. NTBs are 
lowered with Brazil 
and Russia 
- Logistics are 
improved in the 
SEMCs, reducing 
transport costs 
between the SEMCs 
and Middle East & 
emerging Asian 
economies 
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Table 24. Overview of main scenario assumptions (cont’d) 
 Population Infrastructure Risk Trade 
QIV - Population falls 
in the SEMCs 
- Largest 
population fall 
of all the 
alternative 
scenarios 
- Capital destruction in the 
SEMCs in 2015 
- Reduction in government 
investment in 2015 
- Resumption of investment 
from 2020 onwards 
- Change in consumption 
patterns in the SEMCs 
- Governance 
deterioration leads 
to higher risks in 
the SEMCs 
- Conflict worsens 
perceived risks for 
the SEMCs 
- Increase of NTBs 
between the SEMCs 
and the EU 
- Reduced tourism and 
exports of the SEMCs 
- Logistic performance 
worsens in the SEMCs, 
increasing transport 
costs between the 
SEMCs and the EU, 
the rest of the Middle 
East & emerging Asian 
economies 
- Import duties remain in 
place 
Source: Authors’ notes. 
4. Simulation results23 
4.1 Scenario QI 
The reference scenario (QI) developed with the GEM-E3-MEDPRO model is consistent with the 
Ayadi and Sessa (2011) assumptions regarding Euro-Mediterranean policies, i.e. the Euro-
Mediterranean state of affairs continues without any substantial change up to 2030. Assumptions on 
economic growth in the SEMC region are based on Coutinho (2011) and IMF (2011).24 For the EU 
countries, the GDP projections provided in the European Commission’s (2011) 2012 Ageing Report 
have been adopted. Population projections are consistent with the S1 scenario of Groenewold et al. 
(2011). Table 25 presents the GDP projections as produced by the GEM-E3-MEDPRO model. 
In the reference scenario, the EU economy is projected to grow at a relatively slow pace. In 
contrast, the SEMC economies are projected to record relatively high growth rates and to 
marginally increase the SEMCs’ share of world GDP. Turkey is projected to remain the largest 
economy in the SEMC region in terms of GDP. Economic growth in the SEMCs is sustained by the 
growing population and the availability of relatively cheap labour and hydrocarbon resources in 
some of the countries. With no structural changes assumed, the GDP per capita projected for the 
SEMC region, with the exception of Israel, remains rather low up to 2030, as population trends are 
also significant. 
The SEMC region remains below the world average GDP per capita in the QI scenario throughout 
the entire projection period. No leapfrogging is assumed for the SEMCs; thus, the gap between the 
EU member states and the SEMC region (excluding Israel) is projected to remain, indicating a lack 
of convergence between the EU and the SEMCs. The average GDP per capita for the SEMCs 
increases from $5,741 to $9,861 in 2030. However, the gap between these countries and the EU 
remains, because in 2030 the EU’s GDP per capita is projected to reach $45,529.  
                                                   
23 The authors gratefully acknowledge constructive comments on development of the scenarios and analysis 
of simulation results provided by Rym Ayadi, Marek Dabrowski, Luc De wolf, and the participants of the 
MEDPRO scientific workshops. Any errors remain the responsibility of the authors. 
24 IMF projections take into consideration the effects of the Arab spring on the growth prospects of the 
SEMCs. Thus no additional adjustments are made by the authors in the growth projections for the region. The 
Arab spring is assumed not to alter the long-term growth prospects of the SEMCs. 
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Table 25. GDP and GDP per-capita projections in the reference scenario (QI) 
Country GDP GDP/capita  
(US$ 2010) 
% Share in 
world GDP 
  (bn US$) 
2010 
(bn US$) 
2030 
Annual 
growth 
rate 
 2010–30 
2010 2030 2010 2030 
Algeria 157.7 286.5 3.0 4,446.9 6,363.0 0.3 0.2 
Egypt 151.6 379.1 4.7 1,868.5 3,458.6 0.3 0.3 
Israel 187.0 412.1 4.0 25,212.4 41,144.1 0.3 0.4 
Jordan 20.1 49.9 4.6 3,255.8 5,764.1 0.0 0.0 
Lebanon 28.4 52.1 3.1 6,715.4 10,887.5 0.0 0.0 
Libya 72.8 163.4 4.1 11,449.1 20,074.4 0.1 0.1 
Morocco 84.4 186.9 4.1 2,642.4 4,879.8 0.1 0.2 
Palestine 5.8 13.3 4.2 1,435.4 1,850.4 0.0 0.0 
Syria 49.8 108.5 4.0 2,440.7 3,825.8 0.1 0.1 
Tunisia 39.7 101.0 4.8 3,792.1 8,038.9 0.1 0.1 
Turkey 812.4 1,777.2 4.1 11,167.1 20,393.9 1.3 1.5 
SEMCs 1,609.8 3,530.1 4.0 5,741.1 9,860.5 2.7 3.0 
Rest of the Arab world 1,349.4 3,023.2 4.2 11,192.0 19,798.8 2.2 2.6 
EU-27 17,461.9 23,125.1 1.5 34,892.9 45,529.4 28.8 20.2 
Emerging Asian economies 8,840.3 3,4920.2 7.1 2,854.8 9,540.5 14.6 29.5 
Rest of the world 31,294.4 51,126.9 2.6 11,308.9 14,337.5 51.7 44.6 
World 60,555.8 115,725.0 3.4 8,951.0 14,105.5 100.0 100.0 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
 
Table 26. Macroeconomic aggregates in reference scenario (QI), 2030 (in bn US$)  
 SEMC EU27 Rest of 
Arab World 
Emerging 
Asian 
Economies 
World 
Gross domestic 
product 
3,530 23,125 3,023 34,290 115,725 
Investment 768 5,088 654 7,488 25,014 
Public consumption 687 4,924 506 6,169 20,915 
Private 
consumption 
2,110 13,831 1,677 19,747 70,517 
Exports 816 5,090 1,213 5,807 0 
Imports 851 5,808 1,027 4,921 0 
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4.2 Individual economic impacts by type of structural change for alternative 
scenarios QII and QIII25  
Before presenting the GEM-E3-MEDPRO results for scenarios QII–QIV, it is worth examining 
separately the different structural changes included in each scenario. For each alternative scenario, 
sensitivity analysis simulations were performed, focusing on the effects of the following categories 
of structural change (simulated individually): i) changes in the population, active population and 
labour force; ii) the development of investment in infrastructure (transport, energy, 
telecommunications, water and sanitation) and human capital; iii) changes in governance; and iv) 
trade integration. 
4.2.1 Population 
In the QII and QIII scenarios, it is assumed that the labour force in the SEMC region increases in 
2030 compared with the reference case, by 18 and 5.8 million people respectively.26 By considering 
only the effects of population changes, in the QII scenario GDP in the SEMCs increases by 0.4% 
above the reference cumulatively over 2015–30. In the QIII scenario, GDP in the SEMCs increases 
by 0.2% above the reference case (Table 27). The increase in labour supply leads to a decrease in 
the unit cost of labour and hence a decrease in unit production costs, inducing a lower price level 
and enabling gains from consumption, investment and trade. Thus, the SEMCs succeed in 
increasing exports and GDP, relative to the reference scenario. 
Table 27. Effects of population changes in the SEMCs in scenarios QII–QIII 
 QII QIII 
GDP (% change from QI scenario, 2015–30) 0.44 0.25 
Change in labour force relative to QI (million persons) 18 5.8 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
4.2.2 Investment in infrastructure and human capital 
Compared with the QI scenario, the additional funds required to upgrade and extend the 
infrastructure in the SEMCs are partly financed domestically (by an increase in indirect taxes) and 
by capital transfers from abroad. Over the period 2015–30, the additional capital flows from the EU 
in the QII scenario are assumed to reach $360.8 billion (which represent 0.41% of total EU 
investment), whereas the SEMCs raise indirect taxes to collect $705 billion during the same 
period.27 The total amount of $1,065.8 billion invested in infrastructure represents 0.8% of the 
SEMCs’ cumulative GDP for the same period. In the QIII scenario, the total budget invested is 
$698.9 billion, which represents 0.8% of the SEMCs’ GDP. This amount is partly covered by the 
Middle East and the emerging Asian economies ($252 billion). Improving infrastructure implies 
higher domestic demand for goods and services along with higher total factor productivity 
(multiplier effect). As a result, there is a decrease in the unit cost of production and an increase in 
production activity. Increasing production exerts pressure on primary factor markets; hence, wages 
and rates of return on capital tend to increase (a rent-seeking effect). As public investment 
increases, some of the private investment (that would otherwise manifest) is cancelled (a crowding-
out effect). Investment financing through taxation implies lower investment demand, which partly 
offsets a demand rise owing to productivity gains.  
                                                   
25 This discussion focuses on the assumptions employed for QII–QIII so as to enable the reader to benefit 
from the analysis of the non-straightforward effects expected in the QIV scenario. 
26 In the QII scenario, it is also assumed that there is an increase in the EU labour force by 0.4% due to 
increased migration flows from the SEMC region. 
27 For a detailed analysis and trends in FDI flows to the SEMCs, see Sekkat (2012). 
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Table 28 summarises the investment amounts dedicated to infrastructure in the SEMCs, the shares 
of domestic and foreign financing, and the required tax rate increases. 
Table 28. Investment in infrastructure in the SEMCs, additional to the QI scenario for 2015–30 
  Investment  
(bn US$) 
External financing 
 (% of total) 
VAT increase (%) 
 QII QIII QII, QIII QII QIII 
Algeria 141.15 55.04 32.42 2.96 1.14 
Egypt 211.48 207.65 50.2 1.76 1.73 
Israel 33.11 16.36 5.43 1.15 0.55 
Jordan 17.28 14.23 35.62 2.04 1.69 
Lebanon 16.49 11.37 40 1.65 1.11 
Libya 98.65 74.94 33.59 4.69 3.46 
Morocco 71.07 38.48 54.8 1.05 0.55 
Syria 24.03 25.93 34.72 1.27 1.37 
Tunisia 35.37 19.7 50.26 1.47 0.81 
Turkey 417.18 235.15 23.05 1.59 0.88 
SEMCs 1,066 700    
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
According to model-based simulations, increasing the stock of infrastructure in a region exerts 
growth-enhancing effects. These positive effects on GDP stem not only from the direct impact on 
domestic activity of building the infrastructure, but also from indirect positive impacts on 
productivity in relevant sectors (which rely on more cost-effective transportation, communication, 
public services, etc.). It also has further implications, notably leading to increased attractiveness to 
FDI and access to broader markets, which enable productivity gains by raising the minimum 
efficiency scale of firms.  
The multiplier effect is differentiated by country, depending on the stock of infrastructure already in 
place, the contribution of the domestic economy to the building of the infrastructure and the 
magnitude of adverse effects of the tax, which further depends on the degree of foreign exposure of 
the country’s economy. 
Depending on the type of infrastructure investment, different branches of the economy benefit from 
the increased demand for their products. Indications for sectors that are characterised by low 
domestic competition (being essentially non-traded sectors) reveal that increasing investment in 
infrastructure mainly benefits domestic activity. On the other hand, if the economy relies primarily 
on imports to meet domestic demand, the effect of infrastructure investment will be reduced. The 
net effect on GDP and on the balance of trade depends on the characteristics of each economy. 
The total budget is split among the different types of infrastructure according to the inputs from the 
different Work Packages. 28 To quantify the effects on economic performance of upgrading the 
infrastructure in the SEMCs, two methodologies have been employed:  
1) Static input–output analysis  
The static analysis focuses on the primary effect that changes in the final demand for goods 
and services have on activity. It does not take into account potential structural changes in the 
economy, nor the effects of the accumulation of capital stock or improvements in total factor 
                                                   
28 See the previous section for a detailed analysis. Inputs have been extracted from the following works: 
transport from Carruthers (2013), human capital from Arbak (2012), ICT from Abbassi (2011), water from 
Varela et al. (2012) and energy from Fragkos et al. (2012). 
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productivity. The net effect on GDP is determined by the share of domestic production in the 
total demand of each country and the Leontief coefficient, which takes into account the back-
and-forth interconnections between sectors, as well as the share of value to total output of 
each sector. The upgrading of infrastructure has two main effects in the static model. The first 
is the direct effect, which increases final demand for the goods/services of the sectors 
necessary for the investment plan to be undertaken. The second is the indirect effect, which 
increases the intermediate demand for goods in the economy. This approach helps to 
determine the initial impact of infrastructure investment in the SEMC economy. 
2) CGE 
The general equilibrium simulation serves to quantify the net effect on GDP, consumption, 
investment and the current account, with the calculation being dynamic through capital 
accumulation and investment by sector. The general equilibrium analysis takes into account 
production factor substitutions, the impacts of factor prices, the closure of the economy and 
the interdependencies between sectors and regions (as captured by the input–output and the 
bilateral trade flows). 
The following sections summarise the results when each type of infrastructure investment is 
simulated separately. 
A. Transport 
Investment in transport infrastructure entails additional demand for certain sectors of the economy. 
In the GEM-E3-MEDPRO model it was assumed that these sectors are mainly construction and 
services, followed by the equipment goods industry. Based on Carruthers (2013), the additional 
investment to QI was calculated for each alternative scenario (Table 29).  
Table 29. Total budget for transport infrastructure, additional expenditure to QI, cumulatively over 
2015–30  
 QII QIII QIV 
  (% of 
GDP) 
(bn US$)  (% of 
GDP) 
(bn US$)  (% of 
GDP) 
(bn US$)  
Algeria 2.40 85.72 0.69 24.75 -0.70 -25.00 
Egypt 0.70 30.24 0.50 21.60 -0.60 -25.92 
Israel 0.40 18.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Jordan 1.10 6.09 0.50 2.77 -0.50 -2.77 
Lebanon 0.80 5.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Libya 3.00 59.37 2.70 53.44 0.40 7.92 
Morocco 1.80 39.11 0.60 13.04 -0.70 -15.21 
Syria 0.60 7.67 0.80 10.22 -0.50 -6.39 
Tunisia 1.30 14.74 0.59 6.73 -0.70 -7.94 
Turkey 1.20 249.83 0.40 83.28 -0.20 -41.64 
Palestine 1.50 2.14 0.00 0.00 -0.10 -0.14 
SEMCs 1.26 518.45 0.52 215.82 -0.28 -117.09 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
 
The results of the static model for the alternative scenarios are presented in Table 30. It is the 
economy of Jordan that has the smallest overall multiplier effect. This is due to the heavy import 
dependency of the sectors involved in the construction of transport infrastructure (excluding the 
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construction sector). Israel and Libya present the lower import-dependency coefficients for these 
sectors and hence have the highest multiplier effects.29 
The multipliers obtained from the GEM-E3-MEDPRO model are significantly higher compared 
with those estimated using the static model. The multiplier effect of the investment in infrastructure 
in the QII scenario is calculated with the GEM-E3-MEDPRO model to be 1.31 for the SEMC 
region as measured in terms of additional real GDP, above the QI scenario levels.30 This multiplier 
is different from the static model, as it corresponds to the net equilibrium effect in the sense that it 
includes all positive and negative implications: 
 Some of the positive multiplier effects on GDP are offset by the negative impacts of tax 
increases on income and hence on domestic activity. 
 The GEM-E3-MEDPRO model captures the potential leakage effect occurring when 
domestic prices tend to increase during infrastructure construction, inducing higher imports 
and lower exports.  
 The GEM-E3-MEDPRO model takes into account the effects of capital accumulation and the 
productivity gains produced by the upgrade of infrastructure. 
Table 30. Economic impacts of investment in transport infrastructure 
  Multiplier effect GDP change relative to QI (%) 
  Static IO model CGE model QII QIII 
Algeria 0.88 1.59 3.81 1.12 
Egypt 0.78 1.67 1.17 0.86 
Israel 1.08 1.3 0.52 0.07 
Jordan 0.58 1.55 1.71 0.82 
Lebanon 0.74 1.61 1.29 0.07 
Libya 1.32 1.53 4.59 4.13 
Morocco 0.86 1.56 2.81 1.00 
Syria 0.91 1.62 0.97 1.27 
Tunisia 0.84 1.55 2.02 0.97 
Turkey 0.88 1.04 1.24 0.46 
SEMCs 0.89 1.31 1.64 0.76 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO and static IO model. 
 
                                                   
29 Keho and Echui (2011) study the link between investment in transport infrastructure and economic growth 
and provide a thorough literature survey on the topic. The majority of the studies mentioned conclude that 
economic growth is positively related to the upgrade of transport infrastructure. The effect is found to be more 
intense in poor countries.  
30 This result is consistent with studies that calculate infrastructure multiplier effects in the range of 1 (Ramey, 
2009) and 3.21 (Cohen et al., 2012). Carruthers (2013) estimates the road and rail investment impacts on the 
economic performance of the SEMCs. He also finds that Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt and Jordan would 
significantly benefit from transport infrastructure investment. 
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Table 31. GDP impacts of investment in transport infrastructure: Change from QI scenario 
cumulatively over 2015–30 (bn US$) 
 QII QIII 
Algeria 135.95 39.97 
Egypt 50.47 37.03 
Israel 23.86 3.44 
Jordan 9.45 4.55 
Lebanon 8.26 0.46 
Libya 90.8 81.69 
Morocco 61.09 21.68 
Palestine 0.01 0 
Syria 12.39 16.24 
Tunisia 22.91 11.03 
Turkey 258.89 95.88 
SEMCs 674.07 311.98 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO.  
 
B. Telecommunications 
Investment in telecommunications infrastructure in the SEMCs is mainly carried out by the private 
sector with very little public contribution. Public investment in telecommunications infrastructure 
undertaken in scenarios QII and QIII represents 0.04% of the SEMCs’ GDP. The multipliers 
calculated from the static and the CGE models are presented in Table 32. The static model estimates 
multiplier values at much lower levels than the CGE model, since it takes into account only the 
share of imports in the total supply of communications equipment. The effect on the SEMCs’ GDP 
in the period 2015–30 in the QII scenario is an increase of $17.4 billon (0.04% of GDP) and in QIII 
an increase of $12.2 billon (0.03% of GDP), compared with the reference scenario.31  
                                                   
31  The World Bank conducted an analysis to assess the impact of telecommunications penetration on 
economic growth at the country level (see Qiang and Rossotto, 2009). According to the analysis of 120 
countries, for every increase of 10 percentage points in the penetration of mobile phones, there is an increase 
in economic growth of 0.81% in developing countries, versus 0.60% in developed countries. This was 
confirmed by a study by Lee et al. (2009) and Calderón and Servén (2008). Badran (2011) has performed a 
similar study in the context of the Arab world and her results also showed positive GDP growth correlation 
with enhanced penetration levels of telecom services. The studies also found that all information and 
communications technologies promote growth more effectively in developing countries than in developed 
ones. This is because telecommunications services help improve the functioning of the markets, reduce 
transaction costs and increase productivity through better management in both public and private sectors. 
Additionally, reliable broadband connectivity is a major prerequisite for export-oriented service industries, 
such as call centres, outsourcing and financial services. The telecommunications sector itself is a major job 
creator. Telecom operators create direct jobs and indirect jobs through their massive retail networks. In 
addition, the sector is a major tax generator for the governments (through income taxes, revenue sharing and 
sales taxes). It has also proven to be a sector that is quite malleable to major FDI flows. Increasing 
telecommunications infrastructure can have a significant GDP multiplier effect. This is because it increases 
productivity across all economic sectors and serves as a complementary investment to other infrastructure, 
such as electricity, transportation systems and health. Bruce (1989), Singh (1999) and Datta and Agarwal 
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Table 32. Multiplier and GDP effects of investment in telecommunications infrastructure 
 Multiplier effect GDP change relative to QI (%) 
 Static IO model CGE model QII QIII 
Algeria 0.78 1.9 0.07 0.05 
Egypt 0.72 1.79 0.14 0.09 
Israel 1.03 1.27 0.01 0.01 
Jordan 0.48 1.82 0.12 0.08 
Lebanon 0.64 1.77 0.14 0.1 
Libya 0.91 1.97 0.02 0.02 
Morocco 0.85 2.04 0.05 0.04 
Syria 0.86 1.78 0.13 0.09 
Tunisia 0.86 1.98 0.05 0.04 
Turkey 0.86 1.32 0.02 0.01 
SEMCs 0.82 1.7 0.04 0.03 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO and static IO model. 
 
C. Water supply and sanitation 
Investment in water supply and sanitary services increases the factor productivity of the agricultural 
sector and decreases expenditures on health services. In the SEMC region, the agricultural sector 
represents 10% of total value added. The importance of this sector is different across countries as 
presented in Table 33.  
Table 33. Share of agricultural value added, 2007 (% of total) 
 Turkey Egypt Morocco  Tunisia Algeria Libya 
Share 10.2 10.8 17.9 14 6.2 6 
 Lebanon Israel Syria Jordan Palestine SEMCs 
Share 6.2 2.4 20.1 6.4 15.1 10 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO.  
When only the total investment in water supply and sanitary services is modelled, GDP in the 
SEMCs increases by $49.7 billon (0.12% of GDP) over the period 2015–30 in the QII scenario and 
by $51.9 billon (0.13% of GDP) in the QIII scenario. Table 34 presents the GDP multiplier effects 
for this type of infrastructure. The multiplier effects are found to be smaller than for other types of 
infrastructure.  
 
                                                                                                                                                           
(2004) conclude that the telecommunications infrastructure has the greater potential to lead “leapfrogging” 
development in the developing countries. The model-based analysis has also found similar results. 
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Table 34. Multiplier and GDP impacts of investment in water supply and sanitation infrastructure  
 Multiplier effect GDP change relative to QI (%) 
 Static IO model CGE model QII QIII 
Algeria 0.7 1.38 0.07 0.07 
Egypt 0.67 0.49 0.55 0.51 
Israel 1.24 0.39 0 0 
Jordan 0.48 0.56 0.47 0.45 
Lebanon 0.65 0.71 0.17 0.3 
Libya 0.99 0.57 0.18 0.11 
Morocco 0.8 1.08 0.11 0.11 
Syria 0.84 0.9 0.09 0.12 
Tunisia 0.81 1.81 0.04 0.04 
Turkey 0.86 1.06 0.06 0.08 
SEMCs 0.8 0.64 0.12 0.13 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO and static IO model. 
 
D. Human capital 
Investment in human capital has three main, direct implications: i) it increases labour productivity 
primarily in the high value-added sectors of the economy, i.e. the services sector; ii) it allows 
countries that are far from the technology frontier to catch up by mimicking/replicating patents 
produced abroad; and iii) it reduces the labour force, since the participation rate of the active 
population decreases (i.e. working time is replaced by time spent in education). In the GEM-E3-
MEDPRO model, these effects are captured by appropriate increases in total factor and labour 
productivity. The impact on the SEMCs’ GDP from investment in human capital alone in the QII 
scenario is $350.50 billion (0.85% of GDP) and $172.1 billion (0.42% of GDP) in the QIII scenario 
cumulatively over 2015–30 (Table 35).32  
The results of the static IO model show that investment in human capital is found to have a 
multiplier effect close to 1. Higher multipliers were obtained using the general equilibrium model. 
Investment in human capital pays off, as it induces incremental GDP above initial spending. 
Investment in human capital yields the highest returns (as these are captured through the static IO 
multipliers) among all the different types of infrastructure. The static multiplier ranks high because 
upgrading human capital is mainly achieved through the use of domestic resources.  
 
 
                                                   
32 Sianesi and Van Reenen (2000) conclude that an overall 1% increase in school enrolment rates leads to an 
increase in GDP per-capita growth by 1-3%. Gemmell (1996) finds that an increase of 1% in initial tertiary 
human stock is associated with 1.1% in per-capita GDP growth, while a 1% increase in subsequent growth in 
tertiary education (flow) is associated with almost 6% output growth. On the same subject, Barro and Lee 
(1993) suggest that an extra year of male secondary schooling is associated with a 1.4% increase in GDP 
growth per worker, while an additional year of female schooling seemingly has a negative impact on a 
country’s growth rate. 
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Table 35. Multiplier and GDP impacts of investment in human capital 
 Multiplier effect GDP change relative to QI (%) 
 Static IO model CGE model QII QIII 
Algeria 0.99 1.65 0.81 0.38 
Egypt 0.9 1.57 1.65 0.8 
Israel 1.03 1.31 0.18 0.01 
Jordan 0.71 1.38 0.6 0.31 
Lebanon 0.98 1.75 1.75 0.82 
Libya 1.17 1.54 1.32 0.62 
Morocco 0.98 1.64 1.2 0.58 
Syria 1 1.44 0.78 0.4 
Tunisia 0.96 1.63 1.5 0.7 
Turkey 0.97 1.36 0.71 0.38 
SEMCs 0.97 1.48 0.85 0.42 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO and static IO model. 
 
E. Electricity sector 
In the QII and QIII scenarios, it is assumed that investment in the electricity sector modernises 
equipment and delivers a higher degree of power connection. This implies higher total factor 
productivity enabled by the wide diffusion of electricity using technologies at lower costs thanks to 
capital modernisation. The model results confirm significant gains in economic growth due to 
electricity sector investment (changes of 0.73% and 0.88% in GDP above the reference case 
cumulatively over 2015–30, see Table 36).33 
Table 36. Multiplier and GDP impacts of investment in the electricity sector 
  Multiplier effect GDP change relative to QI (%) 
  Static IO model CGE model QII QIII 
Algeria 0.66 1.47 1.42 0.73 
Egypt 0.61 1.38 2.7 3.65 
Israel 1.23 1.39 0.24 0.47 
Jordan 0.41 1.38 0.95 1.36 
Lebanon 0.55 1.43 0.64 1.08 
Libya 0.76 1.31 1.03 0.54 
Morocco 0.77 1.48 0.9 0.97 
Syria 0.81 1.45 0.81 1.07 
Tunisia 0.77 1.4 1.19 0.84 
Turkey 0.84 1.13 0.24 0.41 
SEMCs 0.74 1.35 0.73 0.88 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO and static IO model. 
                                                   
33 Sanchez-Robles (1998) and Calderón and Servén (2008) find a small but positive impact of increasing the 
power sector infrastructure on economic growth. 
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F. All infrastructure 
Table 37 summarises the multiplier effect on GDP of each type of infrastructure asset as estimated 
using the GEM-E3-MEDPRO model. The highest multiplier is found in telecommunications, 
followed by investment in human capital. Building infrastructure, including for energy, transport, 
agriculture and telecommunication services, increases domestic demand in relation to the 
construction sector (roughly 40% of the infrastructure investment budget is allocated to 
construction). This sector is characterised by low domestic competition (being essentially a non-
traded sector), indicating that increasing investment in infrastructure will benefit mainly domestic 
activity and hence domestic employment. 
Table 37. GDP and multiplier effects of infrastructure investment in the SEMCs 
 Multiplier effect estimated 
using the GEM-E3 
GDP change from QI,  
cumulatively over 2015–30 
  QII QIII 
Electricity 1.35 0.73 0.88 
Human capital 1.48 0.85 0.42 
Telecommunications 1.70 0.04 0.03 
Transport 1.31 1.64 0.76 
Water supply, health, environment 
and sanitary services 
0.80 0.15 0.15 
All 1.26 3.01 1.89 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
The positive employment effects of infrastructure investment are very significant in the equipment 
goods industry and in construction, mainly as a result of the multiplier effect of building the 
infrastructure (Table 38). Indirect effects, stemming from productivity improvement due to 
infrastructure, exert positive activity effects in the consumer goods industry. Crowding-out effects 
and rent-seeking effects (higher wage rates due to higher demand for labour) explain the slight 
decrease in employment found in certain sectors (agriculture, food industry and services). 
Table 38. Employment effects of investment in all types of infrastructure in the SEMCs, changes 
from QI cumulatively over 2015–30 (%)* 
  QII QIII 
Agriculture -1.9 12.1 
Energy 1.3 -0.8 
Chemical products 7.6 26.8 
Other energy-intensive 5.3 -4.0 
Electric goods – Other equipment goods 8.3 -6.6 
Transport equipment 2.6 -5.6 
Consumer goods industries – Food -3.1 0.9 
Consumer goods industries – Rest -1.8 -4.9 
Textiles and clothing 3.1 -6.8 
Construction 12.7 7.3 
Transport -0.8 -5.5 
Communication 7.0 4.9 
Services 1.0 -0.7 
* For detailed sectoral results see the appendix see Table 79 and Table 80. 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
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4.2.3 Risk and governance  
The cooperation between the SEMC region and the EU is assumed to take place in a context of 
increasing geopolitical stability and improving governance. Hence it is assumed that business 
uncertainty decreases and financial stability favours reducing risk premiums associated with 
investment in the region. This is reflected in a reduction of interest rates by 2.4% in the region. If 
the SEMCs cooperate with the rest of the Middle East and emerging Asian economies, the interest 
rates are assumed to reduce by 1.3%. This leads to an increase of the SEMCs’ GDP by $888.5 
billion and $603.4 billion over the period 2015–30, respectively, in scenarios QII and QIII.  
Lower interest rates imply higher consumption (because of the higher present value of expected 
income and the lower propensity to save), higher investment and a reduced cost of capital, which 
exert a positive effect on GDP (Table 39). Increased consumption drives increases in domestic 
production, which tends to increase the unit cost of capital and labour. In the short run, the unit cost 
of capital will increase due to higher demand, but in the long run it will decrease due to the larger 
accumulation of capital stock in the economy (as lower interest rates increase investment). 
Additional demand for labour increases wages. The total effect is an increase in the unit cost of 
production, which leads to an increase in net imports (leakage effect). 
Table 39. Interest rate and GDP effects of a change in risk perception in the SEMCs* 
 QII QIII 
Decrease of interest rates  2.4% 1.3% 
Change in GDP relative to QI (cumulatively over 2015–30, bn US$) 888.5 603.4 
* For detailed GDP effects per SEMC, see the appendix, Table 74.  
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
 
4.2.4 Trade liberalisation 
In scenario QI, the existing trade links and patterns of the SEMCs are assumed to continue up to 
2030. Hence in 2030, the main bulk of SEMC exports (46% of total) are directed at the EU (which 
represents roughly 6.5% of EU imports). A further 16.93% of SEMC exports are directed at the 
emerging Asian economies (EAEs) and the rest of the Middle Eastern (ME) countries (which 
represents 2.4% of their imports), and 10.8% of SEMC exports relate to trade in the internal market 
of the SEMCs (see Table 40 and Table 41). Exports of the SEMCs to the EU mainly consist of 
energy products, textiles, other consumer goods and agricultural products. The SEMCs import from 
the EU the main bulk of their equipment and manufacturing products (see Table 42 and Table 43).34 
                                                   
34 Konan and Maskus (2006) analyse the effects of preferential liberalisation vis-à-vis the EU for Egypt. They 
find that total welfare gains (in terms of equivalent variation) account for 0.2% of GDP, the export prices of 
Egyptian goods increase by 1% on average and by 8% in the agricultural and clothing sector. The welfare 
gains rise to 1.8% of GDP in the case in which the reduced administrative costs occurring from the 
liberalisation of trade with the EU are applied to all trade partners. A study by Baier and Bergstrand (2001) 
analyses the factors that account for the growth of trade. Their results show that income growth, tariff rate 
reductions and lower transport costs have contributed to the growth of world trade. According to these 
authors, income growth explains 67%, tariff reductions 25% and transport cost reductions 8% of the growth of 
trade. The EU has recently completed an impact assessment study on trade liberalisation in Libya, which 
shows net economic benefits for Libya. The abolition of tariff and non-tariff barriers enables more efficient 
transportation of goods and services and a reduction of trade costs. In the QII scenario, market integration is 
assumed to occur between the SEMCs and the EU, and in the QIII scenario between the SEMCs, the rest of 
the Middle East and emerging Asian economies, alongside improved cooperation with Brazil and Russia. 
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Table 40. Destination of SEMC exports in the QI scenario, shares in 2030 (% of total) 
  Israel Turkey Algeria Egypt Morocco Tunisia Libya Lebanon Syria Jordan Palestine SEMCs 
EU-27 29.54 52.43 50.07 31.62 51.07 69.65 73.12 14.11 39.25 9.87 0.00 46.03 
EAEs 21.33 5.23 2.54 23.49 16.48 6.61 3.24 6.99 13.86 11.00 0.00 10.54 
RAW 1.00 8.31 0.91 7.33 3.36 2.80 1.19 29.88 10.61 19.71 4.34 6.09 
ROW 40.06 25.53 29.93 28.32 25.59 13.41 6.57 38.83 17.50 32.59 0.00 26.51 
SEMCs 8.08 8.49 16.54 9.23 3.50 7.54 15.88 10.19 18.78 26.83 95.66 10.84 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
Table 41. Origin of SEMC imports in the QI scenario, shares in 2030 (% of total) 
  Israel Turke
y 
Algeria Egypt Morocco Tunisia Libya Lebanon Syria Jordan Palestine SEMCs 
EU-27 23.0
3 
23.52 27.39 20.81 33.79 47.02 18.43 18.88 10.56 10.02 0.00 23.77 
EAEs 29.1
6 
30.77 13.41 32.60 20.51 17.51 15.91 17.85 13.94 30.67 0.00 26.96 
RAW 0.56 4.02 2.41 7.99 7.73 2.53 15.78 9.41 14.54 14.58 11.96 5.04 
ROW 38.4
6 
33.06 29.89 33.22 28.39 19.70 36.20 34.18 38.59 26.25 0.00 33.02 
SEMC
s 
8.80 8.63 26.90 5.37 9.59 13.25 13.68 19.68 22.37 18.48 88.04 11.22 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
Table 42. SEMC exports to the EU, ME and EAEs in the QI scenario, shares in 2030 (% of total) 
 EU ME, EAEs* 
  Agricultur
e 
Energ
y 
Industr
y 
Service
s 
Agricultur
e 
Energ
y 
Industr
y 
Service
s 
Algeria 0.14 77.37 21.26 1.23 2.7 83.3 6.44 7.57 
Egypt 3.03 16.15 68.5 12.32 14.38 25.47 44.62 15.53 
Israel 5.87 6.61 58.8 28.72 5.39 0.41 44 50.19 
Jordan 0.49 8.85 24.29 66.37 5.13 24.72 49.09 21.07 
Lebano
n 
3.66 1.24 16.6 78.49 12.07 0.23 23.42 64.28 
Libya 0.05 89.98 7.23 2.75 4.37 63.73 17.7 14.2 
Morocc
o 
5.12 1.37 84.78 8.73 3.21 0.4 65.29 31.1 
Syria 2.87 67.85 10.06 19.21 71.47 0.13 15.97 12.44 
Tunisia 0.45 8.16 88.25 3.13 6.58 1.27 56.35 35.8 
Turkey 0.97 0.91 95.33 2.79 6.83 2.35 80.69 10.13 
* ME: Rest of the Middle East countries; EAEs: emerging Asian economies 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
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Table 43. SEMC imports from the EU, ME and EAEs in the QI scenario, shares in 2030 (% of total) 
 EU ME, EAEs* 
  Agricultur
e 
Energ
y 
Industr
y 
Service
s 
Agricultur
e 
Energ
y 
Industr
y 
Service
s 
Algeria 16.34 5.15 78.30 0.22 0.96 0.20 98.51 0.34 
Egypt 3.57 1.15 65.28 29.99 0.14 10.66 85.99 3.22 
Israel 0.92 2.83 67.38 28.87 0.02 0.28 94.73 4.97 
Jordan 5.28 0.71 92.98 1.03 1.87 2.40 93.09 2.64 
Lebano
n 
3.58 21.31 71.40 3.71 1.86 7.11 85.10 5.93 
Libya 3.81 0.69 91.32 4.18 0.38 0.14 70.31 29.17 
Morocc
o 
15.41 14.16 62.72 7.70 0.24 18.59 79.02 2.16 
Syria 4.90 4.94 79.88 10.29 12.16 0.60 78.75 8.49 
Tunisia 7.77 10.21 76.40 5.62 0.28 1.24 95.24 3.24 
Turkey 3.06 3.00 84.61 9.34 0.48 6.66 90.73 2.13 
* ME: Rest of the Middle Eastern countries; EAEs: emerging Asian economies 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
According to Ghoneim et al. (2012), agricultural and consumer goods are the most protected sectors 
in the SEMCs (i.e. high non-tariff barriers and duty rates). Table 44 presents the duty rates by 
country that are assumed to hold in the QI scenario. In the alternative scenarios QII and QIII, these 
duty rates are assumed to be lowered or removed, and thus the agricultural sector of the SEMCs is 
left exposed (more than the industrial sector) to international competition. The effects on the energy 
sector of the removal or lowering of the duty rates are expected to be small.  
Table 44. SEMC average duty rates in the QI scenario, 2030 (%) 
  Agriculture Energy Industry 
Algeria 8.37 0.72 7.41 
Egypt 6.38 3.35 11.50 
Israel 15.01 0.15 0.27 
Jordan 18.78 0.00 6.74 
Lebanon 30.63 5.54 13.64 
Libya 50.65 21.83 8.37 
Morocco 21.78 0.90 11.18 
Syria 28.39 29.95 3.78 
Tunisia 66.06 0.00 6.97 
Turkey 18.63 1.26 0.43 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
In scenario QII, trade integration between the EU and the SEMCs increases the GDP of the SEMCs 
by 0.7% over the period 2015–30 (Table 45). The switch to a regime of market integration increases 
activity and hence employment as a result of efficiency gains enabled by trade liberalisation. This 
effect counterbalances the negative effects stemming from sectors that may suffer from higher 
exposure to foreign competition, such as textiles and some consumer goods in certain SEMCs. The 
model results show a marginal increase in total employment in the SEMCs, 0.1% above reference. 
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According to the model results, the impacts on the EU’s GDP are negligible, as changes in trade 
flows compensate each other; however, a welfare gain for the EU is found. 
Table 45. GDP and employment effects of trade liberalisation, cumulatively over 2015–30* 
 QII QIII 
  SEMCs EU SEMCs ME, 
EAEs** 
GDP, absolute change from reference 291.5 -29.3 235.6 -92.0 
GDP, % change from reference 0.7 -0.0 0.5 -0.0 
Equivalent variation 148.3 22.4 251.3 -47.6 
Employment (%) 0.1 0.0 0.5 0.00 
* For detailed effects per SEMC, see the appendix, Table 75. 
** ME: Rest of the Middle Eastern countries; EAEs: emerging Asian economies 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
Trade integration with the EU increases welfare bilaterally through the following channels:  
 EU exports become more competitive in the SEMC markets as non-tariff barriers and duties 
are removed (exports of the EU to the SEMCs increase);  
 trade between the SEMCs increases mainly in the textiles and chemical product sectors;  
 final consumers in the SEMCs benefit from cheaper imports and hence welfare increases; and  
 cheaper imports drive production costs down, making SEMC products more competitive in 
international markets. The exports of the SEMCs increase. The biggest part of this increase 
relates to the trade among the SEMCs and between the SEMCs and the rest of the Middle 
East and emerging Asian economies.  
The impact is not uniform across countries (see Figure 3 and Figure 4 at the end of this sub-section). 
The countries mainly favoured by the enlargement of the market are those that have already 
established strong trade relationships with the EU in the reference case. Economies that were 
already open and EU-oriented, like Tunisia’s, profit the most from the creation of the single market, 
experiencing GDP gains of up to 3.2% above the reference case. Countries with extensive domestic 
markets, like Israel, experience positive effects but these are below the SEMC average. Government 
revenues are altered by trade integration: revenues from duties decrease by $296 billion over the 
period (Table 46) but revenues from indirect taxes increase by $62 billion.35 The net effect on the 
public budget is negative and accounts for $234.9 billion over the 2015–30 period.36  
Table 46. Change in revenues from duties under trade liberalisation assumptions, cumulatively over 
2015–30 
  QII QIII 
 (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) 
SEMCs -296 -47.3% -271.9 -43.1% 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
To examine the effects of changes on the public budget, an additional simulation was performed. In 
this simulation, trade liberalisation occurs as described above but the government raises a VAT-type 
                                                   
35 Reported figures are GEM-E3-MEDPRO model results. 
36 Same as above. 
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of tax to collect the income lost from the removal of duties. In particular, the government raises a 
tax so that its surplus or deficit as a percentage of GDP remains the same as in the QI scenario. 
Table 47 presents the impact on GDP and employment when the public budget is fixed. 
Qualitatively, the results and conclusions drawn are the same when comparing the impact of trade 
liberalisation in QII and QIII. As expected, activity and welfare are found to be at lower levels than 
in the case where no restrictions on government borrowing are imposed. 
Table 47. GDP and employment effects of trade liberalisation without changes in the public budget, 
changes from QI, cumulatively over 2015–30* 
2015–30 QII QIII 
  SEMCs EU SEMCs ME, 
EAEs** 
GDP change (bn US$) 265.8 -28.2 211 -94.5 
GDP % change  0.64 -0.01 0.51 -0.03 
Equivalent variation of welfare (bn US$) 69.6 30 183.01 -39.84 
Employment (% change)  0.04 0.00 0.47 0.00 
* For detailed effects per SEMC, see the appendix, Table 76. 
** ME: Rest of the Middle Eastern countries; EAEs: emerging Asian economies 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
The abolition of tariff barriers has a marginal impact on the energy trade flows due to the low duty 
rates on energy and the absence of non-tariff barriers. Trade is intensified in protected sectors, such 
as textiles, consumer goods, chemicals and agriculture. Table 48 summarises the changes in 
production by sector of activity. What is noticeable is the increase in the services sector. In the 
SEMCs, employment is higher in the services and agricultural sectors. The changes in employment 
in the context of the QII scenario follow the changes in sectoral production. Compared with the QI 
scenario, employment increases in services and in most industrial sectors (Table 49). 
Table 48. Sectoral production effects of trade liberalisation in the SEMCs, changes from QI 
cumulatively over 2015–30 (%)* 
  QII QIII 
Agriculture -0.5 11.2 
Energy 0.0 -0.9 
Chemical products 5.8 19.0 
Other energy-intensive 0.2 -7.3 
Electric goods – Other equipment goods -0.9 -11.6 
Transport equipment 0.6 -7.8 
Consumer goods industries – Food 1.3 2.1 
Consumer goods industries – Rest -3.1 -4.9 
Textiles and clothing 10.3 8.3 
Construction 0.5 0.6 
Transport -0.3 -2.5 
Communication 0.8 1.7 
Services 0.3 0.1 
* For detailed results on sectoral production and employment in the SEMCs, see the appendix, Table 77 to 
Table 78. 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
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Table 49. Employment effects of trade liberalisation in the SEMCs, changes from QI cumulatively 
over 2015–30 (%) 
  QII QIII 
Agriculture -1.1 14.4 
Energy 0.4 -1.3 
Chemical products 2.7 23.4 
Other energy-intensive 0.2 -7.4 
Electric goods – Other equipment goods 0.6 -12.1 
Transport equipment 1.9 -8.3 
Consumer goods industries – Food 2.6 1.0 
Consumer goods industries – Rest -5.9 -7.3 
Textiles and clothing 3.4 7.3 
Construction 0.5 0.2 
Transport -0.5 -4.6 
Communication 1.0 1.5 
Services 0.3 -0.8 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
In the QIII scenario, the results show a decrease in SEMC exports to the EU and an increase in 
intra-SEMC trade. The net trade position of the SEMCs with emerging Asian economies and the 
rest of the Middle East deteriorates (net exports decrease by 1% over the period 2015–30). The 
increase in imports overcompensates for the increase in exports. As trade relations between certain 
SEMCs and the rest of the Middle East are rather weak, the overall implications are small in 
magnitude. 
Figure 3 and Figure 4 summarise the effects on the SEMCs’ GDP and employment respectively in 
the QII and QIII scenarios in the case where only trade liberalisation is simulated. The effect in QII 
on GDP is more intense due to the characteristics of trade: the trade with the EU is complementary, 
while the trade with the emerging Asian economies can be characterised as more competitive. In 
particular, the 11 SEMCs import from the EU intermediate goods and technology goods, while the 
Middle East and mainly the Asian economies are low-cost producers of textiles and consumer 
goods, which compete with the same goods produced and exported by the SEMCs.37  
In terms of GDP increase, the QII scenario was found to be more favourable than scenario QIII 
when looking at the aggregate of the SEMCs. This results from the impact of trade liberalisation on 
some of the biggest SEMC economies, like Turkey and Egypt. For Tunisia, trade liberalisation with 
the EU is also preferable, as Tunisia has already established strong trade links with a number of EU 
countries.38 For Jordan and Algeria, the results show that a single market with the rest of the Middle 
                                                   
37 Notable also is the case of Turkey in the QIII scenario. Its GDP is reduced compared with QII over the 
period 2015–30. This decrease is mainly driven by Turkey’s increased imports from Asian economies. The 
sector that presents a considerable increase in its imports and decrease in its exports is electrical and other 
equipment goods. 
38 “[The] EU is Tunisia’s first trading partner accounting in 2010 for 66.9% of Tunisian imports and 74.1% of 
Tunisian exports”.… Tunisia’s main exports to the EU in 2011 were manufactured products 78.5% (of which 
24.7% Clothing and 33.6% Machinery and transport equipment), then Energy (16.3%) and Agricultural 
products (4.7%). Major imports from the EU were Machinery and transport equipment (35.8%), Energy 
(13.6%) and Chemicals (10.0%)” (European Commission, DG Trade). 
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East and the BRICs may be preferable. This result is attributed to the structure of trade and tariffs 
with the rest of the Middle Eastern and Asian countries.39 
Figure 3. GDP impacts of trade liberalisation in the QII and QIII scenarios, changes from QI, 
cumulatively over 2015–30 (%) 
 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
Figure 4. Employment impacts of trade liberalisation in the QII and QIII scenarios, changes from 
QI, cumulative manpower over 2015–30 (%) 
 
 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
                                                   
39 In particular, Jordan’s economy can be characterised as one of the most open economies to trade among the 
SEMCs, as it has signed free trade agreements with the EU, the US, Canada, Syria, Algeria, Tunisia, 
Singapore, Malaysia and Libya. The major exporting commodities of Jordan are fertilizers, potash, 
phosphates, pharmaceuticals and clothing, which are exported mainly to the rest of the Middle Eastern and 
Asian countries: India (16.2% of exports), Iraq (16.1%), Saudi Arabia (6.9%) and the UAE (4.6%). Hence, 
Jordan is mostly favoured when tariff and non-tariff barriers are abolished with its main exporting partners. 
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
4.0
4.5
QII QIII
-0.1
0.4
0.9
1.4
1.9
QII QIII
44 | PAROUSSOS, FRAGKIADAKIS, CHARALAMPIDIS, TSANI & CAPROS 
 
4.3 Economic impacts of the alternative scenarios QII, QIII and QIV 
In the context of the cooperation scenarios QII and QIII, the changes occur simultaneously in all the 
areas analysed in the previous section, i.e. in infrastructure, trade, human capital, population and 
interest rates. Using the general equilibrium model, the net economic impacts can be estimated 
(Table 50), taking into account possible conflicts among the individual changes: for example, 
building infrastructure requires labour and hence influences the labour market, which is in turn 
affected by different shares of the active population and labour force. 
Table 50. GDP and employment impacts of all structural changes in the SEMCs, changes from the 
QI scenario, cumulatively over 2015–30* 
  QII QIII 
  Cumulative GDP Employment Cumulative GDP Employment 
  (%) (bn US$) (%) (%) (bn US$) (%) 
All measures 7.03 2895.61 2.02 4.62 1905.07 1.35 
Infrastructure 3.26 1344.42 0.04 2.12 873.89 0.01 
Trade 
liberalisation 
0.71 291.49 0.12 0.57 235.64 0.53 
Population 0.49 200.16 1.03 0.25 101.87 0.35 
Risk premium 2.16 888.49 0.80 1.46 603.45 0.51 
* For detailed GDP and employment impacts in the SEMCs, see the appendix, Table 81 and Table 82. 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO.  
 
Similarly, expenditure on infrastructure and also investment in productive capital triggered by lower 
interest rates compete with each other on the capital markets. Raising taxation to finance 
infrastructure tends to increase domestic prices. This undermines competitiveness in some sectors, 
which at the same time are exposed to foreign competition as a result of trade liberalisation. All 
these potential conflicts are simultaneously taken into account through the model. The results show 
that the net effects on GDP are not equal to summing up the GDP effects of individual changes. 
The model results show significant economic development gains in the SEMCs from the changes 
assumed in scenarios QII and QIII. The gains due to infrastructure and to economic stability (lower 
interest rates) are clearly higher than those due to trade liberalisation and to demographic changes. 
In terms of employment, demographic changes are recorded to have the highest positive impact in 
scenario QII, while trade liberalisation is found to have the highest impact in scenario QIII. Trade 
liberalisation has small positive effects on the GDP of the SEMCs due to the significant increase in 
imports driven by the removal of NTBs.  
The removal of trade barriers leads to a decrease in the share of SEMC exports being directed at the 
EU by 0.1% compared with QI for the 2015–30 period. For the same period, SEMC exports 
directed at its internal market (i.e. the bilateral trade among the SEMCs) increases by 5.5% relative 
to QI. These results are in line with the findings of Ghoneim et al. (2012), which indicate that trade 
liberalisation in the SEMCs can lead to greater changes in SEMC imports originating from the EU 
rather than in exports directed at the EU.  
In both the QII and QIII scenarios, the main driver of economic growth is related to increased 
investment (Table 51 and Table 52). The reduction of investment risk and the higher demand for 
investment goods due to the upgrade of infrastructure increase investment by sector activity above 
QI levels by 11% and 7% on average in the QII and QIII scenarios, respectively (for the period 
2015–30). Private consumption is found to increase in both the QII and QIII scenarios relative to 
QI. Both exports and imports increase relative to QI, with the latter increasing more than the former 
in volume terms. Nevertheless, current account effects relative to QI are very limited thanks to a 
readjustment of terms of trade, which is beneficial to the SEMC region.  
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Table 51. Macroeconomic impacts of scenario QII, change from QI cumulatively over 2015–30*  
 SEMCs EU-27 Rest of the ME 
countries 
EAEs World 
 (bn 
US$) 
(%)  (bn 
US$) 
(%)  (bn 
US$) 
(%)  (bn 
US$) 
(%)  (bn 
US$) 
(%)  
GDP 2,896 7.03 1,321 0.42 -7 -0.02 -48 -0.01 4,131 0.29 
Investment 997 10.94 242 0.35 0 0.00 -1 0.00 1,230 0.39 
Public 
expenditure 848 11.19 0 0.00 0 0.00 0 0.00 848 0.34 
Private 
consumption 
1,414 5.65 775 0.42 2 0.01 -20 -0.01 2,128 0.25 
Exports 1,344 13.45 943 1.34 -15 -0.10 -75 -0.12 - - 
Imports 1,708 16.28 639 0.81 -6 -0.05 -48 -0.09 - - 
Employment - 2.02 - 0.59 - -0.04 - 0.00 - 0.09 
Real wages - 4.78 - -0.62 - -0.11 - -0.02 - 0.01 
* For detailed country results, see the appendix, Table 71. 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
The economic impacts on the EU are generally small: they are clearly positive in the case of the QII 
scenario but slightly negative in the QIII scenario. The economic impacts on the rest of the world’s 
regions are negligible in QII, but slightly positive for the Middle Eastern countries and for the 
emerging Asian economies in QIII, as expected. 
Table 52. Macroeconomic impacts of scenario QIII, change from QI cumulatively over 2015–3040 
  SEMCs EU-27 Rest of the ME 
countries 
EAEs World 
  (bn 
US$) 
(%)  (bn 
US$) 
(%)  (bn 
US$) 
(%)  (bn 
US$) 
(%)  (bn 
US$) 
(%)  
GDP 1,905 4.62 -119 -0.04 115 0.32 356 0.10 2,350 0.17 
Investment 675 7.41 -24 -0.03 16 0.20 26 0.03 662 0.21 
Public 
expenditure 555 7.32 0 0 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 555 0.22 
Private 
consumption 
1,527 6.10 -322 -0.17 99 0.54 125 0.06 1,177 0.14 
Exports 1,425 14.27 -94 -0.13 159 1.07 1,072 1.69 - - 
Imports 2,278 21.70 -321 -0.41 160 1.33 867 1.61 - - 
Employment - 1.35 - 0.00 - 1.22 - 0.00 - 0.07 
Real wages - 7.15 - -0.13 - -1.90 - 0.07 - 0.07 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
Both scenarios (QII and QIII) are found to improve welfare, measured by Hicksian equivalent 
variation (Table 53). Lower unemployment rates and higher wages induced mainly by projects to 
upgrade the infrastructure lead to an increase in household income. In the presence of lower interest 
                                                   
40 Same as above. 
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rates, households prefer to use their income for consumption rather than savings. Hence, in the 
period 2015–30, consumption increases above QI levels by 5.65% and 6.10% in the QII and QIII 
scenarios, respectively.  
Table 53. Hicksian equivalent variation of welfare (bn US$) 
  QII QIII 
 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Israel 0.19 0.61 0.99 1.41 0.19 1.05 2.08 3.64 
Turkey -0.02 3.89 8.74 15.73 0.73 6.07 11.64 18.87 
Algeria 1.76 4.45 7.55 11.42 0.70 2.21 3.81 5.83 
Egypt 0.76 3.21 5.71 9.07 0.75 3.29 5.95 9.55 
Morocco 0.89 2.12 3.19 4.54 0.47 1.43 2.19 3.25 
Tunisia 0.71 2.57 3.91 5.73 0.28 1.34 2.17 3.46 
Libya -0.26 1.43 3.09 5.02 -0.18 1.39 2.63 4.01 
Lebanon 0.29 0.97 1.50 2.11 0.23 0.77 1.25 1.90 
Syria 0.32 0.84 1.35 2.02 0.20 0.73 1.21 1.83 
Jordan 0.22 0.75 1.09 1.48 0.45 1.69 2.19 2.74 
Palestine 1.29 0.91 1.04 1.27 0.77 0.90 1.06 1.27 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
GDP per capita in the SEMCs increases in both the QII and QIII scenarios (Table 54). Despite the 
significant increases in GDP per capita, many of the SEMCs are projected to lag considerably 
behind the global average. 
Table 54. GDP per capita in scenarios QII and QII, changes relative to QI in 2030 (%) 
 QII QIII 
Israel 2.54 3.57 
Turkey 6.38 3.42 
Algeria 27.26 14.40 
Egypt 14.65 10.94 
Morocco 12.82 7.96 
Tunisia 18.32 11.03 
Libya 24.60 19.69 
Lebanon 13.52 10.87 
Syria 7.79 6.26 
Jordan 10.98 10.79 
Palestine 21.18 16.51 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
Production increases mainly in the sectors producing the investment goods and the services for 
upgrading infrastructure and in sectors that are favoured by trade liberalisation. In QII, the increase 
in production is found to be higher in equipment and basic manufacturing goods, as well as in 
construction and services. The textile sector benefits from trade liberalisation in the context of the 
QII scenario. This contrasts with the QIII context, where trade liberalisation with Asian and Middle 
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Eastern economies induces lower production levels in the equipment goods industry and in some of 
the consumer goods industry, obviously because of fiercer competition (Table 55).  
Table 55. Sectoral production effects in QII and QIII, cumulative changes from QI over 2015–30* 
 QII QIII 
  (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) 
Agriculture 131 3.02 541 12.46 
Energy 409 1.96 -13 -0.06 
Chemical products 568 17.42 881 27.01 
Other energy-intensive 565 8.99 -136 -2.16 
Electric goods – Other equipment goods 413 8.89 -248 -5.34 
Transport equipment 180 9.12 -37 -1.89 
Consumer goods industries – Food 293 5.72 258 5.04 
Consumer goods industries – Rest 52 6.93 8 1.06 
Textiles and clothing 1,165 28.48 731 17.86 
Construction 1,112 15.42 745 10.34 
Transport 182 2.74 -14 -0.21 
Communication 173 11.21 122 7.87 
Services 1,201 3.86 738 2.37 
* For detailed sectoral results for the SEMCs, see the appendix, Table 82 and Table 83. 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
Employment increases by 2.02% and 1.35% in QII and QIII, respectively, relative to the QI 
scenario. The effects on sectoral employment follow the same pattern as production by sector. Job 
creation is particularly more intense in construction, services and those sectors providing inputs 
related to investment, all of which are favoured by infrastructure investment (Table 56).41  
Table 56. Sectoral employment effects in QII and QIII, changes from QI cumulatively, 2015–30 (%) 
 QII QIII 
Agriculture -1.9 12.1 
Energy 1.3 -0.8 
Chemical products 7.4 26.7 
Other energy-intensive 5.2 -4.0 
Electric goods – Other equipment goods 8.1 -6.7 
Transport equipment 2.5 -4.7 
Consumer goods industries – Food -3.1 0.5 
Consumer goods industries – Rest -1.8 -4.9 
Textiles and clothing 3.0 -6.8 
Construction 12.7 7.2 
Transport -0.8 -5.5 
Communication 7.0 4.9 
Services 1.0 0.7 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
                                                   
41 Same as above. 
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Scenario QIV describes a gloomy future for the Euro-Mediterranean area. The QIV scenario design 
involves continual threats in the region during 2015–30, which undermine investment, trade and 
demographic developments. The lack of political stability further provokes higher risk factors and 
higher interest rates. The quantification of scenario QIV confirms a decreasing trend in the 
economic activity and welfare of the region, for both the SEMCs and the EU, ensuing from 
persisting tensions, which destroy the existing capital and increase the investment risk of the region. 
The increase of trade barriers that impede trade integration in the SEMC region further decreases 
activity and welfare.  
The destruction of capital due to conflicts in the southern Mediterranean region along with the 
reduction of government investment results in a 12.71% reduction of GDP in the SEMCs compared 
with the QI case (over the 2015–30 period). GDP in the SEMC region is also reduced because of 
increased barriers to trade, which reduce demand for exports and thus regional economic activity. 
Increased import prices reduce household purchasing power and higher interest rates postpone 
consumption, hence reducing final demand. 
Production costs increase compared with the reference case due to trade restrictions, leading to 
higher import prices, capital scarcity and a reduction of the active population, which increases real 
wages.  
Table 57 summarises the key macroeconomic results of the QIV scenario. As a result of the 
slackened final demand and increased unit production costs, private consumption and exports 
decrease compared with the QI scenario by 13.26% and 20.76% respectively over the period 2015–
30. Increased business uncertainty and financial instability increases the investment risk associated 
with the region. Investment is reduced compared with QI by 13.42% over the period 2015–30. 
Under increased threats and regional conflicts, the labour participation and school enrolment rates 
decrease, making skilled labour scarce. Following the reductions in overall activity and in the active 
population, employment reduces by 1.54% compared with the QI scenario. 
Table 57. Macroeconomic impacts of scenario QIV: Change from the QI scenario, cumulatively 
over 2015–30* 
 SEMCs EU-27 Rest of the ME 
countries 
EAEs World 
 (bn US$) (%)  (bn US$) (%)  (bn US$) (%)  (bn US$) (%)  (bn US$) (%)  
GDP -5,239 -12.71 -21 -0.01 -1 0.00 115 0.03 -5,010 -0.35 
Investment -1,223 -13.42 -35 -0.05 0 -0.01 0 0.00 -1,271 -0.40 
Private consumption -3,317 -13.26 -398 -0.21 -23 -0.13 -155 -0.08 -4,323 -0.51 
Exports -2,074 -20.76 42 0.06 2 0.01 235 0.37 - - 
Imports -1,375 -13.10 -370 -0.47 -21 -0.17 -35 -0.06 - - 
Employment - -1.54 - 0.02 - -0.01 - 0.01 - -0.03 
Real wages - -12.86 - -0.12 - -0.11 - -0.03 - -0.36 
* For detailed sectoral results for the SEMCs, see the appendix, Table 71. 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
Table 58 presents the impact on GDP for all the SEMCs. Countries where the financial sector is 
important in terms of value added, such as Israel, present the highest reductions in GDP compared 
with the QI scenario. For Jordan and Tunisia, consumption is the main driver of the reduction in 
GDP. The export-driven economy of Libya is severely affected by trade restrictions.  
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Table 58. GDP impacts by SEMC of scenario QIV: Change from QI cumulatively over 2015–30 (%) 
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GDP -16.6 -11.8 -11.7 -12.2 -13.8 -15.0 -12.4 -13.8 -11.2 -16.6 -19.2 -12.7 
Investment -21.1 -15.5 -7.2 -10.1 -10.2 -10.9 -6.6 -9.8 -13.1 -16.3 22.4 -13.4 
Private consumption -16.3 -13.0 -12.4 -12.3 -13.7 -15.7 -10.4 -15.7 -12.2 -19.9 32.1 -13.3 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
Production by sector of activity decreases significantly in QIV compared with the other scenarios 
(Table 59).42 
Table 59. Sectoral production in QIV for the SEMC region, change from QI cumulatively over 
2015–30* 
  (bn US$)  (%)  
Agriculture -237 -5.45 
Energy -1444 -6.91 
Chemical products -640 -19.62 
Other energy-intensive -728 -11.59 
Electric goods – Other equipment goods -984 -21.18 
Transport equipment -352 -17.80 
Consumer goods industries – Food -457 -8.95 
Consumer goods industries – Rest -98 -13.00 
Textiles and clothing -778 -19.02 
Construction -893 -12.40 
Transport -809 -12.15 
Communication -158 -10.25 
Services -2486 -7.99 
* For detailed sectoral results, see the appendix, Table 82 and Table 83. 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
Household consumption patterns change due to the presence of conflicts, reduced welfare and 
insecurity. Demand for medical care and health services increases by 14%, while demand for 
recreational and other services falls by 17% in 2030 compared with the reference scenario. Figure 5 
summarises the quantified results for GDP for the QI scenario and the alternative scenarios. The 
results show positive effects on the GDP of the SEMCs in both the QII and QIII scenarios. GDP and 
welfare benefits are higher in QII than in QIII for most of the SEMCs (Table 60). Both QII and QIII 
have negative effects on the current accounts of the SEMCs. The EU enjoys benefits in QII but 
bears small negative impacts in QIII. The QIV projection shows significant negative impacts on 
GDP in all the SEMCs. 
 
                                                   
42 It was assumed that over the 2015–30 period, there would be no reconstruction initiatives; hence the 
activity in all sectors decrease compared with the QI scenario. 
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Figure 5. GDP projections for the QI–QIV scenarios 
 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
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Table 60. Summary of impacts on GDP, welfare and the current account, changes from QI 
cumulatively over 2015–30 
 QII QIII 
 GDP (% 
change 
from QI) 
Equivalent 
variation 
of welfare 
(bn US$) 
Current 
account as 
% of GDP 
(in p.p. 
difference 
from QI) 
GDP 
(% 
change 
from 
QI) 
Equivalent 
variation 
of welfare 
(bn US$) 
Current 
account as 
% of GDP 
(in p.p. 
difference 
from QI) 
Algeria 16.77 97.8 -0.72 8.71 49.0 -0.87 
Egypt 9.99 73.3 -0.02 7.73 76.3 1.18 
Israel 2.01 12.6 0.19 2.30 27.0 0.61 
Jordan 8.15 14.1 2.19 8.17 28.5 7.25 
Lebanon 9.45 19.3 -2.35 7.11 16.3 -0.69 
Libya 16.26 37.1 1.22 13.83 31.8 2.00 
Morocco 9.14 42.0 -1.61 5.57 28.8 -0.60 
Syria 5.66 17.7 0.19 4.52 15.6 0.04 
Tunisia 13.02 51.0 -2.98 7.74 28.5 -1.43 
Turkey 4.36 110.3 -0.17 2.45 146.6 -0.32 
Palestine 12.72 16.1 -1.21 9.60 15.2 0.00 
SEMCs 7.03 491.2 -0.15 4.62 463.5 0.06 
EU-27 0.42 218.9 0.04 -0.04 -60.0 0.01 
Rest of ME countries -0.02 1.0 0.01 0.32 43.2 0.14 
Emerging Asian economies -0.01 -3.5 -0.01 0.10 25.4 -0.06 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
 
5. Sensitivity analysis 
5.1 Fixed current account 
In the simulations examined so far, the SEMCs have been allowed to change their current accounts 
in order to adjust to the structural changes imposed. As a result, most of the countries increased 
their borrowing from abroad in QII and QIII compared with QI, deteriorating in this way their 
current accounts. To examine a more plausible, sustainable growth path for the SEMCs, additional 
simulations have been performed assuming restrictions on current account deficits. Thus, the QII 
and QIII scenarios have been simulated so that the current account deficit or surplus (as a 
percentage of GDP) of each SEMC is the same as in QI. The balancing instrument chosen was the 
real interest rate.43 
 
                                                   
43 For a detailed discussion on current account liberalisation and vulnerability in the countries of the southern 
Mediterranean, see Mouley (2012). 
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Table 61 presents the main macroeconomic aggregate results for the SEMCs for both the standard 
scenarios (A) and the sensitivity scenario (S). The overall activity level in the SEMCs was found to 
be virtually the same as in the standard scenarios. However this was achieved through a different 
adjustment process: the SEMCs increased their interest rates in order to avoid current account 
deterioration. Essentially, they performed a domestic devaluation leading to lower consumption, 
higher exports and lower imports. 
Table 61. Main macroeconomic aggregates for the SEMCs, change from QI, cumulatively over 
2015–30* 
 QII QIII 
 S A S A 
GDP 7.00 7.03 4.58 4.62 
Investment 10.80 10.94 7.41 7.41 
Public consumption 11.19 11.19 7.32 7.32 
Private consumption 5.09 5.65 6.23 6.10 
Exports 14.22 13.45 13.68 14.27 
Imports 15.65 16.28 21.60 21.70 
Current account  
(% of GDP, in p.p. differences) 
- -0.15 - 0.06 
Employment (in b man hours) 2.12 2.02 1.30 1.35 
Real interest rate  
(average p.p. difference) 
-0.96 -0.99 -0.69 -0.69 
Terms of trade 5.07 4.85 11.22 11.29 
Real wage (man hour) 4.41 4.78 6.98 7.15 
* For detailed results, see the appendix, Table 72. 
A: Main scenario results; S: Sensitivity scenario results 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
 
In particular, the direct effect of the higher real interest rates is a lower level of consumption and 
investment (at higher interest rates, households prefer to save). In both the QII and QIII scenarios, 
real wages decrease (countries adjust through domestic depreciation) compared with the case where 
the current account is not balanced (Tables 61-63).  
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Table 62. Macroeconomic impacts of scenario QII: Changes from the QI scenario, cumulatively over 2015–30 (%) 
 Israel Turkey Algeria Egypt Morocco Tunisia Libya Lebanon Syria 
 S A S A S A S A S A S A S A S A S A S 
GDP 1.93 2.01 4.35 4.36 16.62 16.77 9.96 9.99 9.60 9.14 13.42 13.02 15.70 16.26 9.44 9.45 5.64 5.66 8.38 
Investment 2.79 2.80 7.90 7.93 20.44 21.04 13.08 13.15 14.83 15.02 22.32 22.81 15.23 15.00 22.66 22.92 7.24 7.24 8.91 
Public consumption 4.21 4.21 8.63 8.63 21.09 21.09 19.62 19.62 12.16 12.16 13.16 13.16 29.58 29.58 7.41 7.41 12.03 12.03 9.38 
Private consumption 1.52 1.30 3.02 3.38 9.78 11.75 8.85 8.98 7.26 9.80 13.04 18.67 13.64 9.19 7.23 11.51 5.85 5.55 14.39 
Exports 3.52 4.08 6.84 5.93 27.34 25.94 17.64 17.55 26.78 21.32 37.39 30.82 19.39 23.64 19.95 15.67 8.17 8.64 9.84 
Imports 4.54 4.49 9.68 10.06 29.70 31.60 22.09 22.23 22.86 24.96 39.01 41.62 39.53 34.98 18.48 20.70 13.40 13.34 17.53 
Current account (% of GDP, in p.p. differences) - 0.19 - -0.17 - -0.72 - -0.02 - -1.61 - -2.98 - 1.22 - -2.35 - 0.19 - 
Employment (in b man hours) 0.76 0.87 1.05 1.04 7.15 6.97 1.12 1.10 2.59 1.91 2.82 2.32 1.56 1.84 2.14 1.55 2.46 2.51 3.61 
Real interest rate (average p.p. difference) -0.17 -0.16 -0.69 -0.70 -2.63 -2.79 -1.23 -1.24 -1.21 -1.31 -1.72 -1.91 -1.72 -1.63 -1.68 -1.82 -0.73 -0.71 -0.89 
Terms of trade 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.29 10.42 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
A: Main scenario results; S: Sensitivity scenario results 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
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Table 63. Macroeconomic impacts of scenario QIII: Changes from the QI scenario, cumulatively over 2015–30 (%) 
 Israel Turkey Algeria Egypt Morocco Tunisia Libya Lebanon Syria Jordan 
 S A S A S A S A S A S A S A S A S A S A 
GDP 2.08 2.30 2.44 2.45 8.82 8.71 7.63 7.73 5.74 5.57 7.92 7.74 13.11 13.83 7.08 7.11 4.51 4.52 8.71 8.17 
Investment 2.55 2.35 6.50 6.55 10.78 11.29 8.17 8.02 8.58 8.65 11.92 12.17 10.00 9.39 13.04 13.14 4.47 4.49 8.19 6.94 
Public consumption 2.18 2.18 4.87 4.87 8.22 8.22 19.35 19.35 6.58 6.58 7.33 7.33 22.53 22.53 5.09 5.09 13.18 13.18 7.78 7.78 
Private consumption 3.66 2.85 4.31 4.95 4.38 6.52 11.65 9.59 5.81 6.75 7.51 10.10 14.86 7.78 7.60 8.95 5.64 5.56 38.72 22.67 
Exports 6.65 8.83 7.20 5.51 23.38 21.06 18.70 22.21 24.84 22.77 24.83 21.66 22.04 28.53 17.78 16.47 9.33 9.49 5.85 28.52 
Imports 9.38 9.27 18.57 19.29 27.80 29.53 32.80 30.92 21.92 22.64 24.54 25.60 57.41 50.04 16.58 17.27 17.72 17.73 43.98 37.04 
Current account (% of GDP, in p.p. differences) - 0.61 - -0.32 - -0.87 - 1.18 - -0.60 - -1.43 - 2.00 - -0.69 - 0.04 - 7.25 
Employment (in b man hours) 0.99 1.41 1.26 1.22 2.95 2.70 0.92 1.15 1.02 0.77 1.14 0.91 0.46 0.88 2.42 2.23 0.75 0.75 1.78 2.91 
Real interest rate (average p.p. difference) -0.11 -0.10 -0.59 -0.61 -1.51 -1.67 -0.81 -0.74 -0.74 -0.78 -1.04 -1.15 -1.22 -0.98 -1.04 -1.09 -0.43 -0.43 -0.92 -0.45 
Terms of trade 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 6.78 6.75 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
A: Main scenario results; S: Sensitivity scenario results 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
Table 64. Hicksian equivalent variation of welfare in scenarios QII and QIII, cumulatively over 2015–30 (bn US$) 
 Israel Turkey Algeria Egypt Morocco Tunisia Libya Lebanon Syria Jordan 
 S A S A S A S A S A S A S A S A S A S A 
QII 14.95 12.62 99.36 110.29 79.13 97.76 72.37 73.32 28.87 41.96 35.16 51.01 54.26 37.13 11.29 19.27 18.72 17.65 19.78 14.11 
QIII 35.73 26.97 125.72 146.65 28.94 48.99 94.13 76.34 23.87 28.76 20.70 28.50 62.84 31.75 13.81 16.30 15.84 15.58 47.03 28.52 
A: Main scenario results; S: Sensitivity scenario results 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
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5.2 Best policy scenario Q* 
To explore the growth path that provides the best welfare, employment and GDP prospects for the 
SEMCs, an additional scenario (Q*) has been designed and quantified using the GEM-E3-
MEDPRO model. This scenario draws from the QII and QIII scenario assumptions and represents 
the optimal policy mix in terms of GDP growth and employment creation. The main assumptions of 
the scenario are presented in Table 65.44 
Table 65. Assumptions for best policy scenario (Q*) 
Population Infrastructure Risk Trade 
- Population 
projection used 
in QII 
- Labour force 
increases in the 
SEMCs due to 
increased female 
participation 
 
- SEMCs invest in 
infrastructure and human 
capital (5.25% of GDP) 
- Funds from the EU, Middle 
East and BRICs are directed at 
infrastructure and human 
capital investment in the 
SEMCs 
- Infrastructure investment 
affects total factor 
productivity, increasing 
demand for investment goods 
and increasing the capital 
stock of specific sectors 
- Investment in human capital 
increases labour productivity 
- Governance 
improvements lead 
to a lower risk 
parameter in the 
SEMCs (lower than 
in the QII and QIII 
scenarios) 
- Import duties and 
NTBs removed 
between the SEMCs 
and the rest of the 
world 
- Logistics performance 
improved in the 
SEMCs, reducing 
transport costs between 
the SEMCs and the 
rest of the world 
 
Source: Authors’ assumptions. 
GDP in the optimal policy case increases by $3,368 billion compared with QI (Table 66). This is 
higher by $472 billion and $1,436 billion than QII and QIII respectively. Trade is intensified, 
leading to higher exports and imports along with employment increases by 2.55% above the 
reference case. This has a direct positive effect on welfare as measured by the Hicksian equivalent 
variation (increases by $963.2 billion).  
Table 66. Best policy scenario – Main macroeconomics aggregates, change from QI, cumulatively 
over 2015–30*  
  11 SEMCs EU-27 Rest of Arab 
countries 
EAEs World 
  (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) 
GDP 3,368 8.17 1,493 0.48 20 0.06 169 0.05 5,184 0.37 
Investment 1,381 15.15 220 0.32 2 0.02 -1 0.00 1,618 0.51 
Private consumption 3,011 12.04 502 0.27 29 0.16 -55 -0.03 3,380 0.39 
Exports 2,595 25.97 1,005 1.43 54 0.36 308 0.49 - - 
Imports 4,468 42.57 234 0.30 65 0.54 82 0.15 - - 
Employment - 2.55 - 0.59 - 0.08 - 0.01 - 0.12 
Real wages - 11.47 - -0.73 - 0.30 - 0.00 - 0.18 
Equivalent variation 963.20 - 167.48 - 7.49 - -16.58 - 1,104.97 - 
* For detailed results, see the appendix, Table 73. 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
                                                   
44 This scenario merges the assumptions of scenarios QII and QIII. 
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6. Conclusions and policy implications 
This report summarises the work completed for Work Package 8 on “Scenario building and impact 
assessment” of the MEDPRO project. Alternative scenarios of Euro-Mediterranean policies up to 
2030 have been quantified using GEM-E3-MEDPRO, a computable general equilibrium model 
specially built for the purposes of the MEDPRO project. The aim has been to assess the economic 
impacts of alternative approaches to cooperation policy in the region. 
The alternative scenarios assess the implementation of policies associated with Euro-Mediterranean 
cooperation (QII), the development of a global outlook by the southern Mediterranean countries 
(QIII) and the escalation of regional conflicts (QIV) as defined in Ayadi and Sessa (2011). The 
scenario projections have been compared with the QI reference scenario, which assumes a 
continuation of current Euro-Mediterranean policies. The scenarios involve explicitly different 
assumptions about infrastructure and human capital investment, interest rates, trade liberalisation 
and demographic changes. 
The model-based results suggest that Euro-Mediterranean cooperation policies can benefit 
economic growth in the region. Trade integration between the SEMCs and EU countries along with 
investment in infrastructure and human capital can have growth-enhancing effects. In the presence 
of strong trade relationships between the SEMCs and the EU, the creation of a single market can 
boost economic growth and employment. This effect is more pronounced for the economies that are 
already EU-oriented. 
Increasing the stock of infrastructure and human capital in the region also exert growth-enhancing 
effects. These positive effects on GDP accrue not only through the direct impacts of increasing 
capital stock and factor productivity, but also through indirect effects (for instance, enhanced 
attractiveness to flows of FDI). The simulations have confirmed that such policies can be pursued 
without creating imbalances in public finances or the current accounts of the SEMCs.  
The scenario involving an opening of the SEMC economies mainly towards the rest of the Middle 
East and Asian economies, and less towards the EU, was also found to increase GDP and activity. 
The magnitude of economic gains, however, is smaller than in the scenario that involves mainly 
cooperation with the EU. This stems from the higher exposure of the SEMC region to global trade 
and from the relatively lower amounts of foreign investment realised in the SEMCs.  
Investment in the SEMCs, in infrastructure and in production sectors has greater potential in the 
context of cooperation with the EU than in the context of global opening. That is because the 
complementarities between the SEMCs and the EU are clearly higher than when considering the 
SEMC region in relation to the rest of the Middle East and the emerging Asian economies. The 
structural effects on the economy are also different in the two cooperation cases: the SEMC sectors 
of production all benefit from EU cooperation, whereas some sectors bear adverse effects from the 
global opening. The EU economy is found to bear small negative effects in the scenario of the 
SEMCs focusing on global cooperation.  
The benefits for the EU, stemming from SEMC–EU cooperation, have been found to be clearly 
positive, albeit small in magnitude. At the same time, cooperation can also be seen from the 
perspective of ensuring stability in the region and hence avoiding negative effects for the EU, as 
found in the results of a scenario that assumes instability in the region. 
The simulation results suggest that the Euro-Mediterranean countries should push forward on 
cooperation policies of regional trade integration and investment, and that the EU has an interest in 
pursuing economic integration with the SEMCs. The establishment of a single market, investment 
in infrastructure and reduction of the risk associated with the possible escalation of regional 
conflicts can boost economic growth and welfare in the region, particularly in the context of 
SEMC–EU cooperation. 
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Appendix 
Table 67. Investment in infrastructure in QI by SEMC (% of total) 
  Transport Human 
capital 
Water & 
sanitation 
Telecommunications Electricity Total 
Algeria 56.92 8.23 0.00 3.33 31.51 100.00 
Egypt 23.89 9.60 43.60 1.65 21.26 100.00 
Israel 8.32 38.47 24.97 0.13 28.11 100.00 
Jordan 18.28 3.28 49.00 2.34 27.10 100.00 
Lebanon 9.58 14.72 32.08 3.83 39.80 100.00 
Libya 22.02 8.87 50.31 0.35 18.45 100.00 
Morocco 40.72 9.06 26.47 0.76 22.99 100.00 
Syria 34.03 6.06 2.69 3.77 53.45 100.00 
Tunisia 46.81 14.78 3.12 1.24 34.05 100.00 
Turkey 44.02 15.67 0.00 0.67 39.65 100.00 
Palestine 13.45 2.58 67.18 3.40 13.39 100.00 
SEMCs 33.79 13.33 20.64 1.39 30.86 100.00 
Source: Authors’ estimations. 
Table 68. Investment in infrastructure in QII by SEMC (% of total) 
  Transport Human 
capital  
Water & 
sanitation 
Telecommunications Electricity Total 
Algeria 58.89 10.40 0.71 2.12 27.88 100.00 
Egypt 19.84 14.59 34.78 1.61 29.18 100.00 
Israel 19.21 33.91 19.40 0.33 27.14 100.00 
Jordan 22.95 6.17 42.91 2.27 25.70 100.00 
Lebanon 17.79 23.97 23.48 3.55 31.22 100.00 
Libya 39.49 12.71 30.25 0.30 17.24 100.00 
Morocco 46.44 14.42 17.11 0.76 21.27 100.00 
Syria 33.49 11.84 3.38 3.78 47.51 100.00 
Tunisia 44.51 21.36 2.01 1.06 31.06 100.00 
Turkey 51.87 20.85 1.33 0.62 25.33 100.00 
Palestine 21.10 5.49 53.73 3.65 16.04 100.00 
SEMCs 40.18 17.21 14.82 1.21 26.58 100.00 
Source: Authors’ estimations. 
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Table 69. Investment in infrastructure in QIII by SEMC (% of total) 
  Transport Human 
capital  
Water & 
sanitation 
Telecommunications Electricity Total 
Algeria 53.40 10.93 1.03 2.86 31.78 100.00 
Egypt 18.25 10.54 34.42 1.41 35.37 100.00 
Israel 7.25 33.51 21.96 0.38 36.89 100.00 
Jordan 18.56 4.68 44.77 2.20 29.79 100.00 
Lebanon 6.72 19.49 29.58 3.61 40.59 100.00 
Libya 41.28 10.21 32.69 0.30 15.52 100.00 
Morocco 38.91 12.60 20.95 0.82 26.73 100.00 
Syria 35.47 8.36 3.78 3.41 48.97 100.00 
Tunisia 42.88 19.16 2.51 1.17 34.27 100.00 
Turkey 40.96 19.05 2.27 0.68 37.05 100.00 
Palestine 11.96 4.38 60.32 3.79 19.55 100.00 
SEMCs 32.78 14.89 17.41 1.27 33.65 100.00 
Source: Authors’ estimations. 
Table 70. Investment in infrastructure in QIV by SEMC (% of total) 
 Transport Human 
capital  
Water & 
sanitation 
Telecommunications Electricity Total 
Algeria 40.51 3.45 17.07 2.58 36.38 100.00 
Egypt 12.70 3.10 49.64 0.56 34.00 100.00 
Israel 9.73 21.26 36.97 0.15 31.89 100.00 
Jordan 9.09 1.00 67.26 1.22 21.44 100.00 
Lebanon 9.05 5.30 46.39 2.04 37.21 100.00 
Libya 42.66 4.85 25.34 0.24 26.90 100.00 
Morocco 31.24 3.85 37.97 0.38 26.56 100.00 
Syria 20.54 1.99 25.82 2.17 49.49 100.00 
Tunisia 39.09 7.90 8.53 0.88 43.60 100.00 
Turkey 42.07 7.25 0.00 0.22 50.46 100.00 
Palestine 29.79 1.84 26.17 5.47 36.73 100.00 
SEMCs 27.19 5.73 27.96 0.80 38.32 100.00 
Source: Authors’ estimations. 
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Table 71. Summary of macroeconomic aggregates with a flexible current account, GEM-E3-MEDPRO results 
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Table 71. Summary of macroeconomic aggregates with a flexible current account, GEM-E3-MEDPRO results (cont’d) 
 
 
EU - 15 Countries
Macroeconomic Aggregates (in b.$ 2007) % bn$ % bn$ % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030
Gross Domestic Product 0.5 878 0.0 -51 0.0 16 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Investment 0.4 143 0.0 -5 0.0 -9 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Public Consumption 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Private Consumption 0.4 417 -0.1 -108 -0.1 -142 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2
Exports 1.3 511 -0.1 -45 0.1 50 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.4 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Imports 0.5 193 -0.3 -108 -0.3 -116 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.6 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4
Terms of Trade 0.0 - 0.0 - -0.2 - -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4
Employment 0.7 - 0.0 - 0.0 - 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Equivalent Variation of Welfare - 130 - -21 - -29 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
New EU member states
Macroeconomic Aggregates (in b.$ 2007) % bn$ % bn$ % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030
Gross Domestic Product 0.2 53 0.0 -9 0.0 2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Investment 0.2 13 0.0 -2 0.0 -2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1
Public Consumption 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Private Consumption 0.3 52 -0.1 -20 -0.1 -21 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2
Exports 0.7 55 -0.1 -8 0.1 7 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Imports 0.7 67 -0.2 -20 -0.2 -18 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.8 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3
Terms of Trade 0.0 - 0.0 - -0.1 - 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.2
Employment 0.3 - 0.0 - 0.0 - 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Equivalent Variation of Welfare - 14 - -4 - -5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Israel
Macroeconomic Aggregates (in b.$ 2007) % bn$ % bn$ % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030
Gross Domestic Product 2.0 92 2.3 106 -16.6 -764 1.0 1.7 2.1 2.5 0.6 1.5 2.5 3.6 -10.8 -14.1 -17.4 -20.4
Investment 2.8 26 2.4 21 -21.1 -193 1.9 2.4 2.9 3.4 1.2 1.9 2.5 3.2 -14.4 -18.2 -22.0 -25.6
Public Consumption 4.2 42 2.2 22 0.0 0 3.9 4.1 4.3 4.5 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Private Consumption 1.3 37 2.8 80 -16.3 -460 -0.1 0.9 1.5 1.9 0.5 2.1 3.1 4.1 -10.2 -13.7 -17.1 -20.2
Exports 4.1 61 8.8 133 -24.5 -368 1.8 3.7 4.5 5.1 2.5 7.2 9.8 12.4 -13.3 -19.6 -26.5 -32.8
Imports 4.5 73 9.3 150 -15.8 -257 2.2 4.1 4.9 5.3 3.3 8.4 10.2 11.6 -7.6 -12.2 -17.4 -21.7
Terms of Trade 0.0 - 0.0 - 2.3 - 0.3 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.1 3.1 3.3 3.3 3.2 3.0 2.3 2.3
Employment 0.9 - 1.4 - -6.9 - 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.2 0.7 1.6 2.7 -0.8 -4.6 -8.1 -11.3
Equivalent Variation of Welfare - 13 - 27 - -164
Cumulative 2015 - 2030, changes from QI Scenario % changes from QI
QII QIII QIV QII QIII QIV
Cumulative 2015 - 2030, changes from QI Scenario % changes from QI
QII QIII QIV QII QIII QIV
Cumulative 2015 - 2030, changes from QI Scenario % changes from QI
QII QIII QIV QII QIII QIV
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Table 71. Summary of macroeconomic aggregates with a flexible current account, GEM-E3-MEDPRO results (cont’d) 
 
 
Turkey
Macroeconomic Aggregates (in b.$ 2007) % bn$ % bn$ % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030
Gross Domestic Product 4.4 909 2.4 509 -11.8 -2461 1.1 3.1 4.8 6.4 0.7 1.9 2.7 3.4 -8.6 -10.5 -12.3 -13.9
Investment 7.9 357 6.6 295 -15.5 -698 4.9 6.6 8.3 10.0 4.3 5.6 6.9 8.0 -10.9 -13.5 -16.1 -18.6
Public Consumption 8.6 325 4.9 184 0.0 0 10.0 9.2 8.5 7.9 5.6 5.2 4.8 4.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Private Consumption 3.4 454 5.0 665 -13.0 -1741 0.0 2.2 3.9 5.4 0.6 3.9 5.7 6.9 -9.3 -11.5 -13.5 -15.4
Exports 5.9 200 5.5 186 -21.5 -726 -1.5 3.8 6.9 10.0 0.6 5.5 5.9 6.8 -12.0 -16.6 -22.5 -29.6
Imports 10.1 428 19.3 820 -16.6 -704 5.6 9.4 10.9 11.7 7.3 17.5 21.3 23.7 -9.4 -13.1 -17.4 -22.7
Terms of Trade 0.0 - 0.0 - 0.3 - 0.3 0.6 0.2 -0.4 1.9 11.0 15.3 16.4 -0.3 -0.1 0.3 1.2
Employment 1.0 - 1.2 - -1.0 - 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.1 0.5 1.2 1.4 1.3 -0.1 -0.8 -1.2 -1.4
Equivalent Variation of Welfare - 110 - 147 - -464
Algeria
Macroeconomic Aggregates (in b.$ 2007) % bn$ % bn$ % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030
Gross Domestic Product 16.8 599 8.7 311 -11.7 -417 3.9 10.7 18.6 27.3 1.4 5.4 9.9 14.4 -9.5 -10.8 -12.0 -13.2
Investment 21.0 198 11.3 106 -7.2 -67 14.7 18.5 22.2 25.8 7.8 9.9 11.9 13.8 -5.6 -6.5 -7.5 -8.4
Public Consumption 21.1 113 8.2 44 0.0 0 21.8 21.4 20.9 20.6 8.5 8.4 8.2 8.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Private Consumption 11.7 179 6.5 99 -12.4 -189 2.4 7.8 12.9 18.3 1.4 4.6 7.2 9.9 -10.5 -11.5 -12.6 -13.9
Exports 25.9 326 21.1 264 -14.3 -179 -1.2 13.4 30.7 49.8 -0.6 12.3 25.3 37.8 -8.7 -12.1 -15.4 -18.4
Imports 31.6 217 29.5 203 -2.7 -19 18.2 28.3 34.4 39.0 11.0 24.9 33.3 39.9 1.4 -0.9 -3.4 -6.4
Terms of Trade 0.0 - 0.0 - -7.3 - 2.4 4.7 5.5 5.8 1.5 4.1 5.2 6.0 -1.6 -2.0 -2.5 -3.0
Employment 7.0 - 2.7 - -2.1 - 4.8 6.1 7.4 8.6 1.3 2.2 3.0 3.7 -1.1 -1.7 -2.3 -2.8
Equivalent Variation of Welfare - 98 - 49 - -113
Egypt
Macroeconomic Aggregates (in b.$ 2007) % bn$ % bn$ % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030
Gross Domestic Product 10.0 432 7.7 334 -12.2 -527 2.5 7.1 10.9 14.7 2.5 5.7 8.4 10.9 -9.8 -11.2 -12.5 -13.8
Investment 13.2 122 8.0 75 -10.1 -94 7.8 10.8 13.8 16.8 4.5 6.6 8.5 10.3 -6.7 -8.7 -10.5 -12.2
Public Consumption 19.6 161 19.4 159 0.0 0 23.8 21.3 19.2 17.5 23.5 21.0 18.9 17.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Private Consumption 9.0 252 9.6 269 -12.3 -344 1.8 6.8 10.0 13.1 1.9 7.1 10.7 14.1 -9.7 -11.2 -12.6 -14.1
Exports 17.6 193 22.2 244 -21.9 -240 -0.6 12.7 19.8 26.9 3.7 18.0 24.6 30.8 -14.3 -18.1 -22.6 -28.1
Imports 22.2 296 30.9 412 -11.3 -150 12.2 21.3 23.7 25.3 13.5 27.6 33.4 38.4 -6.6 -8.9 -11.7 -15.3
Terms of Trade 0.0 - 0.0 - -3.9 - 2.3 5.1 5.2 4.9 3.3 10.7 14.6 18.2 -2.1 -2.3 -2.7 -3.3
Employment 1.1 - 1.2 - -1.1 - 0.7 1.0 1.2 1.3 0.3 0.9 1.3 1.6 -0.3 -0.9 -1.3 -1.6
Equivalent Variation of Welfare - 73 - 76 - -114
Cumulative 2015 - 2030, changes from QI Scenario % changes from QI
QII QIII QIV QII QIII QIV
Cumulative 2015 - 2030, changes from QI Scenario % changes from QI
QII QIII QIV QII QIII QIV
Cumulative 2015 - 2030, changes from QI Scenario % changes from QI
QII QIII QIV QII QIII QIV
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Table 71. Summary of macroeconomic aggregates with a flexible current account, GEM-E3-MEDPRO results (cont’d) 
 
 
Morocco
Macroeconomic Aggregates (in b.$ 2007) % bn$ % bn$ % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030
Gross Domestic Product 9.1 199 5.6 121 -13.8 -301 3.0 7.0 10.0 12.8 1.6 4.2 6.1 8.0 -12.2 -13.1 -14.0 -15.0
Investment 15.0 86 8.7 49 -10.2 -58 10.8 13.5 15.8 17.9 6.0 7.8 9.1 10.4 -8.2 -9.4 -10.5 -11.6
Public Consumption 12.2 54 6.6 29 0.0 0 12.4 12.2 12.1 12.0 6.7 6.6 6.6 6.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Private Consumption 9.8 136 6.7 94 -13.7 -190 3.4 8.2 10.7 12.9 2.0 5.6 7.3 9.1 -11.8 -12.9 -13.9 -15.0
Exports 21.3 117 22.8 124 -28.6 -156 4.6 19.3 23.7 27.7 3.9 19.7 25.0 31.7 -19.8 -24.1 -29.6 -36.6
Imports 25.0 193 22.6 176 -13.4 -104 15.3 25.1 26.5 27.0 9.7 21.2 24.2 28.4 -7.5 -10.5 -14.2 -18.9
Terms of Trade 0.0 - 0.0 - 3.9 - 0.7 1.0 0.4 -0.5 1.0 1.7 1.3 0.9 3.1 3.5 4.3 5.5
Employment 1.9 - 0.8 - -1.2 - 1.3 1.7 2.0 2.3 0.3 0.6 0.9 1.1 -0.2 -0.8 -1.4 -2.0
Equivalent Variation of Welfare - 42 - 29 - -66
Tunisia
Macroeconomic Aggregates (in b.$ 2007) % bn$ % bn$ % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030
Gross Domestic Product 13.0 148 7.7 88 -15.0 -170 3.6 9.7 14.2 18.3 1.8 5.8 8.4 11.0 -12.0 -13.6 -15.3 -17.2
Investment 22.8 58 12.2 31 -10.9 -28 13.3 19.2 24.1 28.8 7.1 10.3 12.8 15.4 -7.2 -9.3 -11.4 -13.5
Public Consumption 13.2 28 7.3 16 0.0 0 14.5 13.7 13.0 12.4 8.1 7.6 7.3 6.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Private Consumption 18.7 133 10.1 72 -15.7 -112 5.1 16.5 20.5 23.6 2.0 8.4 11.0 13.8 -13.1 -14.6 -16.0 -17.5
Exports 30.8 150 21.7 106 -26.1 -127 6.8 26.4 34.2 41.3 3.2 18.4 23.8 30.2 -17.1 -21.5 -27.0 -34.1
Imports 41.6 222 25.6 136 -18.2 -97 16.4 39.6 45.2 49.6 7.9 23.4 27.6 32.9 -11.9 -15.1 -18.9 -23.5
Terms of Trade 0.0 - 0.0 - -4.5 - 4.1 9.2 8.6 7.7 2.0 5.7 5.7 5.7 -2.8 -3.2 -3.6 -4.2
Employment 2.3 - 0.9 - -1.6 - 1.7 2.2 2.5 2.6 0.5 0.8 1.0 1.0 -0.3 -1.1 -1.8 -2.4
Equivalent Variation of Welfare - 51 - 29 - -53
Libya
Macroeconomic Aggregates (in b.$ 2007) % bn$ % bn$ % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030
Gross Domestic Product 16.3 322 13.8 274 -12.4 -246 3.1 11.0 18.3 24.6 2.6 10.3 15.7 19.7 -9.5 -11.3 -12.9 -14.1
Investment 15.0 70 9.4 44 -6.6 -31 9.3 12.7 16.0 19.0 5.2 7.9 10.1 12.2 -4.4 -5.7 -7.1 -8.2
Public Consumption 29.6 79 22.5 60 0.0 0 32.1 30.5 29.2 28.2 24.4 23.2 22.3 21.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Private Consumption 9.2 62 7.8 53 -10.4 -70 -0.7 5.0 10.1 15.5 -0.4 4.8 8.6 12.4 -7.5 -9.2 -10.7 -12.0
Exports 23.6 182 28.5 220 -14.9 -115 0.7 15.1 28.2 38.5 1.7 22.5 33.9 40.7 -8.3 -13.0 -16.4 -18.0
Imports 35.0 72 50.0 103 14.4 30 27.1 35.8 36.9 34.8 19.6 50.0 55.8 56.1 20.1 15.3 12.8 12.9
Terms of Trade 0.0 - 0.0 - 9.3 - 2.9 4.5 5.0 5.2 2.4 8.0 9.1 9.5 3.0 2.6 2.4 2.6
Employment 1.8 - 0.9 - -2.4 - 0.9 1.4 2.0 2.5 0.4 1.0 1.1 0.7 0.5 -1.3 -2.9 -4.1
Equivalent Variation of Welfare - 37 - 32 - -62
Cumulative 2015 - 2030, changes from QI Scenario % changes from QI
QII QIII QIV QII QIII QIV
Cumulative 2015 - 2030, changes from QI Scenario % changes from QI
QII QIII QIV QII QIII QIV
Cumulative 2015 - 2030, changes from QI Scenario % changes from QI
QII QIII QIV QII QIII QIV
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Table 71. Summary of macroeconomic aggregates with a flexible current account, GEM-E3-MEDPRO results (cont’d) 
 
Lebanon
Macroeconomic Aggregates (in b.$ 2007) % bn$ % bn$ % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030
Gross Domestic Product 9.5 61 7.1 46 -13.8 -88 2.3 7.3 10.7 13.5 1.6 5.1 7.9 10.9 -10.2 -12.2 -14.3 -16.6
Investment 22.9 33 13.1 19 -9.8 -14 13.0 18.7 24.1 29.0 7.2 10.5 13.7 17.0 -5.7 -7.9 -10.3 -12.7
Public Consumption 7.4 13 5.1 9 0.0 0 6.8 7.1 7.5 8.0 4.7 4.9 5.2 5.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Private Consumption 11.5 49 9.0 38 -15.7 -66 3.1 9.7 13.1 15.7 2.5 7.3 10.0 12.7 -12.1 -14.1 -16.3 -18.8
Exports 15.7 39 16.5 41 -18.6 -46 1.6 13.8 17.9 20.6 3.1 13.7 18.2 22.8 -12.4 -15.7 -19.4 -23.5
Imports 20.7 73 17.3 61 -10.7 -38 8.9 18.9 22.5 25.7 7.3 15.6 18.7 21.9 -6.8 -8.8 -11.3 -14.3
Terms of Trade 0.0 - 0.0 - -1.8 - 3.4 6.0 6.4 6.6 3.0 5.2 5.4 5.4 -1.3 -1.3 -1.6 -2.2
Employment 1.6 - 2.2 - -3.8 - 0.7 1.4 1.8 1.8 0.2 1.3 2.6 4.0 -0.2 -2.4 -4.5 -6.6
Equivalent Variation of Welfare - 19 - 16 - -33
Syria
Macroeconomic Aggregates (in b.$ 2007) % bn$ % bn$ % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030
Gross Domestic Product 5.7 72 4.5 58 -11.2 -144 2.1 4.4 6.2 7.8 1.7 3.5 4.9 6.3 -8.4 -10.1 -11.7 -13.0
Investment 7.2 13 4.5 8 -13.1 -24 4.2 5.9 7.5 9.1 2.4 3.5 4.7 5.8 -8.5 -11.0 -13.5 -15.9
Public Consumption 12.0 20 13.2 21 0.0 0 14.8 12.9 11.7 10.8 16.2 14.1 12.9 11.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Private Consumption 5.5 43 5.6 43 -12.2 -95 1.4 4.3 6.2 7.8 1.4 4.5 6.1 7.7 -8.9 -10.7 -12.7 -14.6
Exports 8.6 44 9.5 49 -13.4 -69 2.5 7.3 9.7 11.4 3.3 8.4 10.4 12.1 -9.2 -11.7 -14.0 -16.2
Imports 13.3 48 17.7 64 -12.3 -44 6.6 12.9 14.3 14.8 9.4 17.5 18.8 19.5 -7.6 -9.9 -12.7 -15.9
Terms of Trade 0.0 - 0.0 - -7.3 - 1.7 3.4 4.1 4.6 2.1 4.6 5.7 6.7 -2.1 -2.6 -3.4 -4.6
Employment 2.5 - 0.7 - -2.2 - 2.2 2.4 2.6 2.7 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.8 -0.7 -1.7 -2.5 -3.0
Equivalent Variation of Welfare - 18 - 16 - -40
Jordan
Macroeconomic Aggregates (in b.$ 2007) % bn$ % bn$ % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030
Gross Domestic Product 8.2 45 8.2 45 -16.6 -92 2.9 6.3 8.8 11.0 2.8 6.5 8.9 10.8 -12.3 -14.7 -17.1 -19.5
Investment 8.5 14 6.9 11 -16.3 -26 5.1 7.2 9.0 10.7 3.4 6.0 7.4 8.8 -11.4 -14.2 -16.9 -19.6
Public Consumption 9.4 14 7.8 12 0.0 0 8.8 9.1 9.5 9.8 7.3 7.6 7.8 8.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Private Consumption 10.2 38 22.7 85 -19.9 -75 2.7 9.0 11.3 12.9 6.5 22.6 24.9 25.8 -14.8 -17.5 -20.5 -23.8
Exports 15.7 27 28.5 48 -19.6 -33 3.3 13.3 17.2 19.6 9.3 26.6 30.7 33.1 -11.3 -16.1 -20.3 -24.4
Imports 15.8 47 37.0 111 -14.0 -42 6.8 15.1 17.2 18.1 12.9 37.2 40.4 41.7 -8.5 -11.4 -14.7 -18.4
Terms of Trade 0.0 - 0.0 - -2.8 - 3.3 8.0 8.8 11.3 9.3 28.6 30.0 33.8 -2.1 -2.3 -2.4 -1.4
Employment 4.0 - 2.9 - -4.4 - 2.9 3.7 4.2 4.4 1.3 2.7 3.2 3.4 -1.3 -3.3 -4.9 -6.2
Equivalent Variation of Welfare - 14 - 29 - -33
Cumulative 2015 - 2030, changes from QI Scenario % changes from QI
QII QIII QIV QII QIII QIV
Cumulative 2015 - 2030, changes from QI Scenario % changes from QI
QII QIII QIV QII QIII QIV
Cumulative 2015 - 2030, changes from QI Scenario % changes from QI
QII QIII QIV QII QIII QIV
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Table 71. Summary of macroeconomic aggregates with a flexible current account, GEM-E3-MEDPRO results (cont’d) 
 
Palestine
Macroeconomic Aggregates (in b.$ 2007) % bn$ % bn$ % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030
Gross Domestic Product 12.7 18 9.6 14 -19.2 -29 0.0 7.7 14.2 21.2 1.0 5.3 10.6 16.5 -68.1 -27.1 -8.5 -7.4
Investment 42.7 20 32.2 15 22.4 10 36.3 37.8 43.6 50.3 24.6 28.7 33.4 38.4 30.1 29.7 18.1 15.9
Public Consumption 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Private Consumption 33.5 31 32.0 30 32.1 26 43.9 29.6 32.2 35.8 24.2 29.4 33.1 35.8 98.6 75.1 6.3 -3.5
Exports 23.0 5 46.2 10 -75.5 -15 -80.4 0.2 32.1 49.1 -30.0 28.0 53.4 65.8 -99.9 -99.8 -77.1 -50.5
Imports 50.8 38 55.3 42 65.5 50 53.8 43.8 51.3 57.7 33.2 49.1 59.8 66.4 212.2 123.0 13.0 3.4
Terms of Trade 0.0 - 0.0 - 13.3 - 23.3 8.7 6.4 4.8 10.5 8.5 7.4 6.1 -15.1 14.7 13.3 5.6
Employment 9.5 - 8.1 - 6.0 - 5.4 7.1 10.0 13.8 3.5 6.1 8.8 12.0 8.4 9.3 4.4 3.0
Equivalent Variation of Welfare - 16 - 15 - 17
Emerging Asian Economies
Macroeconomic Aggregates (in b.$ 2007) % bn$ % bn$ % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030
Gross Domestic Product 0.0 -48 0.1 356 0.0 115 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Investment 0.0 -1 0.0 26 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Public Consumption 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Private Consumption 0.0 -20 0.1 125 -0.1 -155 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Exports -0.1 -75 1.7 1072 0.4 235 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.3 0.7 1.7 1.8 1.8 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
Imports -0.1 -48 1.6 867 -0.1 -35 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.6 1.7 1.8 1.7 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
Terms of Trade 0.0 - 0.0 - 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Employment 0.0 - 0.0 - 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Equivalent Variation of Welfare - -4 - 25 - -46
Rest of Middle East Countries
Macroeconomic Aggregates (in b.$ 2007) % bn$ % bn$ % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030
Gross Domestic Product 0.0 -7 0.3 115 0.0 -1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Investment 0.0 0 0.2 16 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Public Consumption 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Private Consumption 0.0 2 0.5 99 -0.1 -23 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.6 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2
Exports -0.1 -15 1.1 159 0.0 2 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.7 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0
Imports -0.1 -6 1.3 160 -0.2 -21 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.6 1.3 1.4 1.5 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3
Terms of Trade 0.0 - 0.0 - 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Employment 0.0 - 1.2 - 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Equivalent Variation of Welfare - 1 - 43 - -7
Cumulative 2015 - 2030, changes from QI Scenario % changes from QI
QII QIII QIV QII QIII QIV
QII QIII QIV QII QIII QIV
Cumulative 2015 - 2030, changes from QI Scenario % changes from QI
QII QIII QIV QII QIII QIV
Cumulative 2015 - 2030, changes from QI Scenario % changes from QI
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Table 71. Summary of macroeconomic aggregates with a flexible current account, GEM-E3-MEDPRO results (cont’d) 
 
Rest of OECD
Macroeconomic Aggregates (in b.$ 2007) % bn$ % bn$ % bn$ 2011 2020 2025 2030 2011 2020 2025 2030 2011 2020 2025 2030
Gross Domestic Product 0.0 -28 0.0 54 0.0 105 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Investment 0.0 -7 0.0 -41 0.0 -8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Public Consumption 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Private Consumption 0.0 -28 -0.1 -255 -0.1 -294 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Exports 0.0 -16 -0.1 -29 0.4 219 0.2 0.1 -0.1 -0.2 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5
Imports 0.0 -23 -0.6 -379 -0.3 -188 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.6 -0.6 -0.7 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4
Terms of Trade 0.0 - 0.0 - -0.1 - -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.4 -0.6 -0.7 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2
Employment 0.0 - 0.0 - 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Equivalent Variation of Welfare - -4 - -45 - -51
Rest of Emerging Economies
Macroeconomic Aggregates (in b.$ 2007) % bn$ % bn$ % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030
Gross Domestic Product 0.0 2 0.0 39 0.0 24 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Investment 0.0 0 0.0 11 0.0 -5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Public Consumption 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Private Consumption 0.0 -9 0.1 59 -0.1 -91 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Exports 0.0 -12 0.9 212 0.2 40 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.5 0.9 0.9 1.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1
Imports -0.1 -23 1.1 244 -0.4 -81 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.2 1.5 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5
Terms of Trade 0.0 - 0.0 - 0.1 - 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Employment 0.0 - 0.0 - 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Equivalent Variation of Welfare - -1 - 12 - -20
Rest of World
Macroeconomic Aggregates (in b.$ 2007) % bn$ % bn$ % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030
Gross Domestic Product 0.0 -5 0.0 1 0.0 7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Investment 0.0 0 0.0 -2 0.0 -1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Public Consumption 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Private Consumption 0.0 -7 -0.1 -55 -0.1 -44 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Exports -0.1 -10 0.0 -6 0.2 33 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Imports -0.1 -12 -0.4 -65 -0.1 -20 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2
Terms of Trade 0.0 - 0.0 - 0.0 - 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Employment 0.0 - 0.0 - 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Equivalent Variation of Welfare - -1 - -10 - -9
Cumulative 2015 - 2030, changes from QI Scenario % changes from QI
Cumulative 2015 - 2030, changes from QI Scenario % changes from QI
QII QIII QIV QII QIII QIV
Cumulative 2011 - 2030, changes from QI Scenario % changes from QI
QII QIII QIV QII
QII QIII QIV QII QIII QIV
QIII QIV
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Table 71. Summary of macroeconomic aggregates with a flexible current account, GEM-E3-MEDPRO results (cont’d) 
 
 
WORLD
Macroeconomic Aggregates (in b.$ 2007) % bn$ % bn$ % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030
Gross Domestic Product 0.3 4131 0.2 2350 -0.4 -5010 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4
Investment 0.4 1230 0.2 662 -0.4 -1271 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.5
Public Consumption 0.3 849 0.2 555 0.0 0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Private Consumption 0.2 2128 0.1 1177 -0.5 -4323 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 -0.4 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6
Employment 0.1 - 0.1 - 0.0 - 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1
Equivalent Variation of Welfare - 702 - 429 - -1337
Cumulative 2015 - 2030, changes from QI Scenario % changes from QI
QII QIII QIV QII QIII QIV
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Table 72. Summary of macroeconomic aggregates with a fixed current account, GEM-E3-MEDPRO model results 
 
 
SEMC
Macroeconomic Aggregates (in b.$ 2007) % bn$ % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030
Gross Domestic Product 7.0 2884 4.6 1887 1.9 5.0 7.7 10.2 1.2 3.4 5.1 6.6
Investment 10.8 984 7.4 675 6.9 9.2 11.4 13.4 4.8 6.3 7.8 9.2
Public Consumption 11.2 849 7.3 555 12.2 11.6 11.1 10.5 8.0 7.6 7.3 6.9
Private Consumption 5.1 1273 6.2 1558 -0.9 3.0 6.0 8.7 0.4 4.5 7.1 9.3
Exports 14.2 1420 13.7 1367 3.4 11.5 15.9 19.7 3.3 11.7 15.1 18.4
Imports 15.6 1642 21.6 2267 7.2 14.4 17.0 18.9 8.4 19.3 23.7 27.1
Terms of Trade 5.1 - 11.2 - 1.7 3.7 3.7 3.5 1.8 7.2 8.8 9.8
Employment 2.1 - 1.3 - 1.7 2.1 2.2 2.3 0.7 1.2 1.4 1.5
Equivalent Variation of Welfare - 438 - 483
EU - 27 Countries
Macroeconomic Aggregates (in b.$ 2007) % bn$ % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030
Gross Domestic Product 0.4 1325 0.0 -117 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Investment 0.4 243 0.0 -24 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Public Consumption 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Private Consumption 0.4 802 -0.2 -335 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
Exports 1.3 924 -0.1 -88 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.5 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2
Imports 0.8 644 -0.4 -330 0.5 0.8 0.9 1.0 -0.2 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5
Terms of Trade 0.0 - 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 -0.1 -0.4 -0.5 -0.6
Employment 0.6 - 0.0 - 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Equivalent Variation of Welfare - 224 - -63
South EU member states
Macroeconomic Aggregates (in b.$ 2007) % bn$ % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030
Gross Domestic Product 0.3 393 0.0 -60 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
Investment 0.3 86 -0.1 -17 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Public Consumption 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Private Consumption 0.4 318 -0.3 -202 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
Exports 1.6 372 -0.2 -39 1.1 1.6 1.7 1.9 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
Imports 1.3 383 -0.7 -199 0.7 1.3 1.4 1.6 -0.3 -0.7 -0.8 -0.8
Terms of Trade 0.0 - 0.0 - 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 -0.2 -0.8 -1.0 -1.0
Employment 0.6 - 0.0 - 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Equivalent Variation of Welfare - 77 - -36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cumulative 2015 - 2030, changes from QI Scenario % changes from QI
QII QIII QII QIII
Cumulative 2015 - 2030, changes from QI Scenario % changes from QI
QII QIIIQII QIII
Cumulative 2015 - 2030, changes from QI Scenario % changes from QI
QIIIQII QIII QII
72 | PAROUSSOS, FRAGKIADAKIS, CHARALAMPIDIS, TSANI & CAPROS 
 
Table 72. Summary of macroeconomic aggregates with a fixed current account, GEM-E3-MEDPRO model results (cont’d) 
 
 
EU - 15 Countries
Macroeconomic Aggregates (in b.$ 2007) % bn$ % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030
Gross Domestic Product 0.5 878 0.0 -48 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Investment 0.4 144 0.0 -5 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Public Consumption 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Private Consumption 0.4 431 -0.1 -113 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Exports 1.3 498 -0.1 -41 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.4 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Imports 0.5 194 -0.3 -111 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.6 -0.1 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
Terms of Trade 0.0 - 0.0 - -0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3
Employment 0.7 - 0.0 - 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Equivalent Variation of Welfare - 132 - -22 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
New EU member states
Macroeconomic Aggregates (in b.$ 2007) % bn$ % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030
Gross Domestic Product 0.2 53 0.0 -9 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Investment 0.2 13 0.0 -2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Public Consumption 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Private Consumption 0.3 54 -0.1 -20 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2
Exports 0.7 54 -0.1 -7 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Imports 0.7 68 -0.2 -20 0.4 0.6 0.7 0.8 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2
Terms of Trade 0.0 - 0.0 - 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.4 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2
Employment 0.3 - 0.0 - 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Equivalent Variation of Welfare - 14 - -4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Israel
Macroeconomic Aggregates (in b.$ 2007) % bn$ % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030
Gross Domestic Product 1.9 89 2.1 96 1.0 1.6 2.1 2.4 0.5 1.4 2.2 3.3
Investment 2.8 25 2.5 23 1.8 2.4 2.9 3.4 1.5 2.0 2.7 3.4
Public Consumption 4.2 42 2.2 22 3.9 4.1 4.3 4.5 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.3
Private Consumption 1.5 43 3.7 103 -0.1 1.1 1.7 2.2 0.9 2.7 3.9 5.2
Exports 3.5 53 6.6 100 2.0 3.2 3.8 4.2 2.1 5.7 7.3 8.9
Imports 4.5 74 9.4 152 2.3 4.2 4.9 5.4 4.1 8.4 10.2 11.7
Terms of Trade 0.0 - 0.0 - 0.2 1.1 1.3 1.4 2.0 3.4 3.8 3.9
Employment 0.8 - 1.0 - 0.8 0.7 0.8 0.8 -0.1 0.4 1.1 2.1
Equivalent Variation of Welfare - 15 - 36
Cumulative 2015 - 2030, changes from QI Scenario % changes from QI
QII QIII QII QIII
Cumulative 2015 - 2030, changes from QI Scenario % changes from QI
QII QIII QII QIII
Cumulative 2015 - 2030, changes from QI Scenario % changes from QI
QII QIII QII QIII
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Table 72. Summary of macroeconomic aggregates with a fixed current account, GEM-E3-MEDPRO model results (cont’d) 
 
 
Turkey
Macroeconomic Aggregates (in b.$ 2007) % bn$ % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030
Gross Domestic Product 4.4 906 2.4 508 1.1 3.1 4.8 6.3 0.7 1.9 2.7 3.4
Investment 7.9 356 6.5 293 4.8 6.6 8.3 10.0 4.2 5.6 6.8 8.0
Public Consumption 8.6 325 4.9 184 10.0 9.2 8.5 7.9 5.6 5.2 4.8 4.5
Private Consumption 3.0 406 4.3 578 -1.2 1.5 3.7 5.6 -0.4 3.1 5.2 6.4
Exports 6.8 231 7.2 243 1.6 5.7 7.6 9.3 3.4 7.5 7.4 8.1
Imports 9.7 411 18.6 789 4.4 8.7 10.6 11.9 6.2 16.7 20.7 23.1
Terms of Trade 0.0 - 0.0 - 0.1 0.3 0.1 -0.5 1.6 10.7 15.0 16.1
Employment 1.0 - 1.3 - 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.1 0.5 1.3 1.4 1.3
Equivalent Variation of Welfare - 99 - 126
Algeria
Macroeconomic Aggregates (in b.$ 2007) % bn$ % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030
Gross Domestic Product 16.6 594 8.8 315 4.3 10.9 18.5 26.5 1.6 5.6 10.0 14.3
Investment 20.4 192 10.8 101 13.7 17.7 21.7 25.6 7.2 9.3 11.5 13.5
Public Consumption 21.1 113 8.2 44 21.8 21.4 20.9 20.6 8.5 8.4 8.2 8.0
Private Consumption 9.8 149 4.4 67 -3.7 3.9 11.5 19.4 -2.4 1.6 5.3 9.1
Exports 27.3 343 23.4 293 3.6 17.2 31.8 46.6 2.5 15.4 27.6 38.6
Imports 29.7 204 27.8 191 12.3 25.0 33.2 39.8 7.5 22.5 31.9 39.5
Terms of Trade 0.0 - 0.0 - 2.1 4.6 5.4 5.8 1.4 4.1 5.2 6.0
Employment 7.2 - 2.9 - 5.6 6.6 7.5 8.2 1.8 2.6 3.2 3.7
Equivalent Variation of Welfare - 79 - 29
Egypt
Macroeconomic Aggregates (in b.$ 2007) % bn$ % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030
Gross Domestic Product 10.0 430 7.6 330 2.5 7.2 10.9 14.5 2.5 5.7 8.3 10.7
Investment 13.1 122 8.2 76 7.6 10.7 13.7 16.8 4.5 6.6 8.6 10.7
Public Consumption 19.6 161 19.4 159 23.8 21.3 19.2 17.5 23.5 21.0 18.9 17.3
Private Consumption 8.9 248 11.7 327 0.3 5.3 10.1 14.9 1.2 7.6 13.2 18.6
Exports 17.6 194 18.7 205 2.2 15.5 19.6 23.2 5.0 17.2 20.4 23.3
Imports 22.1 295 32.8 437 10.8 20.1 23.8 26.7 12.9 28.1 35.7 42.5
Terms of Trade 0.0 - 0.0 - 2.4 5.1 5.2 4.9 3.4 10.7 14.5 18.0
Employment 1.1 - 0.9 - 0.9 1.2 1.2 1.1 0.4 0.9 1.0 1.1
Equivalent Variation of Welfare - 72 - 94
Cumulative 2015 - 2030, changes from QI Scenario % changes from QI
QII QIII QII QIII
Cumulative 2015 - 2030, changes from QI Scenario % changes from QI
QII QIII QII QIII
Cumulative 2015 - 2030, changes from QI Scenario % changes from QI
QII QIII QII QIII
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Table 72. Summary of macroeconomic aggregates with a fixed current account, GEM-E3-MEDPRO model results (cont’d) 
 
 
 
Morocco
Macroeconomic Aggregates (in b.$ 2007) % bn$ % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030
Gross Domestic Product 9.6 209 5.7 125 3.6 7.6 10.4 13.1 1.8 4.4 6.2 8.1
Investment 14.8 85 8.6 49 10.6 13.3 15.6 17.8 6.0 7.7 9.0 10.3
Public Consumption 12.2 54 6.6 29 12.4 12.2 12.1 12.0 6.7 6.6 6.6 6.5
Private Consumption 7.3 101 5.8 81 0.2 4.7 8.3 11.5 0.7 4.4 6.6 8.4
Exports 26.8 146 24.8 136 11.2 26.8 28.9 30.6 6.7 22.3 26.6 33.4
Imports 22.9 177 21.9 170 13.1 22.5 24.5 25.6 8.8 20.3 23.6 27.7
Terms of Trade 0.0 - 0.0 - 0.1 0.3 -0.1 -0.7 0.8 1.4 1.2 0.7
Employment 2.6 - 1.0 - 2.2 2.7 2.6 2.6 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.3
Equivalent Variation of Welfare - 29 - 24
Tunisia
Macroeconomic Aggregates (in b.$ 2007) % bn$ % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030
Gross Domestic Product 13.4 152 7.9 90 3.8 10.1 14.7 18.8 1.8 6.0 8.6 11.3
Investment 22.3 56 11.9 30 13.1 18.7 23.6 28.2 7.0 10.0 12.6 15.1
Public Consumption 13.2 28 7.3 16 14.5 13.7 13.0 12.4 8.1 7.6 7.3 6.9
Private Consumption 13.0 93 7.5 54 1.5 10.3 14.7 18.2 0.4 5.8 8.6 10.6
Exports 37.4 183 24.8 121 11.0 33.5 41.0 47.9 5.2 21.5 26.7 34.3
Imports 39.0 208 24.5 131 15.2 37.0 42.5 46.5 7.4 22.5 26.6 31.3
Terms of Trade 0.0 - 0.0 - 4.2 9.1 8.4 7.5 2.1 5.7 5.7 5.7
Employment 2.8 - 1.1 - 2.1 2.8 3.0 3.0 0.7 1.1 1.2 1.3
Equivalent Variation of Welfare - 35 - 21
Libya
Macroeconomic Aggregates (in b.$ 2007) % bn$ % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030
Gross Domestic Product 15.7 311 13.1 259 3.1 10.8 17.7 23.6 2.6 9.7 14.8 18.7
Investment 15.2 71 10.0 47 8.8 12.7 16.4 19.8 5.1 8.3 10.8 13.2
Public Consumption 29.6 79 22.5 60 32.1 30.5 29.2 28.2 24.4 23.2 22.3 21.5
Private Consumption 13.6 93 14.9 101 -5.4 6.0 15.6 25.1 -2.0 9.9 16.7 23.0
Exports 19.4 150 22.0 170 2.5 14.2 23.0 28.5 2.3 18.4 26.1 29.8
Imports 39.5 82 57.4 118 20.7 37.3 43.4 45.6 17.6 55.8 64.7 67.6
Terms of Trade 0.0 - 0.0 - 2.2 4.7 5.5 6.0 2.2 8.5 9.7 10.2
Employment 1.6 - 0.5 - 1.2 1.3 1.6 1.9 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.2
Equivalent Variation of Welfare - 54 - 63
Cumulative 2015 - 2030, changes from QI Scenario % changes from QI
QII QIII QII QIII
Cumulative 2015 - 2030, changes from QI Scenario % changes from QI
QII QIII QII QIII
Cumulative 2015 - 2030, changes from QI Scenario % changes from QI
QII QIII QII QIII
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Table 72. Summary of macroeconomic aggregates with a fixed current account, GEM-E3-MEDPRO model results (cont’d) 
 
 
Lebanon
Macroeconomic Aggregates (in b.$ 2007) % bn$ % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030
Gross Domestic Product 9.4 61 7.1 45 2.3 7.3 10.7 13.6 1.6 5.1 7.9 10.8
Investment 22.7 33 13.0 19 12.9 18.5 23.8 28.7 7.1 10.4 13.6 16.9
Public Consumption 7.4 13 5.1 9 6.8 7.1 7.5 8.0 4.7 4.9 5.2 5.5
Private Consumption 7.2 31 7.6 32 -0.2 5.4 8.8 10.9 0.8 5.5 8.8 11.9
Exports 20.0 49 17.8 44 5.1 18.2 22.0 25.2 5.0 15.5 19.3 23.6
Imports 18.5 65 16.6 59 7.2 16.6 20.3 23.3 6.4 14.6 18.1 21.5
Terms of Trade 0.0 - 0.0 - 2.7 5.1 5.5 5.7 2.6 4.8 5.1 5.2
Employment 2.1 - 2.4 - 1.3 2.1 2.3 2.4 0.5 1.6 2.7 4.1
Equivalent Variation of Welfare - 11 - 14
Syria
Macroeconomic Aggregates (in b.$ 2007) % bn$ % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030
Gross Domestic Product 5.6 72 4.5 58 2.1 4.4 6.1 7.7 1.7 3.5 4.9 6.2
Investment 7.2 13 4.5 8 4.2 5.9 7.5 9.1 2.4 3.5 4.7 5.8
Public Consumption 12.0 20 13.2 21 14.8 12.9 11.7 10.8 16.2 14.1 12.9 11.8
Private Consumption 5.9 45 5.6 44 1.5 4.2 6.5 8.6 1.3 3.9 6.3 8.5
Exports 8.2 42 9.3 48 2.3 7.4 9.1 10.2 3.4 9.0 10.1 11.1
Imports 13.4 48 17.7 64 6.8 12.8 14.4 15.1 9.3 17.0 18.8 20.0
Terms of Trade 0.0 - 0.0 - 1.6 3.4 4.0 4.4 2.1 4.8 5.8 6.6
Employment 2.5 - 0.7 - 2.1 2.4 2.5 2.5 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.7
Equivalent Variation of Welfare - 19 - 16
Jordan
Macroeconomic Aggregates (in b.$ 2007) % bn$ % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030
Gross Domestic Product 8.4 46 8.7 48 2.9 6.5 9.1 11.3 3.0 6.9 9.5 11.5
Investment 8.9 14 8.2 13 5.1 7.5 9.4 11.3 3.8 7.1 8.7 10.3
Public Consumption 9.4 14 7.8 12 8.8 9.1 9.5 9.8 7.3 7.6 7.8 8.1
Private Consumption 14.4 54 38.7 145 3.2 12.4 16.2 18.4 11.9 39.5 42.4 42.9
Exports 9.8 17 5.9 10 2.5 8.3 10.6 12.5 1.1 1.1 6.5 11.0
Imports 17.5 52 44.0 131 7.0 16.6 19.2 20.4 15.3 44.6 48.0 48.9
Terms of Trade 0.0 - 0.0 - 3.4 8.7 9.7 12.5 10.3 31.5 32.7 36.3
Employment 3.6 - 1.8 - 2.8 3.4 3.8 4.0 0.9 1.5 2.0 2.2
Equivalent Variation of Welfare - 20 - 47
Cumulative 2015 - 2030, changes from QI Scenario % changes from QI
QII QIII QII QIII
Cumulative 2015 - 2030, changes from QI Scenario % changes from QI
QII QIII QII QIII
Cumulative 2015 - 2030, changes from QI Scenario % changes from QI
QII QIII QII QIII
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Table 72. Summary of macroeconomic aggregates with a fixed current account, GEM-E3-MEDPRO model results (cont’d) 
Palestine
Macroeconomic Aggregates (in b.$ 2007) % bn$ % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030
Gross Domestic Product 10.3 15 9.5 14 1.4 5.4 11.4 18.0 -8.3 7.3 11.6 15.8
Investment 33.9 16 33.2 16 17.2 30.6 36.1 42.2 37.4 29.7 32.6 36.6
Public Consumption 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Private Consumption 12.4 11 28.6 27 -28.1 13.7 16.3 19.1 85.7 22.9 22.3 24.0
Exports 59.1 13 -17.5 -4 134.9 27.6 56.5 71.9 -99.1 -39.9 -9.6 5.5
Imports 34.6 26 32.9 25 2.0 31.9 39.6 45.2 108.3 22.0 23.6 26.3
Terms of Trade 0.0 - 0.0 - -5.5 6.0 4.5 3.1 33.7 7.8 4.4 2.7
Employment 7.7 - 7.6 - 2.4 5.8 8.5 11.9 6.5 5.6 7.7 10.5
Equivalent Variation of Welfare - 5 - 14
Emerging Asian Economies
Macroeconomic Aggregates (in b.$ 2007) % bn$ % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030
Gross Domestic Product 0.0 -59 0.1 358 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Investment 0.0 -1 0.0 25 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Public Consumption 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Private Consumption 0.0 2 0.1 112 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Exports -0.2 -108 1.7 1067 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 0.6 1.6 1.8 1.9
Imports -0.1 -47 1.6 847 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.6 1.6 1.7 1.6
Terms of Trade 0.0 - 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.0
Employment 0.0 - 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Equivalent Variation of Welfare - 2 - 22
Rest of Middle East Countries
Macroeconomic Aggregates (in b.$ 2007) % bn$ % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030
Gross Domestic Product 0.0 -7 0.3 114 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Investment 0.0 0 0.2 16 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2
Public Consumption 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Private Consumption 0.0 4 0.5 98 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.6
Exports -0.1 -16 1.1 159 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.6 1.1 1.1 1.1
Imports 0.0 -5 1.3 159 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.6 1.3 1.4 1.5
Terms of Trade 0.0 - 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.6
Employment 0.0 - 1.2 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 1.3 1.2 1.1
Equivalent Variation of Welfare - 2 - 43
% changes from QI
QII QIII QII QIII
Cumulative 2015 - 2030, changes from QI Scenario % changes from QI
Cumulative 2015 - 2030, changes from QI Scenario % changes from QI
QII QIII QII QIII
Cumulative 2015 - 2030, changes from QI Scenario
QII QIII QII QIII
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Table 72. Summary of macroeconomic aggregates with a fixed current account, GEM-E3-MEDPRO model results (cont’d) 
 
 
Rest of OECD
Macroeconomic Aggregates (in b.$ 2007) % bn$ % bn$ 2011 2020 2025 2030 2011 2020 2025 2030
Gross Domestic Product 0.0 -40 0.0 60 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Investment 0.0 -7 0.0 -40 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1
Public Consumption 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Private Consumption 0.0 24 -0.1 -262 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
Exports -0.1 -62 0.0 -21 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
Imports 0.0 -4 -0.6 -383 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.3 -0.6 -0.7 -0.7
Terms of Trade 0.0 - 0.0 - 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.4 -0.6 -0.7
Employment 0.0 - 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Equivalent Variation of Welfare - 5 - -46
Rest of Emerging Economies
Macroeconomic Aggregates (in b.$ 2007) % bn$ % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030
Gross Domestic Product 0.0 2 0.0 41 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Investment 0.0 0 0.0 12 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1
Public Consumption 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Private Consumption 0.0 3 0.1 57 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Exports -0.1 -20 0.9 218 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.4 0.9 1.0 1.1
Imports -0.1 -19 1.1 246 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.5 1.1 1.2 1.5
Terms of Trade 0.0 - 0.0 - 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.2 0.4 0.4 0.6
Employment 0.0 - 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Equivalent Variation of Welfare - 1 - 11
Rest of World
Macroeconomic Aggregates (in b.$ 2007) % bn$ % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030
Gross Domestic Product 0.0 -5 0.0 1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Investment 0.0 0 0.0 -2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Public Consumption 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Private Consumption 0.0 -1 -0.1 -57 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2
Exports -0.1 -15 0.0 -5 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Imports -0.1 -11 -0.4 -66 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5
Terms of Trade 0.0 - 0.0 - 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4
Employment 0.0 - 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Equivalent Variation of Welfare - 0 - -10
QII QIII QII QIII
QIII
Cumulative 2015 - 2030, changes from QI Scenario % changes from QI
Cumulative 2015 - 2030, changes from QI Scenario % changes from QI
QII QIII QII QIII
Cumulative 2011 - 2030, changes from QI Scenario % changes from QI
QII QIII QII
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Table 72. Summary of macroeconomic aggregates with a fixed current account, GEM-E3-MEDPRO model results (cont’d) 
 
 
  
WORLD
Macroeconomic Aggregates (in b.$ 2007) % bn$ % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 2015 2020 2025 2030
Gross Domestic Product 0.3 4099 0.2 2344 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2
Investment 0.4 1219 0.2 662 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3
Public Consumption 0.3 849 0.2 555 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Private Consumption 0.2 2108 0.1 1171 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.2
Employment 0.1 - 0.1 - 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Equivalent Variation of Welfare - 673 - 440
QII QIII QII QIII
Cumulative 2015 - 2030, changes from QI Scenario % changes from QI
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Table 73. Macroeconomic aggregates by country (Q* scenario), GEM-E3-MEDPRO model results 
 
  
SEMCs EU 27 South EU member states 
  
Cumulative 2015 - 
2030. changes 
from QI Scenario % changes from QI 
Cumulative 2015 
- 2030. changes 
from QI Scenario % changes from QI 
Cumulative 2015 - 
2030. changes 
from QI Scenario % changes from QI 
Macroeconomic Aggregates (in b.$ 2007) % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Gross Domestic Product 8.2 3368 2.1 5.7 9.0 12.1 0.5 1493 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.3 401 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 
Investment 15.2 1381 10.1 13.0 15.9 18.6 0.3 220 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.2 73 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 
Public Consumption 11.2 849 12.2 11.6 11.1 10.5 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Private Consumption 12.0 3011 6.2 9.8 12.9 15.6 0.3 502 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.2 153 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 
Exports 26.0 2595 11.0 20.2 28.5 35.7 1.4 1005 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.5 343 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.6 
Imports 42.6 4468 32.2 39.5 44.5 48.1 0.3 234 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.6 168 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 
Terms of Trade 14.1 - 8.5 9.7 9.8 9.2 0.0 - -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.4 0.0 - -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.4 
Employment 2.6 - 1.8 2.3 2.7 3.0 0.6 - 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 - 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 
Equivalent Variation of Welfare - 963         - 167         - 48 0 0 0 0 
                                      
  EU10 New EU member states Israel 
  
Cumulative 2015 - 
2030. changes 
from QI Scenario % changes from QI 
Cumulative 2015 
- 2030. changes 
from QI Scenario % changes from QI 
Cumulative 2015 - 
2030. changes 
from QI Scenario % changes from QI 
Macroeconomic Aggregates (in b.$ 2007) % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Gross Domestic Product 0.6 1011 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.3 81 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 3.1 141 1.6 2.5 3.3 3.9 
Investment 0.4 137 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.2 10 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 6.4 59 4.4 5.6 6.7 7.8 
Public Consumption 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.2 42 3.9 4.1 4.3 4.5 
Private Consumption 0.3 318 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.2 30 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 5.4 153 3.7 4.9 5.7 6.2 
Exports 1.5 585 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.0 77 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.2 9.1 137 5.7 8.3 9.8 10.6 
Imports 0.1 29 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.4 37 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 15.4 250 11.2 14.5 16.2 17.1 
Terms of Trade 0.0 - -0.3 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - 4.0 5.1 5.5 5.6 
Employment 0.7 - 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.3 - 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 1.1 - 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.3 
Equivalent Variation of Welfare - 111 0 0 0 0 - 9 0 0 0 0 - 41         
                                      
  Turkey Algeria Egypt 
  
Cumulative 2015 - 
2030. changes 
from QI Scenario % changes from QI 
Cumulative 2015 
- 2030. changes 
from QI Scenario % changes from QI 
Cumulative 2015 - 
2030. changes 
from QI Scenario % changes from QI 
Macroeconomic Aggregates (in b.$ 2007) % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Gross Domestic Product 5.3 1096 1.4 3.7 5.8 7.6 17.9 640 3.9 11.3 19.9 29.5 11.2 486 3.1 7.9 12.2 16.6 
Investment 11.5 518 7.2 9.7 12.1 14.4 26.4 248 18.8 23.2 27.8 32.2 17.5 163 10.4 14.4 18.4 22.4 
Public Consumption 8.6 325 10.0 9.2 8.5 7.9 21.1 113 21.8 21.4 20.9 20.6 19.6 161 23.8 21.3 19.2 17.5 
Private Consumption 8.1 1091 3.5 6.4 8.9 11.1 21.2 324 11.0 16.7 22.6 28.7 16.1 452 7.9 13.1 17.4 21.3 
Exports 13.4 451 5.1 10.6 14.6 18.1 35.8 449 6.2 21.6 41.1 62.5 35.6 391 17.5 28.4 38.1 47.4 
Imports 30.4 1290 22.0 27.7 31.8 35.2 72.0 494 52.3 65.6 76.3 84.4 51.1 682 39.2 47.3 53.3 57.4 
Terms of Trade 0.0 - 3.3 3.6 3.3 2.5 0.0 - 10.0 12.7 13.7 13.7 0.0 - 10.5 11.9 12.2 11.6 
Employment 1.4 - 1.1 1.3 1.5 1.5 7.8 - 5.4 6.9 8.3 9.6 1.4 - 0.9 1.2 1.5 1.6 
Equivalent Variation of Welfare - 254         - 165         - 127         
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Table 73. Macroeconomic aggregates by country (Q* scenario), GEM-E3-MEDPRO model results (cont’d) 
  Morocco Tunisia Libya 
Morocco 
Cumulative 2015 - 
2030. changes 
from QI Scenario % changes from QI 
Cumulative 2015 - 
2030. changes 
from QI Scenario % changes from QI 
Cumulative 2015 - 
2030. changes 
from QI Scenario % changes from QI 
Macroeconomic Aggregates (in b.$ 2007) % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Gross Domestic Product 7.8 169 0.3 4.7 8.8 12.7 15.2 173 5.4 11.3 16.5 21.3 23.7 468 5.3 16.4 26.7 35.0 
Investment 20.7 118 15.1 18.6 21.7 24.6 28.2 71 17.3 23.5 29.7 35.7 20.0 94 12.5 16.9 21.4 25.5 
Public Consumption 12.2 54 12.4 12.2 12.1 12.0 13.2 28 14.5 13.7 13.0 12.4 29.6 79 32.1 30.5 29.2 28.2 
Private Consumption 18.4 255 11.8 16.1 19.3 22.1 27.0 192 15.9 23.0 28.6 33.3 21.1 143 8.7 15.5 22.2 29.3 
Exports 48.4 265 33.2 43.3 51.0 57.7 45.4 222 26.6 38.5 48.4 57.2 48.4 373 11.6 34.8 56.2 71.2 
Imports 67.5 523 58.2 65.0 69.4 72.3 63.9 340 46.1 57.8 66.9 74.5 106.9 221 78.1 101.4 114.3 116.8 
Terms of Trade 0.0 - 10.2 9.0 7.9 6.5 0.0 - 10.8 11.4 11.1 10.4 0.0 - 9.1 12.3 13.9 14.5 
Employment 2.3 - 1.6 2.1 2.5 2.9 2.6 - 1.8 2.4 2.8 2.9 2.8 - 1.2 2.2 3.0 3.8 
Equivalent Variation of Welfare - 74         - 71         - 86         
                                      
  Lebanon Syria Jordan 
  
Cumulative 2015 - 
2030. changes 
from QI Scenario % changes from QI 
Cumulative 2015 - 
2030. changes 
from QI Scenario % changes from QI 
Cumulative 2015 - 
2030. changes 
from QI Scenario % changes from QI 
Macroeconomic Aggregates (in b.$ 2007) % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Gross Domestic Product 11.8 76 3.8 9.1 13.2 16.6 7.1 91 3.2 5.6 7.7 9.5 12.4 68 5.5 9.6 13.2 16.4 
Investment 29.4 42 16.7 23.9 30.9 37.6 10.6 20 6.3 8.6 11.0 13.3 15.0 24 9.5 12.7 15.7 18.7 
Public Consumption 7.4 13 6.8 7.1 7.5 8.0 12.0 20 14.8 12.9 11.7 10.8 9.4 14 8.8 9.1 9.5 9.8 
Private Consumption 25.8 109 15.5 22.5 27.8 32.0 12.7 99 8.3 11.2 13.4 15.2 30.7 115 21.8 28.2 32.3 34.8 
Exports 35.5 88 21.5 31.2 38.1 42.7 16.9 87 10.5 15.2 18.0 19.9 29.3 50 17.7 25.7 30.9 34.1 
Imports 50.0 177 35.9 45.0 52.6 59.1 37.1 134 32.0 36.7 38.1 37.9 44.9 134 34.5 42.5 47.0 49.1 
Terms of Trade 0.0 - 15.5 17.6 19.2 20.7 0.0 - 6.5 7.9 8.6 9.1 0.0 - 20.1 22.7 23.9 26.8 
Employment 1.9 - 0.9 1.7 2.1 2.3 3.0 - 2.6 2.9 3.1 3.1 5.9 - 4.5 5.5 6.1 6.5 
Equivalent Variation of Welfare - 41         - 36         - 38         
                                      
  Palestine Emerging Asian Economies Rest of Middle East Countries 
Palestine 
Cumulative 2015 - 
2030. changes 
from QI Scenario % changes from QI 
Cumulative 2015 - 
2030. changes 
from QI Scenario % changes from QI 
Cumulative 2015 - 
2030. changes 
from QI Scenario % changes from QI 
Macroeconomic Aggregates (in b.$ 2007) % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Gross Domestic Product -27.1 -39 -38.0 -37.4 -28.0 -9.9 0.0 169 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.1 20 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Investment 50.8 24 35.0 44.0 53.2 62.8 0.0 -1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Public Consumption 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Private Consumption 84.0 78 49.5 73.2 89.3 99.8 0.0 -55 -0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 29 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2 
Exports 367.9 82 279.0 336.8 374.2 400.8 0.5 308 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 54 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.4 
Imports 296.7 223 183.9 261.9 320.8 356.1 0.2 82 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.5 65 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 
Terms of Trade 0.0 - 27.3 30.3 28.5 24.1 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 
Employment 22.8 - 10.3 17.5 24.7 32.8 0.0 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 - 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Equivalent Variation of Welfare - 32         - -17         - 7         
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Table 73. Macroeconomic aggregates by country (Q* scenario), GEM-E3-MEDPRO model results (cont’d) 
 
 
 
 
 
  Rest of OECD Rest of Emerging Economies Rest of World 
Rest of OECD 
Cumulative 
2015 - 2030, 
changes from 
QI Scenario % changes from QI 
Cumulative 
2015 - 2030, 
changes from 
QI Scenario % changes from QI 
Cumulative 
2015 - 2030, 
changes from 
QI Scenario % changes from QI 
Macroeconomic Aggregates (in b.$ 2007) % bn$ 2011 2020 2025 2030 % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030 
Gross Domestic Product 0,0 114 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 46 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 -26 0,0 0,0 0,0 -0,1 
Investment 0,0 8 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 8 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
Public Consumption 0,0 0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
Private Consumption 0,0 -143 -0,1 -0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 17 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0 19 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 
Exports 0,5 251 0,8 0,6 0,4 0,4 0,6 147 0,6 0,6 0,6 0,6 0,1 12 0,3 0,1 0,1 0,0 
Imports 0,0 1 -0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,6 126 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,4 57 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 
Terms of Trade 0,0 - 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,0 0,0 - 0,4 0,4 0,4 0,3 0,0 - 0,6 0,8 0,9 1,0 
Employment 0,0 - 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 - 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 - 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 
Equivalent Variation of Welfare - -22         - 3         - 2         
                                      
                                      
                                      
  WORLD                         
WORLD 
Cumulative 
2015 - 2030, 
changes from 
QI Scenario % changes from QI                         
Macroeconomic Aggregates (in b.$ 2007) % bn$ 2015 2020 2025 2030                         
Gross Domestic Product 0,4 5184 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5                         
Investment 0,5 1618 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,7                         
Public Consumption 0,3 849 0,3 0,3 0,3 0,3                         
Private Consumption 0,4 3380 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5                         
Employment 0,1 - 0,1 0,1 0,1 0,1                         
Equivalent Variation of Welfare - 1105                                 
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Table 74. GDP change when only the risk perception change is simulated in scenarios QII–QIII 
GDP change from QI, cumulatively over 2015–30  
  QII QIII 
  (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) 
Algeria 165.37 4.63 90.61 2.54 
Egypt 115.24 2.67 65.53 1.52 
Israel 18.19 0.40 10.87 0.24 
Jordan 9.90 1.79 5.75 1.04 
Lebanon 22.25 3.47 12.33 1.92 
Libya 91.33 4.61 50.62 2.56 
Morocco 47.12 2.17 26.73 1.23 
Palestine 15.60 10.22 11.84 7.76 
Syria 15.10 1.18 8.84 0.69 
Tunisia 42.61 3.76 23.65 2.09 
Turkey 345.77 1.66 296.69 1.43 
SEMCs 888.49 2.16 603.45 1.46 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
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Table 75. Employment and GDP effects when only trade liberalisation is simulated in scenarios QII–QIII 
  QII 
  Algeria Egypt Israel Jordan Lebanon Libya Morocco Syria Tunisia Turkey Palestine 
GDP, bn$ absolute change from reference 63.36 34.35 9.30 9.12 10.28 50.26 24.16 7.25 36.28 43.14 4.00 
GDP, % change from reference 1.77 0.80 0.20 1.65 1.60 2.54 1.11 0.57 3.20 0.21 2.80 
Employment (%) 0.26 0.07 0.03 0.82 0.11 0.14 0.16 0.05 0.14 0.03 2.77 
  QIII 
GDP, bn$ absolute change from reference 89.19 7.20 25.30 22.21 10.49 85.31 30.71 8.68 30.98 -78.97 4.54 
GDP, % change from reference 2.50 0.17 0.55 4.01 1.63 4.31 1.41 0.68 2.73 -0.38 3.18 
Employment (%) 0.40 0.68 0.12 1.94 0.04 0.39 0.03 0.07 0.05 0.67 3.94 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
 
 
Table 76. GDP and employment effects when only trade liberalisation is simulated in scenarios QII–QIII without changes in the public budget, cumulatively 
over 2015–30 
  QII 
  Algeria Egypt Israel Jordan Lebanon Libya Morocco Syria Tunisia Turkey Palestine 
GDP, bn$ absolute change from reference 60.18 29.47 8.66 8.44 6.71 48.81 21.39 5.65 32.46 41.56 2.44 
GDP, % change from reference 1.68 0.68 0.19 1.52 1.05 2.47 0.98 0.44 2.86 0.20 1.71 
Employment (%) 0.14 -0.02 0.02 0.73 -0.01 0.10 0.07 0.01 -0.17 0.02 0.78 
  QIII 
GDP, bn$ absolute change from reference 88.40 3.17 24.14 25.81 8.25 85.12 29.79 6.22 29.18 -93.35 4.24 
GDP, % change from reference 2.47 0.07 0.52 4.66 1.29 4.30 1.37 0.49 2.57 -0.45 2.97 
Employment (%) 0.32 0.62 0.12 2.32 -0.04 0.40 -0.01 0.01 -0.10 0.62 2.92 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
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Table 77. Sectoral employment when only changes in trade are simulated in scenarios QII–QIII 
Employment, changes from QI, (%), cumulatively over 2015–30 
  Algeria Egypt Israel Jordan Lebanon Libya Morocco Syria Tunisia Turkey Palestine 
  QII QIII QII QIII QII QIII QII QIII QII QIII QII QIII QII QIII QII QIII QII QIII QII QIII QII QIII 
Agriculture -3.3 1.1 0.0 6.6 2.9 -0.5 13.2 -18.5 3.4 4.9 -3.2 -1.9 -2.3 -4.4 -1.1 -0.6 -9.0 -10.6 -1.1 26.2 -6.0 -8.8 
Energy -1.0 -2.5 1.1 -2.5 0.8 2.0 -4.6 6.8 -0.4 0.0 0.4 0.2 0.1 1.3 0.2 0.1 -1.0 0.7 -0.1 -3.8 -3.9 -4.7 
Chemical products 22.8 7.0 3.0 -4.2 0.8 27.0 -14.9 186.8 20.0 29.6 46.9 80.4 0.8 32.2 8.8 16.2 -3.5 60.2 -1.3 -5.6 0.0 0.0 
Other energy-intensive -3.9 -9.6 1.3 -10.3 -1.0 0.3 -2.9 -2.7 9.8 10.1 0.0 -9.2 -2.2 -1.7 4.8 0.4 -10.3 -2.7 1.3 -9.9 3.0 -5.5 
Electric goods – Other equipment goods -6.5 -11.7 2.8 -20.0 -2.8 -7.6 7.8 -50.3 18.5 38.3 -25.0 -50.2 5.3 -5.7 3.1 -0.6 -8.3 -9.7 -1.3 -14.9 -0.2 -0.3 
Transport equipment 2.2 4.3 -1.0 3.1 -3.9 -13.8 -11.8 -37.8 -11.2 -9.4 -4.4 -2.0 -4.3 -8.0 -1.3 -4.1 -11.5 -4.3 1.6 -12.8 -34.8 -46.3 
Consumer goods industries – Food 4.3 10.4 -9.6 2.2 1.1 2.3 -1.6 -21.8 -9.8 -1.0 -3.2 -6.8 -1.7 -1.7 7.7 1.4 78.4 1.0 0.6 0.0 52.4 66.4 
Consumer goods industries – Rest -4.4 -0.5 -2.7 -12.1 -2.1 -8.3 252.6 288.1 11.8 13.2 -13.1 -12.0 -15.8 -7.9 1.0 10.8 -9.3 -2.2 0.0 -9.0 0.0 0.0 
Textiles and clothing 7.6 1.4 -2.5 -19.4 59.5 59.5 59.5 -36.9 5.4 -6.2 -12.1 50.1 6.0 4.2 26.4 26.0 4.9 5.1 0.9 -11.9 -25.5 -32.0 
Construction 0.4 0.5 0.1 -1.5 0.1 0.3 0.2 1.0 2.1 2.3 0.5 1.1 0.4 0.7 0.4 0.7 2.1 1.3 0.1 -1.2 6.1 9.0 
Transport 0.1 -0.6 2.9 -7.9 -1.0 -2.3 -8.8 -25.1 1.1 0.0 -3.5 -9.6 0.7 -0.7 -1.7 -0.7 -7.5 -5.2 -0.6 -4.5 1.0 2.1 
Communication 1.7 1.6 1.1 1.5 0.2 0.7 4.2 12.7 1.0 2.7 1.8 4.1 0.4 0.3 1.0 1.5 1.3 0.7 0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 
Services 0.5 0.7 0.5 -2.5 -0.3 -0.9 -0.4 -1.1 -0.2 -1.0 0.1 0.1 0.6 0.4 -0.1 0.1 1.5 0.7 0.1 -0.3 1.5 2.2 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
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Table 78. Sectoral production when only changes in trade are simulated in scenarios QII–QIII 
Algeria Sectoral production, changes from QI, cumulatively over 2015–30 
  QII  QIII 
  (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) 
Agriculture -8.3 -2.0 7.1 1.7 
Energy -36.6 -0.6 -106.6 -1.7 
Chemical products 50.2 24.5 17.3 8.5 
Other energy-intensive -25.2 -3.1 -72.6 -8.8 
Electric goods – Other equipment goods -13.4 -5.9 -25.5 -11.3 
Transport equipment 4.2 3.1 7.5 5.5 
Consumer goods industries – Food 12.4 5.1 27.9 11.6 
Consumer goods industries – Rest -6.8 -3.6 0.9 0.5 
Textiles and clothing 3.1 0.7 5.8 1.4 
Construction 6.5 0.7 9.7 1.0 
Transport 0.4 0.2 -0.9 -0.4 
Communication 2.7 2.2 2.8 2.3 
Services 17.8 0.8 24.8 1.2 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
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Table 78. Sectoral production when only changes in trade are simulated in scenarios QII–QIII (cont’d) 
Egypt Sectoral production, changes from QI, cumulatively over 2015–30 
  QII  QIII 
  (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) 
Agriculture 3.4 0.5 147.5 23.2 
Energy 54.7 1.3 -111.7 -2.6 
Chemical products 10.9 3.4 -8.6 -2.7 
Other energy-intensive 11.9 1.6 -70.1 -9.2 
Electric goods – Other equipment goods 7.9 3.1 -47.4 -18.8 
Transport equipment -1.0 -0.5 11.8 6.3 
Consumer goods industries – Food -74.9 -9.3 32.4 4.0 
Consumer goods industries – Rest -2.7 -2.4 -11.2 -9.8 
Textiles and clothing -20.8 -2.4 -153.0 -17.7 
Construction 3.6 0.4 3.8 0.4 
Transport 23.0 3.2 -45.0 -6.2 
Communication 4.3 1.1 9.2 2.4 
Services 21.8 0.7 -30.7 -1.0 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
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Table 78. Sectoral production when only changes in trade are simulated in scenarios QII–QIII (cont’d) 
Israel Sectoral production, changes from QI, cumulatively over 2015–30 
  QII  QIII 
  (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) 
Agriculture 5.0 2.6 0.5 0.3 
Energy 3.4 0.7 12.2 2.6 
Chemical products 3.1 0.9 92.5 27.8 
Other energy-intensive -3.5 -0.9 2.4 0.6 
Electric goods – Other equipment goods -20.8 -2.7 -55.3 -7.3 
Transport equipment -1.8 -3.8 -6.4 -13.7 
Consumer goods industries – Food 3.0 1.3 6.0 2.7 
Consumer goods industries – Rest -0.5 -2.0 -1.8 -7.9 
Textiles and clothing 35.9 61.1 36.2 61.6 
Construction 1.0 0.2 3.4 0.7 
Transport -4.1 -0.8 -8.9 -1.8 
Communication 0.6 0.2 2.1 0.8 
Services -11.3 -0.3 -28.4 -0.7 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO.         
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Table 78. Sectoral production when only changes in trade are simulated in scenarios QII–QIII (cont’d) 
Jordan Sectoral production, changes from QI, cumulatively over 2015–30 
  QII  QIII 
  (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) 
Agriculture 8.7 13.9 -9.9 -15.8 
Energy -16.1 -4.6 22.9 6.5 
Chemical products -7.4 -14.0 104.3 196.8 
Other energy-intensive -0.8 -1.9 0.1 0.2 
Electric goods – Other equipment goods 2.9 9.3 -15.3 -48.4 
Transport equipment -0.3 -10.7 -1.0 -35.9 
Consumer goods industries – Food 0.0 0.0 -13.6 -18.7 
Consumer goods industries – Rest 0.6 261.0 0.7 305.5 
Textiles and clothing 23.4 62.0 -13.1 -34.7 
Construction 1.2 1.6 3.8 5.0 
Transport -2.7 -7.7 -8.0 -22.9 
Communication 1.3 4.9 4.0 15.2 
Services -4.6 -0.5 -15.7 -1.8 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO.         
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Table 78. Sectoral production when only changes in trade are simulated in scenarios QII–QIII (cont’d) 
Lebanon Sectoral production, changes from QI, cumulatively over 2015–30 
  QII  QIII 
  (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) 
Agriculture 4.5 3.0 7.4 4.9 
Energy 0.2 0.1 0.7 0.4 
Chemical products 3.7 20.9 5.4 30.6 
Other energy-intensive 6.2 10.7 6.5 11.2 
Electric goods – Other equipment goods 7.5 19.6 15.2 40.0 
Transport equipment -1.1 -10.6 -0.9 -8.8 
Consumer goods industries – Food -19.9 -9.4 -1.4 -0.7 
Consumer goods industries – Rest 1.3 13.2 1.4 14.1 
Textiles and clothing 2.3 5.9 -2.4 -6.2 
Construction 0.3 2.2 0.3 2.2 
Transport 1.3 1.7 0.4 0.5 
Communication 0.3 1.2 0.6 2.8 
Services 1.7 0.2 -2.9 -0.4 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO.         
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Table 78. Sectoral production when only changes in trade are simulated in scenarios QII–QIII (cont’d) 
Libya Sectoral production, changes from QI, cumulatively over 2015–30 
  QII  QIII 
  (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) 
Agriculture -3.5 -1.8 -0.9 -0.4 
Energy 14.7 0.3 -1.9 0.0 
Chemical products 145.1 47.8 250.2 82.4 
Other energy-intensive 0.7 0.3 -19.0 -8.8 
Electric goods – Other equipment goods -7.8 -25.3 -15.7 -50.8 
Transport equipment -0.1 -4.1 0.0 -0.8 
Consumer goods industries – Food -7.7 -3.1 -16.3 -6.5 
Consumer goods industries – Rest -4.1 -12.8 -3.7 -11.6 
Textiles and clothing -6.4 -11.2 30.9 54.5 
Construction 3.2 0.8 6.3 1.7 
Transport -3.9 -3.6 -10.4 -9.6 
Communication 0.4 1.8 0.9 4.2 
Services -2.5 -0.3 -10.7 -1.4 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO.         
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Table 78. Sectoral production when only changes in trade are simulated in scenarios QII–QIII (cont’d) 
Morocco Sectoral production, changes from QI, cumulatively over 2015–30 
  QII  QIII 
  (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) 
Agriculture -6.8 -1.5 -12.7 -2.9 
Energy -0.6 -0.2 6.1 2.0 
Chemical products 4.6 1.3 113.6 33.1 
Other energy-intensive -8.4 -1.9 -6.5 -1.5 
Electric goods – Other equipment goods 26.6 5.8 -25.0 -5.5 
Transport equipment -4.1 -3.5 -8.7 -7.5 
Consumer goods industries – Food -5.9 -1.2 -6.5 -1.3 
Consumer goods industries – Rest -6.5 -15.4 -3.3 -7.7 
Textiles and clothing 25.4 6.8 17.7 4.7 
Construction 3.1 0.8 3.4 0.9 
Transport 2.9 0.9 -1.7 -0.5 
Communication 0.2 0.5 0.1 0.4 
Services 17.5 0.9 14.3 0.7 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO.         
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Table 78. Sectoral production when only changes in trade are simulated in scenarios QII–QIII (cont’d) 
Syria Sectoral production, changes from QI, cumulatively over 2015–30 
  QII  QIII 
  (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) 
Agriculture -2.4 -0.7 -1.6 -0.5 
Energy 4.5 0.2 4.3 0.2 
Chemical products 1.6 9.2 2.9 16.7 
Other energy-intensive 2.7 5.2 0.5 0.9 
Electric goods – Other equipment goods 1.9 3.5 -0.1 -0.2 
Transport equipment -0.9 -1.0 -3.5 -3.7 
Consumer goods industries – Food 8.9 7.9 1.6 1.4 
Consumer goods industries – Rest 0.0 1.3 0.3 11.1 
Textiles and clothing 8.7 26.8 8.6 26.4 
Construction 1.0 0.7 1.7 1.2 
Transport -1.4 -1.6 -0.5 -0.6 
Communication 0.6 1.0 0.9 1.5 
Services 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.3 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO.         
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Table 78. Sectoral production when only changes in trade are simulated in scenarios QII–QIII (cont’d) 
Tunisia Sectoral production, changes from QI, cumulatively over 2015–30 
  QII  QIII 
  (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) 
Agriculture -4.6 -2.4 -16.6 -8.5 
Energy -15.4 -3.8 -8.2 -2.0 
Chemical products -4.5 -2.6 107.5 61.8 
Other energy-intensive -16.9 -9.6 -3.9 -2.2 
Electric goods – Other equipment goods -15.4 -7.8 -18.9 -9.5 
Transport equipment -5.8 -11.3 -2.1 -4.1 
Consumer goods industries – Food 119.2 80.8 1.8 1.2 
Consumer goods industries – Rest -5.0 -9.7 -1.4 -2.8 
Textiles and clothing 14.3 5.7 14.4 5.7 
Construction 5.2 2.8 3.1 1.7 
Transport -11.3 -7.8 -8.2 -5.6 
Communication 0.3 1.0 0.2 0.6 
Services 18.7 2.2 7.3 0.9 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO.         
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Table 78. Sectoral production when only changes in trade are simulated in scenarios QII–QIII (cont’d) 
Turkey Sectoral production, changes from QI, cumulatively over 2015–30 
  QII  QIII 
  (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) 
Agriculture -12.6 -0.8 373.4 22.7 
Energy -15.0 -0.9 -46.3 -2.8 
Chemical products -17.0 -1.1 -66.1 -4.4 
Other energy-intensive 47.9 1.4 -298.6 -9.0 
Electric goods – Other equipment goods -30.5 -1.2 -351.5 -13.5 
Transport equipment 24.1 1.8 -149.0 -11.3 
Consumer goods industries – Food 18.3 0.7 55.1 2.2 
Consumer goods industries – Rest 0.6 0.2 -18.8 -6.5 
Textiles and clothing 20.9 1.1 -188.4 -9.6 
Construction 7.2 0.2 3.3 0.1 
Transport -24.9 -0.6 -82.9 -1.9 
Communication 1.4 0.2 5.0 0.8 
Services 31.4 0.2 67.3 0.4 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO.         
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Table 78. Sectoral production when only changes in trade are simulated in scenarios QII–QIII (cont’d) 
Palestine Sectoral production, changes from QI, cumulatively over 2015–30 
  Trade  
  QII  QIII 
  (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) 
Agriculture -5.7 -8.6 -7.2 -10.9 
Energy -1.3 -6.9 -1.6 -8.3 
Chemical products 0.0 23.1 0.0 23.1 
Other energy-intensive 0.1 4.3 -0.1 -3.9 
Electric goods – Other equipment goods 0.0 -0.3 0.0 -0.2 
Transport equipment -1.5 -34.6 -2.0 -45.9 
Consumer goods industries – Food 14.2 51.1 18.2 65.4 
Consumer goods industries – Rest 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Textiles and clothing -0.6 -26.5 -0.7 -32.9 
Construction 2.7 3.7 4.2 5.7 
Transport 0.2 2.6 0.3 4.1 
Communication 0.0 -0.7 0.0 -1.0 
Services 2.2 1.6 3.8 2.8 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
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Table 79. Sectoral employment when only changes in infrastructure are simulated in scenarios QII–QIII 
Employment, changes from QI, (%), cumulatively over 2015–30   
  Algeria Egypt Israel Jordan Lebanon Libya Morocco Syria Tunisia Turkey Palestine
  QII QIII QII QIII QII QIII QII QIII QII QIII QII QIII QII QIII QII QIII QII QIII QII QIII QII
Agriculture 0.1 0.0 -2.3 -2.1 -0.4 -0.1 1.0 0.8 -0.5 -0.4 -3.0 -0.8 -1.5 -0.8 -0.8 -0.7 -1.2 -0.7 -1.3 -0.7 0.0
Energy -1.5 -0.6 -0.3 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -1.2 -1.0 0.2 0.1 -0.5 0.2 0.4 0.2 -0.1 -0.1 -0.5 -0.3 -0.1 0.0 0.0
Chemical products 18.7 6.7 3.0 3.2 0.7 0.5 2.0 1.5 2.0 1.1 13.5 0.4 1.1 0.4 4.8 4.2 2.0 1.0 0.6 0.3 0.0
Other energy-intensive 5.0 1.8 2.2 2.5 0.8 0.5 2.7 2.3 4.9 2.7 7.8 0.5 0.9 0.5 2.4 2.6 1.2 0.7 1.2 0.7 -0.3
Electric goods – Other equipment goods 20.5 8.1 16.4 18.2 1.5 1.3 8.0 7.5 9.2 6.9 20.8 2.7 4.2 2.7 8.4 9.6 6.6 3.7 2.4 2.0 -0.3
Transport equipment 11.3 4.3 8.2 8.6 0.0 0.2 4.1 3.4 3.8 2.3 43.0 2.0 3.8 2.0 -0.2 0.2 3.6 2.0 1.7 1.1 0.0
Consumer goods industries – Food 3.9 1.5 -0.3 -0.2 -0.4 -0.2 1.8 1.4 0.0 -0.1 -0.8 -0.3 -0.5 -0.3 1.4 1.8 -0.7 -0.5 -1.3 -0.7 -0.2
Consumer goods industries – Rest 1.1 0.4 3.6 3.9 1.1 0.8 0.0 0.0 6.8 4.3 6.6 -0.2 -0.4 -0.2 3.3 3.8 -0.4 -0.2 1.9 1.3 0.0
Textiles and clothing 0.4 0.1 0.6 0.7 -0.2 0.0 1.9 1.8 4.6 2.8 6.8 -0.1 -0.2 -0.1 3.8 4.0 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.6 -0.1
Construction 1.5 0.6 4.6 4.6 1.4 0.6 5.8 4.8 30.2 21.0 2.5 2.5 4.7 2.5 3.4 3.7 3.6 2.0 2.4 1.3 0.1
Transport -1.9 -0.7 -0.8 -0.5 -0.1 0.0 -0.6 -0.4 0.1 0.0 -1.9 -1.2 -2.2 -1.2 -1.3 -1.3 -3.3 -1.8 -1.1 -0.6 -0.1
Communication 9.3 3.6 2.3 1.7 0.7 0.0 3.1 1.7 4.1 1.8 28.9 6.8 14.3 6.8 2.3 2.0 10.2 5.5 6.0 2.8 0.0
Services 0.1 0.1 -0.6 -0.7 -0.4 -0.2 -0.9 -0.8 -0.7 -0.4 -2.6 -0.3 -0.6 -0.3 -0.5 -0.7 -0.2 -0.1 -0.4 -0.2 0.0
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO.         
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Table 80. Sectoral production when only changes in infrastructure are simulated in scenarios QII–QIII 
Algeria  Sectoral production, changes from QI, cumulatively over 2015–30 
  All infrastructure 
  QII  QIII 
  (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) 
Agriculture 17.9 4.2 6.8 1.6 
Energy -36.6 -0.6 -14.0 -0.2 
Chemical products 51.4 25.1 18.2 8.9 
Other energy-intensive 83.6 10.2 30.8 3.7 
Electric goods – Other equipment goods 61.0 27.0 23.5 10.4 
Transport equipment 23.6 17.2 8.8 6.4 
Consumer goods industries – Food 22.5 9.3 8.4 3.5 
Consumer goods industries – Rest 11.7 6.3 4.5 2.4 
Textiles and clothing 2.3 5.9 7.2 1.8 
Construction 54.9 5.7 21.1 2.2 
Transport 4.9 2.0 1.9 0.8 
Communication 18.2 15.0 6.9 5.7 
Services 95.9 4.5 37.4 1.7 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO.         
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Table 80. Sectoral production when only changes in infrastructure are simulated in scenarios QII–QIII (cont’d) 
Egypt  Sectoral production, changes from QI, cumulatively over 2015–30 
  All infrastructure 
  QII  QIII 
  (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) 
Agriculture 10.7 1.7 10.6 1.7 
Energy -40.0 -0.9 -38.8 -0.9 
Chemical products 23.9 7.5 23.9 7.5 
Other energy-intensive 48.4 6.4 49.6 6.5 
Electric goods – Other equipment goods 54.1 21.4 58.0 23.0 
Transport equipment 24.2 13.0 24.5 13.1 
Consumer goods industries – Food 28.7 3.6 27.8 3.5 
Consumer goods industries – Rest 8.6 7.5 8.6 7.6 
Textiles and clothing 37.6 4.3 36.4 4.2 
Construction 79.2 8.6 77.0 8.3 
Transport 21.5 3.0 22.2 3.1 
Communication 22.9 6.0 19.9 5.2 
Services 94.6 3.0 83.7 2.7 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO.         
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Table 80. Sectoral production when only changes in infrastructure are simulated in scenarios QII–QIII (cont’d) 
Israel  Sectoral production, changes from QI, cumulatively over 2015–30 
  All infrastructure 
  QII  QIII 
  (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) 
Agriculture 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 
Energy 0.6 0.1 0.7 0.1 
Chemical products 4.2 1.3 2.8 0.8 
Other energy-intensive 5.3 1.4 3.3 0.9 
Electric goods – Other equipment goods 15.8 2.1 12.5 1.7 
Transport equipment 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.5 
Consumer goods industries – Food 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.2 
Consumer goods industries – Rest 0.4 1.7 0.3 1.2 
Textiles and clothing 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.3 
Construction 10.4 2.0 4.8 0.9 
Transport 2.4 0.5 1.8 0.4 
Communication 3.3 1.3 1.0 0.4 
Services 4.0 0.1 1.9 0.0 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO.         
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Table 80. Sectoral production when only changes in infrastructure are simulated in scenarios QII–QIII (cont’d) 
Jordan  Sectoral production, changes from QI, cumulatively over 2015–30 
  All infrastructure 
  QII  QIII 
  (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) 
Agriculture 1.9 3.0 1.5 2.3 
Energy -4.0 -1.1 -3.2 -0.9 
Chemical products 2.2 4.2 1.7 3.2 
Other energy-intensive 2.1 4.9 1.7 4.0 
Electric goods – Other equipment goods 3.3 10.4 3.0 9.4 
Transport equipment 0.2 6.4 0.1 5.2 
Consumer goods industries – Food 3.0 4.1 2.4 3.3 
Consumer goods industries – Rest 0.0 3.0 0.0 2.7 
Textiles and clothing 1.5 4.0 1.3 3.5 
Construction 6.1 8.1 5.0 6.5 
Transport 0.5 1.4 0.4 1.1 
Communication 1.4 5.2 0.9 3.4 
Services 10.5 1.2 7.7 0.9 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO.         
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Table 80. Sectoral production when only changes in infrastructure are simulated in scenarios QII–QIII (cont’d) 
Lebanon  Sectoral production, changes from QI, cumulatively over 2015–30 
  All infrastructure 
  QII  QIII 
  (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) 
Agriculture 2.6 1.7 1.4 0.9 
Energy 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.3 
Chemical products 0.8 4.6 0.5 2.6 
Other energy-intensive 4.5 7.8 2.5 4.4 
Electric goods – Other equipment goods 4.7 12.3 3.3 8.7 
Transport equipment 0.6 6.4 0.4 3.8 
Consumer goods industries – Food 5.4 2.5 2.9 1.4 
Consumer goods industries – Rest 1.0 10.2 0.6 6.3 
Textiles and clothing 2.9 7.6 1.7 4.6 
Construction 4.4 32.9 3.0 22.5 
Transport 2.0 2.5 1.1 1.4 
Communication 1.4 6.5 0.7 3.1 
Services 9.7 1.3 5.4 0.7 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO.         
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Table 80. Sectoral production when only changes in infrastructure are simulated in scenarios QII–QIII (cont’d) 
Libya  Sectoral production, changes from QI, cumulatively over 2015–30 
  All infrastructure 
  QII  QIII 
  (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) 
Agriculture 6.4 3.2 5.0 2.5 
Energy -26.6 -0.6 -17.6 -0.4 
Chemical products 71.2 23.5 53.1 17.5 
Other energy-intensive 34.8 16.2 26.8 12.5 
Electric goods – Other equipment goods 8.9 28.9 6.3 20.3 
Transport equipment 1.9 55.0 1.4 38.9 
Consumer goods industries – Food 15.7 6.3 12.0 4.8 
Consumer goods industries – Rest 4.5 13.9 3.3 10.3 
Textiles and clothing 8.3 14.6 6.2 10.9 
Construction 36.1 9.5 27.9 7.4 
Transport 4.7 4.3 3.4 3.2 
Communication 7.9 37.4 6.1 28.9 
Services 36.6 4.6 26.9 3.4 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO.         
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Table 80. Sectoral production when only changes in infrastructure are simulated in scenarios QII–QIII (cont’d) 
Morocco  Sectoral production, changes from QI, cumulatively over 2015–30 
  All infrastructure 
  QII  QIII 
  (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) 
Agriculture 5.0 1.1 2.6 0.6 
Energy 2.3 0.7 1.3 0.4 
Chemical products 14.7 4.3 7.3 2.1 
Other energy-intensive 17.2 3.8 9.1 2.0 
Electric goods – Other equipment goods 34.6 7.6 20.2 4.4 
Transport equipment 8.4 7.2 4.4 3.8 
Consumer goods industries – Food 11.7 2.4 6.1 1.3 
Consumer goods industries – Rest 1.0 2.4 0.6 1.3 
Textiles and clothing 10.1 2.7 5.6 1.5 
Construction 27.8 7.6 14.7 4.0 
Transport 1.3 0.4 0.7 0.2 
Communication 7.2 17.4 3.5 8.4 
Services 42.8 2.1 22.3 1.1 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO.         
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Table 80. Sectoral production when only changes in infrastructure are simulated in scenarios QII–QIII (cont’d) 
Syria  Sectoral production, changes from QI, cumulatively over 2015–30 
  All infrastructure 
  QII  QIII 
  (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) 
Agriculture 4.9 1.5 5.8 1.8 
Energy -1.2 -0.1 -1.1 -0.1 
Chemical products 1.3 7.4 1.2 6.9 
Other energy-intensive 2.5 4.8 2.7 5.2 
Electric goods – Other equipment goods 6.1 11.0 6.8 12.4 
Transport equipment 2.1 2.3 2.7 2.9 
Consumer goods industries – Food 4.6 4.0 5.2 4.6 
Consumer goods industries – Rest 0.2 5.6 0.2 6.3 
Textiles and clothing 2.1 6.3 2.1 6.5 
Construction 8.3 5.8 9.0 6.3 
Transport 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.1 
Communication 2.8 4.6 2.7 4.5 
Services 14.2 1.9 14.0 1.8 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO.         
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Table 80. Sectoral production when only changes in infrastructure are simulated in scenarios QII–QIII (cont’d) 
Tunisia  Sectoral production, changes from QI, cumulatively over 2015–30 
  All infrastructure 
  QII  QIII 
  (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) 
Agriculture 2.3 1.2 1.2 0.6 
Energy -5.8 -1.4 -3.3 -0.8 
Chemical products 9.2 5.3 4.8 2.8 
Other energy-intensive 7.4 4.2 4.1 2.3 
Electric goods – Other equipment goods 20.4 10.3 11.2 5.6 
Transport equipment 3.6 7.0 2.0 3.8 
Consumer goods industries – Food 3.4 2.3 1.7 1.2 
Consumer goods industries – Rest 1.3 2.5 0.7 1.4 
Textiles and clothing 10.5 4.2 5.9 2.3 
Construction 12.2 6.5 6.7 3.6 
Transport -1.1 -0.8 -0.7 -0.5 
Communication 3.5 13.0 1.9 6.9 
Services 20.4 2.4 11.0 1.3 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO.         
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Table 80. Sectoral production when only changes in infrastructure are simulated in scenarios QII–QIII (cont’d) 
Turkey  Sectoral production, changes from QI, cumulatively over 2015–30 
  All infrastructure 
  QII  QIII 
  (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) 
Agriculture 0.3 0.0 0.6 0.0 
Energy -12.5 -0.7 -8.2 -0.5 
Chemical products 35.5 2.4 19.6 1.3 
Other energy-intensive 96.2 2.9 57.2 1.7 
Electric goods – Other equipment goods 108.1 4.2 77.7 3.0 
Transport equipment 47.1 3.6 28.6 2.2 
Consumer goods industries – Food 4.7 0.2 3.4 0.1 
Consumer goods industries – Rest 10.9 3.8 6.9 2.4 
Textiles and clothing 48.9 2.5 32.0 1.6 
Construction 143.3 4.0 79.9 2.2 
Transport 15.2 0.3 11.0 0.2 
Communication 44.4 7.5 21.5 3.6 
Services 137.1 0.9 76.6 0.5 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO.         
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Table 80. Sectoral production when only changes in infrastructure are simulated in scenarios QII–QIII (cont’d) 
Palestine  Sectoral production, changes from QI, cumulatively over 2015–30 
  All infrastructure 
  QII  QIII 
  (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) 
Agriculture 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Energy 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Chemical products 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Other energy-intensive 0.0 -0.3 0.0 -0.2 
Electric goods – Other equipment goods 0.0 -0.3 0.0 -0.2 
Transport equipment 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Consumer goods industries – Food -0.1 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 
Consumer goods industries – Rest 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Textiles and clothing 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 
Construction 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Transport 0.0 -0.1 0.0 0.0 
Communication 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Services 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
108 | PAROUSSOS, FRAGKIADAKIS, CHARALAMPIDIS, TSANI & CAPROS 
 
Table 81. GDP and employment impacts of all structural changes in the SEMC in scenarios QII–QIII, changes from QI scenario, cumulatively over 2015–30 
Algeria QII QIII 
  Cumulative GDP Employment Cumulative GDP Employment 
  (%) (bn US$) (%) (%) in bn US$ (%) 
All measures 16.77 598.83 6.97 8.71 311.16 2.70 
Infrastructure 6.37 227.56 0.33 2.34 83.43 0.14 
Trade liberalisation 1.77 63.36 0.26 2.50 89.19 0.40 
Population 1.58 56.60 3.76 0.35 12.58 0.82 
Risk premium 4.63 165.37 2.36 2.54 90.61 1.31 
 Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
 
            
Egypt QII QIII 
  Cumulative GDP Employment Cumulative GDP Employment 
  (%) (bn US$) (%) (%) in bn US$ (%) 
All measures 9.99 431.69 1.10 7.73 334.04 1.15 
Infrastructure 5.96 257.58 0.00 5.75 248.53 -0.02 
Trade liberalisation 0.80 34.35 0.07 0.17 7.20 0.68 
Population 0.23 9.79 0.47 0.10 4.49 0.22 
Risk premium 2.67 115.24 0.57 1.52 65.53 0.33 
 Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
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Table 81. GDP and employment impacts of all structural changes in the SEMC in scenarios QII–QIII, changes from QI scenario, cumulatively over 2015–30 
(cont’d) 
Israel QII QIII 
  Cumulative GDP Employment Cumulative GDP Employment 
  (%) (bn US$) (%) (%) in bn US$ (%) 
All measures 2.01 92.26 0.87 2.30 105.59 1.41 
Infrastructure 0.89 40.96 0.04 0.55 25.28 0.03 
Trade liberalisation 0.20 9.30 0.03 0.55 25.30 0.12 
Population 0.53 24.15 0.67 0.95 43.53 1.18 
Risk premium 0.40 18.19 0.13 0.24 10.87 0.08 
 Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
 
            
Jordan QII QIII 
  Cumulative GDP Employment Cumulative GDP Employment 
  (%) (bn US$) (%) (%) in bn US$ (%) 
All measures 8.15 45.11 3.96 8.17 45.25 2.91 
Infrastructure 3.43 18.96 0.09 2.68 14.85 0.05 
Trade liberalisation 1.65 9.12 0.82 4.01 22.21 1.94 
Population 0.97 5.39 2.25 0.24 1.33 0.54 
Risk premium 1.79 9.90 0.73 1.04 5.75 0.43 
 Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
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Table 81. GDP and employment impacts of all structural changes in the SEMC in scenarios QII–QIII, changes from QI scenario, cumulatively over 2015–30 
(cont’d) 
Lebanon QII QIII 
  Cumulative GDP Employment Cumulative GDP Employment 
  (%) (bn US$) (%) (%) in bn US$ (%) 
All measures 9.45 60.67 1.55 7.11 45.62 2.23 
Infrastructure 3.58 22.98 0.02 2.12 13.57 0.00 
Trade liberalisation 1.60 10.28 0.11 1.63 10.49 0.04 
Population 0.39 2.50 0.59 1.11 7.10 1.69 
Risk premium 3.47 22.25 0.83 1.92 12.33 0.47 
 Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
 
            
Libya QII QIII 
  Cumulative GDP Employment Cumulative GDP Employment 
  (%) (bn US$) (%) (%) in bn US$ (%) 
All measures 16.26 321.73 1.84 13.83 273.75 0.88 
Infrastructure 7.08 140.14 -0.18 5.32 105.37 -0.15 
Trade liberalisation 2.54 50.26 0.14 4.31 85.31 0.39 
Population 0.11 2.15 0.42 -0.04 -0.83 -0.16 
Risk premium 4.61 91.33 1.40 2.56 50.62 0.79 
 Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
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Table 81. GDP and employment impacts of all structural changes in the SEMC in scenarios QII–QIII, changes from QI scenario, cumulatively over 2015–30 
(cont’d) 
Morocco QII QIII 
  Cumulative GDP Employment Cumulative GDP Employment 
  (%) (bn US$) (%) (%) in bn US$ (%) 
All measures 9.14 198.67 1.91 5.57 121.12 0.77 
Infrastructure 4.92 106.84 0.03 2.60 56.50 0.02 
Trade liberalisation 1.11 24.16 0.16 1.41 30.71 0.03 
Population 0.69 15.05 1.06 0.23 4.97 0.35 
Risk premium 2.17 47.12 0.66 1.23 26.73 0.38 
 Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
 
            
Syria QII QIII 
  Cumulative GDP Employment Cumulative GDP Employment 
  (%) (bn US$) (%) (%) in bn US$ (%) 
All measures 5.66 72.38 2.51 4.52 57.82 0.75 
Infrastructure 2.60 33.27 0.02 2.83 36.17 0.01 
Trade liberalisation 0.57 7.25 0.05 0.68 8.68 0.07 
Population 1.14 14.55 1.93 0.24 3.01 0.39 
Risk premium 1.18 15.10 0.47 0.69 8.84 0.28 
 Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO.             
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Table 81. GDP and employment impacts of all structural changes in the SEMC in scenarios QII–QIII, changes from QI scenario, cumulatively over 2015–30 
(cont’d) 
Tunisia QII QIII 
  Cumulative GDP Employment Cumulative GDP Employment 
  (%) (bn US$) (%) (%) in bn US$ (%) 
All measures 13.02 147.55 2.32 7.74 87.72 0.91 
Infrastructure 4.59 52.07 0.13 2.47 28.05 0.08 
Trade liberalisation 3.20 36.28 0.14 2.73 30.98 0.05 
Population 0.75 8.51 1.18 0.18 2.09 0.29 
Risk premium 3.76 42.61 0.87 2.09 23.65 0.49 
 Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
 
            
Turkey QII QIII 
  Cumulative GDP Employment Cumulative GDP Employment 
  (%) (bn US$) (%) (%) in bn US$ (%) 
All measures 4.36 908.54 1.04 2.45 509.29 1.22 
Infrastructure 2.13 444.06 -0.01 1.26 262.14 -0.01 
Trade liberalisation 0.21 43.14 0.03 -0.38 -78.97 0.67 
Population 0.29 61.35 0.52 0.11 23.51 0.20 
Risk premium 1.66 345.77 0.50 1.43 296.69 0.42 
 Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
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Table 81. GDP and employment impacts of all structural changes in the SEMC in scenarios QII–QIII, changes from QI scenario, cumulatively over 2015–30 
(cont’d) 
Palestine QII QIII 
  Cumulative GDP Employment Cumulative GDP Employment 
  (%) (bn US$) (%) (%) in bn US$ (%) 
All measures 12.72 18.18 9.47 9.60 13.73 8.10 
Infrastructure 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Trade liberalisation 2.80 4.00 2.77 3.18 4.54 3.94 
Population 0.08 0.12 0.33 0.05 0.08 0.13 
Risk premium 10.22 15.60 6.57 7.76 11.84 4.82 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
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Table 82. Changes in sectoral production in the SEMC in the alternative scenarios QII–QIV  
Algeria  Sectoral production, changes from QI, cumulatively over 2015–30 
  QII  QIII QIV 
  (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) 
Agriculture 36.08 8.53 24.78 5.86 -41.64 -9.84 
Energy 71.61 1.11 -71.47 -1.11 -320.98 -4.97 
Chemical products 129.40 63.24 38.88 19.00 -88.27 -43.14 
Other energy-intensive 127.68 15.52 -19.63 -2.39 -127.32 -15.47 
Electric goods – Other equipment goods 78.32 34.64 6.88 3.04 -61.94 -27.40 
Transport equipment 55.14 40.12 28.59 20.80 -32.23 -23.45 
Consumer goods industries – Food 56.52 23.41 46.86 19.41 -39.38 -16.31 
Consumer goods industries – Rest 20.08 10.69 12.13 6.45 -24.40 -12.98 
Textiles and clothing 76.21 13.84 57.86 11.75 -16.72 -4.10 
Construction 241.95 25.32 123.39 12.91 -68.32 -7.15 
Transport 17.84 7.41 5.92 2.46 -33.28 -13.82 
Communication 29.10 24.01 13.37 11.04 -17.14 -14.14 
Services 218.20 10.16 106.74 4.97 -181.35 -8.44 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO.             
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Table 82. Changes in sectoral production in the SEMC in the alternative scenarios QII–QIV (cont’d) 
Egypt  Sectoral production, changes from QI, cumulatively over 2015–30 
  QII  QIII QIV 
  (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) 
Agriculture 20.53 3.23 158.47 24.95 -30.87 -4.86 
Energy 171.47 4.00 -59.09 -1.38 -403.88 -9.42 
Chemical products 47.31 14.82 22.19 6.95 -59.47 -18.63 
Other energy-intensive 104.14 13.69 -0.58 -0.08 -67.94 -8.93 
Electric goods – Other equipment goods 73.25 29.04 4.33 1.72 -53.12 -21.06 
Transport equipment 34.84 18.66 49.60 26.56 -38.09 -20.40 
Consumer goods industries – Food -33.90 -4.22 78.17 9.74 -63.56 -7.92 
Consumer goods industries – Rest 12.63 11.10 0.46 0.40 -11.89 -10.45 
Textiles and clothing 12.64 1.46 -111.21 -12.85 -78.64 -9.09 
Construction 180.14 19.53 134.70 14.60 -87.73 -9.51 
Transport 55.83 7.68 -17.71 -2.44 -122.54 -16.85 
Communication 43.94 11.53 38.04 9.98 -39.88 -10.47 
Services 176.62 5.69 86.85 2.80 -194.04 -6.25 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO.             
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Table 82. Changes in sectoral production in the SEMC in the alternative scenarios QII–QIV (cont’d) 
Israel  Sectoral production, changes from QI, cumulatively over 2015–30 
  QII  QIII QIV 
  (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) 
Agriculture 9.33 4.74 3.50 1.77 -4.42 -2.24 
Energy 7.99 1.71 17.63 3.76 -65.00 -13.87 
Chemical products 9.16 2.75 102.94 30.91 -81.73 -24.53 
Other energy-intensive 6.14 1.63 13.40 3.55 -56.97 -15.11 
Electric goods – Other equipment goods -1.64 -0.22 -27.94 -3.68 -256.12 -33.76 
Transport equipment -1.24 -2.64 -5.12 -10.92 -7.08 -15.10 
Consumer goods industries – Food 8.94 4.02 10.72 4.82 -9.75 -4.39 
Consumer goods industries – Rest 0.29 1.25 -1.05 -4.48 -4.07 -17.41 
Textiles and clothing 36.73 62.54 39.09 66.55 -7.38 -12.60 
Construction 24.43 4.70 17.08 3.29 -95.08 -18.29 
Transport 1.95 0.40 -2.78 -0.57 -58.99 -12.17 
Communication 6.23 2.48 5.94 2.36 -35.28 -14.04 
Services 20.39 0.48 8.48 0.20 -424.81 -9.96 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO.             
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Table 82. Changes in sectoral production in the SEMC in the alternative scenarios QII–QIV (cont’d) 
Jordan  Sectoral production, changes from QI, cumulatively over 2015–30 
  QII  QIII QIV 
  (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) 
Agriculture 13.04 20.86 -8.29 -13.26 -6.77 -10.84 
Energy -12.12 -3.42 26.04 7.36 -44.80 -12.66 
Chemical products -4.99 -9.41 109.66 206.87 -10.92 -20.60 
Other energy-intensive 2.45 5.82 2.04 4.86 -2.61 -6.22 
Electric goods – Other equipment goods 7.79 24.74 -13.68 -43.43 -6.93 -21.99 
Transport equipment -0.06 -2.22 -0.91 -32.73 -0.07 -2.61 
Consumer goods industries – Food 5.06 6.95 -11.25 -15.46 -13.14 -18.04 
Consumer goods industries – Rest 0.60 281.29 0.68 320.07 -0.02 -10.44 
Textiles and clothing 26.04 69.08 -12.05 -31.97 -2.32 -6.16 
Construction 10.96 14.42 10.61 13.96 -10.71 -14.09 
Transport -1.66 -4.75 -7.48 -21.36 -5.66 -16.17 
Communication 3.47 13.23 5.25 20.03 -4.43 -16.89 
Services 31.22 3.66 3.39 0.40 -96.37 -11.31 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO.             
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Table 82. Changes in sectoral production in the SEMC in the alternative scenarios QII–QIV (cont’d) 
Lebanon  Sectoral production, changes from QI, cumulatively over 2015–30 
  QII  QIII QIV 
  (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) 
Agriculture 15.39 10.13 15.07 9.92 -15.84 -10.43 
Energy 6.18 3.64 5.67 3.34 -12.36 -7.27 
Chemical products 4.78 26.99 6.64 37.49 -4.89 -27.61 
Other energy-intensive 13.68 23.75 11.49 19.94 -13.54 -23.51 
Electric goods – Other equipment goods 16.03 42.10 22.14 58.15 -10.70 -28.11 
Transport equipment -0.70 -6.83 -0.49 -4.80 -0.66 -6.44 
Consumer goods industries – Food 1.85 0.87 12.97 6.10 -22.11 -10.40 
Consumer goods industries – Rest 3.15 32.60 2.46 25.53 -3.30 -34.24 
Textiles and clothing 6.93 18.20 0.41 1.07 -11.82 -31.05 
Construction 6.10 45.88 4.11 30.89 -1.33 -10.02 
Transport 2.99 3.80 2.31 2.93 -13.74 -17.48 
Communication 2.44 11.02 1.85 8.36 -1.93 -8.73 
Services 36.33 5.00 23.63 3.25 -65.23 -8.97 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO.             
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Table 82. Changes in sectoral production in the SEMC in the alternative scenarios QII–QIV (cont’d) 
Libya  Sectoral production, changes from QI, cumulatively over 2015–30 
  QII  QIII QIV 
  (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) 
Agriculture 13.94 7.01 9.75 4.90 -22.25 -11.19 
Energy 115.25 2.41 43.15 0.90 -280.17 -5.86 
Chemical products 316.00 104.12 385.67 127.08 -129.20 -42.57 
Other energy-intensive 57.83 26.88 12.92 6.01 -50.89 -23.65 
Electric goods – Other equipment goods 1.21 3.91 -12.66 -41.05 -12.39 -40.16 
Transport equipment 1.93 55.05 1.14 32.46 -2.47 -70.27 
Consumer goods industries – Food 24.49 9.84 4.25 1.71 -40.27 -16.18 
Consumer goods industries – Rest 3.68 11.42 1.20 3.72 -5.89 -18.28 
Textiles and clothing 9.90 17.44 54.40 95.81 -14.12 -24.87 
Construction 76.39 20.14 54.55 14.38 -28.19 -7.43 
Transport 8.76 8.07 -4.16 -3.83 -23.83 -21.95 
Communication 9.44 44.68 7.71 36.47 -1.57 -7.45 
Services 68.78 8.70 32.54 4.12 -74.23 -9.39 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO.             
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Table 82. Changes in sectoral production in the SEMC in the alternative scenarios QII–QIV (cont’d) 
Morocco  Sectoral production, changes from QI, cumulatively over 2015–30 
  QII  QIII QIV 
  (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) 
Agriculture 7.65 1.72 -5.61 -1.26 -29.03 -6.52 
Energy 9.95 3.22 11.89 3.85 -27.52 -8.92 
Chemical products 26.46 7.70 127.64 37.15 -51.71 -15.05 
Other energy-intensive 26.83 5.99 12.07 2.70 -40.38 -9.02 
Electric goods – Other equipment goods 83.13 18.27 3.00 0.66 -107.29 -23.57 
Transport equipment 8.40 7.17 -2.38 -2.03 -17.51 -14.95 
Consumer goods industries – Food 15.24 3.16 4.31 0.89 -51.61 -10.69 
Consumer goods industries – Rest -4.53 -10.69 -2.07 -4.87 -1.53 -3.61 
Textiles and clothing 29.05 7.77 17.90 4.79 -69.97 -18.71 
Construction 75.65 20.71 42.52 11.64 -35.22 -9.64 
Transport 9.11 2.86 1.19 0.37 -22.26 -6.98 
Communication 8.32 19.98 4.05 9.72 -1.88 -4.50 
Services 104.21 5.08 58.31 2.84 -115.77 -5.64 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO.             
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Table 82. Changes in sectoral production in the SEMC in the alternative scenarios QII–QIV (cont’d) 
Syria  Sectoral production, changes from QI, cumulatively over 2015–30 
  QII  QIII QIV 
  (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) 
Agriculture 12.92 3.91 7.61 2.30 -24.23 -7.34 
Energy 29.88 1.52 13.36 0.68 -104.83 -5.33 
Chemical products 3.54 20.19 4.50 25.66 -6.88 -39.22 
Other energy-intensive 7.31 14.11 4.23 8.16 -8.30 -16.01 
Electric goods – Other equipment goods 10.42 18.90 7.18 13.03 -10.15 -18.41 
Transport equipment 5.75 6.14 1.04 1.11 -9.44 -10.08 
Consumer goods industries – Food 18.00 15.81 8.22 7.22 -11.90 -10.45 
Consumer goods industries – Rest 0.30 10.66 0.55 19.72 -0.47 -16.90 
Textiles and clothing 12.30 37.78 12.27 37.69 -13.34 -40.97 
Construction 15.82 11.14 13.99 9.85 -16.32 -11.49 
Transport 1.02 1.16 0.31 0.35 -9.74 -11.03 
Communication 4.91 8.14 4.19 6.95 -6.77 -11.24 
Services 30.29 3.95 22.97 2.99 -74.53 -9.71 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO.             
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Table 82. Changes in sectoral production in the SEMC in the alternative scenarios QII–QIV (cont’d) 
Tunisia  Sectoral production, changes from QI, cumulatively over 2015–30 
  QII  QIII QIV 
  (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) 
Agriculture 2.13 1.09 -13.64 -7.01 -7.01 -3.60 
Energy -2.54 -0.62 -1.83 -0.44 -24.68 -6.00 
Chemical products 11.41 6.56 119.84 68.90 -40.61 -23.35 
Other energy-intensive 3.23 1.82 7.59 4.28 -21.32 -12.01 
Electric goods – Other equipment goods 10.11 5.10 -6.62 -3.34 -67.30 -33.98 
Transport equipment 1.30 2.53 1.78 3.46 -9.71 -18.86 
Consumer goods industries – Food 136.45 92.50 6.06 4.11 -13.28 -9.00 
Consumer goods industries – Rest 1.01 1.99 2.00 3.93 -4.24 -8.34 
Textiles and clothing 36.13 14.40 24.60 9.80 -66.80 -26.62 
Construction 50.66 27.19 27.27 14.64 -19.64 -10.54 
Transport -7.92 -5.46 -7.01 -4.83 -8.05 -5.54 
Communication 4.95 18.24 2.60 9.58 -1.72 -6.34 
Services 68.80 8.04 32.50 3.80 -72.06 -8.43 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MACROECONOMIC SCENARIOS FOR THE EURO-MED AREA QUANTIFIED USING THE GEM-E3 MODEL | 123 
 
Table 82. Changes in sectoral production in the SEMC in the alternative scenarios QII–QIV (cont’d) 
Turkey  Sectoral production, changes from QI, cumulatively over 2015–30 
  QII  QIII QIV 
  (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) 
Agriculture -3.63 -0.22 351.14 21.39 -59.08 -3.60 
Energy -3.53 -0.21 -37.95 -2.27 -188.31 -11.28 
Chemical products 24.98 1.67 -36.86 -2.46 -166.45 -11.13 
Other energy-intensive 215.60 6.48 -179.50 -5.39 -337.52 -10.14 
Electric goods – Other equipment goods 133.99 5.16 -231.15 -8.90 -395.70 -15.24 
Transport equipment 76.45 5.78 -108.61 -8.21 -232.61 -17.59 
Consumer goods industries – Food 52.68 2.08 84.03 3.31 -174.39 -6.87 
Consumer goods industries – Rest 14.85 5.15 -8.39 -2.91 -41.85 -14.52 
Textiles and clothing 32.44 1.65 -172.80 -8.77 -345.28 -17.53 
Construction 413.52 11.57 303.99 8.51 -538.32 -15.06 
Transport 93.55 2.12 14.66 0.33 -507.20 -11.48 
Communication 60.51 10.20 38.60 6.51 -47.92 -8.08 
Services 430.64 2.80 349.74 2.27 -1186.91 -7.72 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO.             
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Table 82. Changes in sectoral production in the SEMC in the alternative scenarios QII–QIV (cont’d) 
Palestine  Sectoral production, changes from QI, cumulatively over 2015–30 
  QII QIII QIV 
  (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) (bn US$) (%) 
Agriculture 3.97 5.97 -1.36 -2.04 4.35 7.18 
Energy 0.27 1.40 -0.55 -2.80 0.28 1.35 
Chemical products 0.00 23.08 0.00 23.08 0.00 -76.92 
Other energy-intensive 0.18 7.20 -0.02 -0.92 -1.31 -56.73 
Electric goods – Other equipment goods 0.25 5.61 0.21 4.79 -2.65 -56.56 
Transport equipment -1.54 -35.36 -2.01 -46.11 -1.93 -45.54 
Consumer goods industries – Food 7.20 25.88 13.44 48.29 -18.00 -71.09 
Consumer goods industries – Rest 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Textiles and clothing -0.55 -25.58 -0.69 -32.20 -1.00 -52.78 
Construction 15.87 21.54 12.92 17.53 7.47 10.40 
Transport 0.56 6.66 0.60 7.16 -3.34 -34.93 
Communication 0.05 8.70 0.03 5.09 0.05 8.00 
Services 15.44 11.43 12.78 9.46 -0.56 -0.34 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO.             
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Table 83. Sectoral employment in scenarios QII–QIV 
Employment, changes from QI (%), cumulatively over 2015–30 
QII 
  Algeria Egypt Israel Jordan Lebanon Libya Morocco Syria Tunisia Turkey Palestine 
Agriculture 1.9 -2.6 4.4 18.0 5.9 -3.6 -2.4 1.1 -9.4 -2.7 4.5 
Energy 0.5 4.0 1.5 -3.4 2.2 2.4 2.9 1.3 2.5 0.9 1.7 
Chemical products 51.0 8.0 2.0 -12.1 20.8 80.9 3.1 16.9 0.8 -1.1 0.0 
Other energy-intensive 8.1 7.6 0.9 2.7 17.4 14.1 1.9 11.0 -3.3 3.6 1.9 
Electric goods – Other equipment goods 26.0 20.2 -0.9 20.5 32.0 -7.5 12.6 15.8 -1.1 1.5 0.7 
Transport equipment 30.3 9.6 -3.1 -5.2 -10.9 35.0 2.0 3.2 -3.8 1.9 -37.8 
Consumer goods industries – Food 14.5 -10.1 3.2 3.2 -5.4 -3.2 -1.6 12.8 78.7 -1.3 20.5 
Consumer goods industries – Rest 2.3 2.6 0.4 266.5 17.2 -5.1 -14.7 7.6 -5.9 0.4 0.0 
Textiles and clothing 1.9 -5.7 60.0 63.8 8.1 -0.9 2.5 33.6 5.4 -2.7 -28.5 
Construction 18.6 12.1 3.9 10.8 37.2 6.9 15.5 8.0 20.5 8.6 20.1 
Transport 1.5 0.9 -0.4 -7.3 -2.5 -4.2 -1.3 -1.0 -10.2 -1.8 0.4 
Communication 16.2 6.1 1.8 10.2 7.0 32.1 15.9 5.7 13.9 7.6 7.4 
Services 3.5 0.9 -0.1 1.7 0.4 -4.9 1.4 1.3 2.3 0.5 4.3 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
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Table 83. Sectoral employment in scenarios QII–QIV (cont’d) 
QIII 
  Algeria Egypt Israel Jordan Lebanon Libya Morocco Syria Tunisia Turkey Palestine 
Agriculture 2.3 22.5 0.8 -17.5 7.8 -3.3 -4.6 -0.6 -11.1 22.6 -2.6 
Energy -2.4 -1.0 3.1 7.5 2.7 1.0 2.7 0.5 2.4 -3.0 -0.7 
Chemical products 13.8 0.4 29.7 190.8 33.6 106.6 33.3 21.8 62.7 -5.5 0.0 
Other energy-intensive -6.1 -5.5 2.9 0.0 16.2 -2.0 0.3 4.7 1.2 -8.1 -5.1 
Electric goods – Other equipment goods -0.4 -5.0 -4.4 -46.5 51.8 -45.0 -2.0 9.5 -6.6 -12.7 1.3 
Transport equipment 15.2 15.7 -11.4 -36.0 -7.2 18.7 -4.7 -2.1 -0.4 -12.2 -47.7 
Consumer goods industries – Food 13.5 2.6 4.1 -20.4 2.9 -7.4 -1.9 3.9 0.2 -1.3 43.9 
Consumer goods industries – Rest 0.6 -7.4 -5.2 293.0 19.1 -7.7 -7.2 15.7 -0.9 -8.8 0.0 
Textiles and clothing 1.9 -19.1 63.8 -35.7 -2.5 69.0 1.7 32.5 4.2 -14.1 -33.9 
Construction 8.9 7.1 2.8 7.4 27.7 4.7 8.9 6.0 11.0 5.1 17.8 
Transport -1.5 -8.7 -1.1 -25.3 -0.1 -11.9 -2.0 -2.2 -7.6 -5.2 1.9 
Communication 7.0 4.6 1.9 15.3 6.4 27.5 7.6 4.2 7.2 3.6 4.5 
Services 1.1 -2.6 -0.2 -0.9 0.6 -4.1 0.7 0.0 0.9 -0.1 4.1 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
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Table 83. Sectoral employment in scenarios QII–QIV (cont’d) 
QIV 
  Algeria Egypt Israel Jordan Lebanon Libya Morocco Syria Tunisia Turkey Palestine 
Agriculture 2.7 3.2 0.6 4.2 -1.1 -3.4 2.6 1.8 5.1 2.7 -2.1 
Energy -0.9 -2.2 -4.8 -3.6 -3.1 -1.1 -0.8 -1.6 -1.8 -0.9 12.7 
Chemical products 5.0 0.9 -9.3 -1.6 -9.0 -19.7 -1.3 -5.5 -7.2 5.0 -44.1 
Other energy-intensive 1.0 0.6 -4.1 6.0 -2.4 -7.5 0.4 1.7 -2.1 1.0 -35.1 
Electric goods – Other equipment goods 2.1 3.0 -15.2 -0.6 -3.1 -4.4 -6.2 0.1 -11.5 2.1 -25.7 
Transport equipment 0.4 -0.2 -8.1 13.5 8.6 -33.6 0.5 -1.7 -1.2 0.4 -19.6 
Consumer goods industries – Food 1.3 1.0 1.3 -0.8 -0.1 -4.1 -0.7 4.8 0.2 1.3 -48.3 
Consumer goods industries – Rest 3.2 1.7 -4.3 -1.1 -10.4 -7.5 4.4 -1.5 -1.0 3.2 -40.0 
Textiles and clothing 2.5 0.6 -0.5 7.8 -7.6 -6.4 -3.9 -19.9 -9.6 2.5 -33.3 
Construction -7.3 -3.9 -12.7 -6.1 -5.3 -4.9 -3.7 -4.1 -4.6 -7.3 3.4 
Transport 0.0 -4.8 -4.2 -2.5 -5.5 -10.7 -1.8 -2.1 -1.0 0.0 -2.9 
Communication -2.0 -2.3 -6.9 -6.6 -3.2 -2.8 -0.5 -2.9 -2.4 -2.0 21.5 
Services -0.9 -1.5 -4.9 -3.9 -3.8 -1.2 -1.0 -2.6 -1.3 -0.9 36.2 
Source: GEM-E3-MEDPRO. 
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